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is as little something that could convey truly the general nature of organic existence； as it is the
expression of those moments of the inner life of the organism。 The essential nature of what is
organic； since this is inherently something universal； lies altogether rather in having its moments
equally universal in concrete reality； i。e。 in having them as permeating processes； and not in giving a
copy of the universal in an isolated thing。
In this manner the idea of a law in the case of organic existence slips altogether from our grasp。
The law wants to grasp and express the opposition as static aspects； and to attach as predicates
of them the characteristic which is really their relation to one another。 The inner； to which falls the
universality appearing in the process； and the outer； to which belong the parts of the static
structure of the organism； were to constitute the corresponding sides of the law； but they lose； in
being kept asunder in this way； their organic significance。 And at the bottom of the idea of law lies
just this； that its two aspects should have a subsistence each on its own account indifferent to the
other； and the relation of the two sides should be shared between them； thus appearing as a
twofold characteristic corresponding to that relation。 But really each aspect of the organism
consists inherently in being simple universality； wherein all determinations are dissolved； and in
being the process of this resolution。
If we quite see the difference between this way of framing laws and previous forms； it will clear up
its nature completely。 Turning back to the process of perceiving and that of understanding
（intelligence）； which reflects itself into itself； and by so doing determines its object； we see that
understanding does not there have before itself in its object the relation of these abstract
determinations； universal and individual； essential and external； on the contrary； it is itself the actual
transition； the relational process； and to itself this transition does not become objective。 Here； on
the other hand； the organic unity； i。e。 just the relation of those opposites； is itself the object； and
this relation is a pure process of transition。 This process in its simplicity is directly universality； and
in that universality opens out into different factors； whose relation it is the purpose of the law to
express； the moments of the process take the form of being universal objects of this mode of
consciousness； and the law runs； 〃the outer is an expression of the inner〃。 Understanding has here
grasped the thought of the law itself； whereas formerly it merely looked for laws in a general way；
and their moments appeared before it in the shape of a definite and specific content； and not in the
form of thoughts of laws。
As regards content； therefore； such laws ought not to have place in this connexion which merely
passively accept and put into the form of universality purely existential distinctions； but such laws
as directly maintain in these distinctions the restless activity of the notion as well； and consequently
possess at the same time necessity in the relation of the two sides。 Yet； precisely because that
object； organic unity； directly combines the endless superseding； or the absolute negation of；
existence with inactive passive existence； and because the moments are essentially pure
transitionthere are thus not to be found any such merely existent aspects as are required for the
law。
To get such aspects； intelligence must take its stand on the other moment of the organic relation；
viz。 on the fact that organic existence is reflected into itself。 But this mode of being is so completely
reflected into self that it has no specific character； no determinateness of its own as against
something else； left over。 The immediate sensuous being is directly one with the determinate quality
as such； and hence inherently expresses a qualitative distinction； e。g。 blue against red； acid against
alkaloid； etc。 But the organic being that has returned into itself is completely indifferent towards an
other； its existence is simple universality； and refuses to offer observation any permanent sense
distinctions； or； what is the same thing； shows its essential characteristic to be merely the changing
flux of whatever determinate qualities there are。 Hence； the way distinction qua actually existing
expresses itself is just this； that it is an indifferent distinction； i。e。 a distinction in the form of
quantity。 In this； however； the notion is extinguished and necessity disappears。 If the content；
however； and filling of this indifferent existence； the flux and interchange of sense determinations
are gathered into the simplicity of an organic determination； then this expresses at the same time
the fact that the content does not have that determinateness （the determinateness of the immediate
property and the qualitative feature falls solely within the aspect of quantity； as we saw above。
Although the objective element； apprehended in the form of a determinate character of organic
existence； has thus the notion inherent in it； and thereby is distinguished from the object offered to
understanding； which in apprehending the content of its laws proceeds in a purely perceptive
manner； yet apprehension in the former case falls back entirely into the principle and manner of
mere percipient understanding； for the reason that the object apprehended is used to constitute
moments of a law。 For by this means what is apprehended receives and keeps the character of a
fixed determinate quality； the form of an immediate property or a passive phenomenon； it is；
further； subsumed under the aspect of quantity； and the nature of the notion is suppressed。
The exchange of a merely perceived object for one reflected into itself； of a mere sense character
for an organic； thus loses once more its value； and does so by the fact that understanding has not
yet cancelled the process of framing laws。
If we compare what we find as regards this exchange in the case of a few examples； we see； it
may be； something that perception takes for an animal with strong muscles characterized as an
animal organism of high irritability〃； or； what perception takes to be a condition of great weakness；
characterized as a 〃condition of high sensibility〃； or； if we prefer it； as an abnormal affection〃； and；
moreover； a raising of it to a 〃higher power…expressions which translate sensuous facts into
Teutonized Latin； instead of into terms of the notion。 That an animal has strong muscles may also
be expressed by understanding in the form that the animal 〃possesses a great muscular
force〃great weakness meaning similarly 〃a slight force〃。 Characterization in terms of irritability
has this advantage over determination by reference to 〃force〃； that the latter expresses
indeterminate； the former determinate reflection into self； for the peculiar force characteristic of
muscles is just irritability； and irritability is also a preferable determination to 〃strong muscles〃； in
that； as in the case of force； reflexion into self is at once implied it； it。 In the same way 〃weakness〃；
or 〃sligh