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expression of the inner is at the same time an existent objective expression； and hence itself falls to
the level of mere existence； which is absolutely contingent for the self…conscious individual。 It is
therefore no doubt an expression； but at the same time only in the sense of a sign； so that to the
content expressed the peculiar nature of that by which it is expressed is completely indifferent。 The
inner in thus appearing is doubtless an invisible made visible； but without being itself united to this
appearance。 It can just as well make use of some other appearance as another inner can adopt the
same appearance。 Lichtenberg； （2） therefore； is right in saying： 〃Suppose the physiognomist ever
did have a man in his grasp； it would merely require a courageous resolution on the man's part to
make himself again incomprehensible for centuries。〃
In the previous case （3） the immediately given circumstances formed a sphere of existence from
which individuality selected what it could or what it wanted； either submitting to or transmuting this
given existence； for which reason this did not contain the necessity and inner nature of individuality。
Similarly here the immediate being in which individuality clothes its appearance is one which either
expresses the fact of its being reflected back out of reality and existing within itself； or which is for
it merely a sign indifferent to what is signified； and therefore signifying in reality nothing； it is as
much its countenance as its mask； which can be put off when it likes。 Individuality permeates its
own shape； moves； speaks in the shape assumed； but this entire mode of existence equally well
passes over into a state of being indifferent to the will and the act。 Individuality effaces from it the
significance it formerly had — of being that wherein individuality is reflected into itself； or has its
true nature — and instead puts its real nature rather in the will and the deed。
Individuality abandons that condition of being reflected into self which finds expression in lines and
lineaments； and places its real nature in the work done。 Herein it contradicts the relationship which
the instinct of reason； engaged in observing self…conscious individuality； establishes in regard to
what its inner and outer should be。 This point of view brings us to the special idea at the basis of
the science of physiognomy…if we care to call it a 〃science〃。 The opposition this form of
observation comes upon is in form the opposition of practical and theoretical； both falling inside
the practical aspect itself — the opposition of individuality； making itself real in action （in the most
general sense of action）； and individuality as being in this action at the same time reflected thence
into self； and taking the action for its object。 Observation apprehends and accepts this opposition
in the same inverted form in which it is when it makes its appearance。 To observation； the deed
itself and the performance； whether it be that of speech or a more solid reality； stand for the
nonessential outer； while the individuality's existence within itself passes for the essential inner。 Of
the two aspects which the practical mind involves； intention and act （the 〃meaning〃 regarding the
action and the action itself）； observation selects the former as the true inner； this （i。e。 the intention
or true inner） is supposed to have its more or less unessential externalization in the act； while its
true outer expression is to be had in the form in which the individual is embodied。 This latter
expression is a sensuous immediate presence of the individual mind： the inwardness； which is
intended to be the true internal aspect； is the particular point of the intention； and the singleness of
self…existence： both together the mind subjectively 〃meant〃 Thus； what observation takes for its
objects is an existence that is 〃meant〃； and within this sphere it looks for laws。
The primary way of making conjectures （meinen） regarding the 〃presumptive〃 presence of mind is
everyday （natürlich） physiognomy； hasty judgment formed at a glance about the inner nature and
the character of its outer form and shape。 The object of this guesswork thinking （4） is of such a
kind that its very essence involves its being in truth something else than merely sensuous and
immediate。 Certainly what is really present is just this condition of being in sensuous form reflected
out of sense into self； it is the visible as a sensuous presentment of the invisible； which constitutes
the object of observation。 But this very sensuous immediate presence is the mind's reality〃 as that
reality is approved by mere conjecture （Meinung）； and observation from this point of view
occupies itself with its 〃presumed〃 （gemeint） existence； with physiognomy； handwriting； sound of
voice； etc。
Observation relates such and such a sensuous fact to just such a supposed or presumed
（gemeintes） inner。 It is not the murderer； the thief； that is to be known； it is the capacity to be a
murderer； a thief。 The definitely marked abstract attribute is thereby lost in the concrete indefinite
characteristic nature of the particular individual； which now demands more skilful delineations than
the former qualifications supply。 Such skilful delineations no doubt say more than the qualification；
〃murderer〃； 〃thief〃； or 〃good…hearted〃； 〃unspoiled〃； and so on； but are a long way short of their
aim； which is to express the being that is 〃meant〃； the single individuality； as far short as the
delineations of the form and shape； which go further than a 〃flat brow〃； a 〃long nose〃； etc。 For the
individual shape and form； like the individual self…consciousness； is qua something 〃meant〃；
inexpressible。 The 〃science of knowing men〃； （5） which is concerned about the supposed human
being； like the 〃science〃 of physiognomy； which deals with his presumed reality and seeks to raise
to the level of knowledge uncritical assertions of everday （natürlich） physiognomy； （6） is therefore
something with neither foundation nor finality； it cannot manage to say what it 〃means〃 because it
merely 〃means〃； and its content is merely what is 〃presumed〃 or 〃meant〃。
The so…called 〃laws〃； this kind of science sets out to find； are relations holding between these two
presumed or supposed aspects； and hence can amount to no more than an empty 〃fancying〃
（meinen）。 Again since this presumed knowledge； which takes upon itself to deal with the reality of
mind； finds its object to be just the fact that mind is reflected from sense existence back into self；
and that； for mind； a specific bodily expression is an indifferent accident； it is therefore bound to be
aware at once that by the so…called 〃laws〃 discovered it really says nothing at all； but that； strictly
speaking； this is mere chatter； or merely giving out a 〃fancy〃 or 〃opinion〃 （Meinung） of its own —
（an assertion which has this amount of truth that to state one's 〃opinion〃； one's 〃fancy〃； and not to
convey thereby the fact itself； but merely a 〃fancy of one's own〃； are one and the same thing）。 In
content； however； such observations cannot differ in value from these： 〃It always rains at our
annual fair； says