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country which they govern。 As merchants their interest is
directly opposite to that interest。
But if the genius of such a government； even as to what
concerns its direction in Europe； is in this manner essentially
and perhaps incurably faulty； that of its administration in India
is still more so。 That administration is necessarily composed of
a council of merchants； a profession no doubt extremely
respectable； but which in no country in the world carries along
with it that sort of authority which naturally overawes the
people； and without force commands their willing obedience。 Such
a council can command obedience only by the military force with
which they are accompanied； and their government is therefore
necessarily military and despotical。 Their proper business；
however； is that of merchants。 It is to sell； upon their masters'
account； the European goods consigned to them； and to buy in
return Indian goods for the European market。 It is to sell the
one as dear and to buy the other as cheap as possible； and
consequently to exclude as much as possible all rivals from the
particular market where they keep their shop。 The genius of the
administration therefore； so far as concerns the trade of the
company； is the same as that of the direction。 It tends to make
government subservient to the interest of monopoly； and
consequently to stunt the natural growth of some parts at least
of the surplus produce of the country to what is barely
sufficient for answering the demand of the company。
All the members of the administration； besides； trade more
or less upon their own account； and it is in vain to prohibit
them from doing so。 Nothing can be more completely foolish than
to expect that the clerks of a great counting…house at ten
thousand miles distance； and consequently almost quite out of
sight； should； upon a simple order from their masters； give up at
once doing any sort of business upon their own account； abandon
for ever all hopes of making a fortune； of which they have the
means in their hands； and content themselves with the moderate
salaries which those masters allow them； and which； moderate as
they are； can seldom be augmented； being commonly as large as the
real profits of the company trade can afford。 In such
circumstances； to prohibit the servants of the company from
trading upon their own account can have scarce any other effect
than to enable the superior servants； under pretence of executing
their masters' order； to oppress such of the inferior ones as
have had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure。 The
servants naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in
favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the
company。 If they are suffered to act as they could wish； they
will establish this monopoly openly and directly； by fairly
prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in
which they choose to deal； and this； perhaps； is the best and
least oppressive way of establishing it。 But if by an order from
Europe they are prohibited from doing this； they will；
notwithstanding； endeavour to establish a monopoly of the same
kind； secretly and indirectly； in a way that is much more
destructive to the country。 They will employ the whole authority
of government； and pervert the administration of justice； in
order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any
branch of commerce； which by means of agents； either concealed；
or at least not publicly avowed； they may choose to carry on。 But
the private trade of the servants will naturally extend to a much
greater variety of articles than the public trade of the company。
The public trade of the company extends no further than the trade
with Europe； and comprehends a part only of the foreign trade of
the country。 But the private trade of the servants may extend to
all the different branches both of its inland and foreign trade。
The monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the natural
growth of that part of the surplus produce which； in the case of
a free trade； would be exported to Europe。 That of the servants
tends to stunt the natural growth of every part of the produce in
which they choose to deal； of what is destined for home
consumption； as well as of what is destined for exportation； and
consequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole country； and
to reduce the number of its inhabitants。 It tends to reduce the
quantity of every sort of produce； even that of the necessaries
of life； whenever the servants of the company choose to deal in
them； to what those servants can both afford to buy and expect to
sell with such a profit as pleases them。
From the nature of their situation； too； the servants must
be more disposed to support with rigorous severity their own
interest against that of the country which they govern than their
masters can be to support theirs。 The country belongs to their
masters； who cannot avoid having some regard for the interest of
what belongs to them。 But it does not belong to the servants。 The
real interest of their masters； if they were capable of
understanding it； is the same with that of the country； and it is
from ignorance chiefly； and the meanness of mercantile prejudice；
that they ever oppress it。 But the real interest of the servants
is by no means the same with that of the country； and the most
perfect information would not necessarily put an end to their
oppressions。 The regulations accordingly which have been sent out
from Europe； though they have been frequently weak； have upon
most occasions been well…meaning。 More intelligence and perhaps
less good…meaning has sometimes appeared in those established by
the servants in India。 It is a very singular government in which
every member of the administration wishes to get out of the
country； and consequently to have done with the government as
soon as he can； and to whose interest； the day after he has left
it and carried his whole fortune with him； it is perfectly
indifferent though the whole country was swallowed up by an
earthquake。
I mean not； however； by anything which I have here said； to
throw any odious imputation upon the general character of the
servants of the East India Company； and much less upon that of
any particular persons。 It is the system of government； the
situation in which they are placed； that I mean to censure； not
the character of those who have acted in it。 They acted as their
situation naturally directed； and they who have clamoured the
loudest against them would probably not have acted better
themselves。 In war and negotiation； the councils of Madras and
Calcutta have upon several occasions conducted themselves with a
resolution and decisive wisdom which would have done honour to
the senate of Rome in the best days of that republic。 The members
of those councils； however； had been bred to professions very
different from war and polities。 But their situation alone；
without education； experience； or even example； seems to have
formed in them all at once the great qualities which it