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leaves this necessity of nature behind and floats above it all by itself。 （4）
If the relation； above alluded to； of organic existence to the elemental conditions of nature does not
express its true being； the notion of Purpose； on the other hand； does contain it。 The observing
attitude does not indeed take the to be the genuine essence of organic existence； this notion seems
to it to fall outside the real nature of the organism； and is then merely that external teleological
relation above mentioned。 Yet looking at how the organic being was previously characterized； the
organic is in point of fact just realized concrete purpose。 For since itself maintains itself in relation
to another； it is just that kind of natural existence in which nature reflects itself into the notion； and
the moments of necessity separated out ＇by Understanding＇…a cause and an effect； an active and a
passive…are here brought together and combined into a single unity。 In this way we have here not
only something appearing as a result of necessity； but； because it has returned to itself； the last or
the result is just as much the first which starts the process； and is to itself the purpose which it
realizes。 What is organic does not produce something； it merely conserves itself； or what is
produced is as much there already as produced。
We must elucidate this principle more fully； both as it is in itself and as it is for the instinct of
reason； in order to see how reason finds itself there； but does not know itself in what it finds。 The
concept of purpose； then； which rational observation has reached； is； while reason has
apprehended it in consciousness； given to reason as something actually real as well； it is not merely
an external relation of the actual； but its inner being。 This actual； which is itself a purpose； is related
purposively to an other； i。e。 its relation is a contingent one with respect to what both are
immediately； prima facie they are both self…subsistent and indifferent to one another。 The real
nature of their relation； however； is something different from what they thus appear to be； and its
effect has another meaning than sense…perception directly finds。 The necessity inherent in the
process is concealed； and comes out at the end； but in such a way that this very end shows it to
have been also the first。 The end； however； shows this priority of itself by the fact that nothing
comes out of the alteration the act produced； but what was there already。 Or； again； if we start
from what is first； this； in coming to the end or the result of its act； merely returns to itself； and； just
by so doing； it demonstrates itself to be that which has itself as its end； that is to say； qua first it
has already returned to itself； or is self…contained； is in and for itself。 What； then； it arrives at by the
process of its action is itself； and its arriving merely at itself means feeling itself； is its self…feeling。
Thus we have here； no doubt； the distinction between what it is and what it seeks； but this is
merely the semblance of a distinction； and consequently it is a notion in its very nature。
This is exactly； however； the way self…consciousness is constituted。 It distinguishes itself in like
manner from itself； without any distinction being thereby established。 Hence it is that it finds in
observation of organic nature nothing else than this kind of reality； it finds itself in the form of a
thing； as a life； and yet； between what it is itself and what it has found； draws a distinction which
is； however； no distinction。 Just as the instinct of an animal is to seek and consume food； but
thereby elicits nothing except itself； similarly too the instinct of reason in its search merely finds
reason itself。 An animal ends with self…feeling。 The instinct of reason； on the other hand； is at the
same time； self…consciousness。 But because it is merely instinct； it is put on one side as against
consciousness； and in the latter finds its opposite。 Its satisfaction is； therefore； broken in two by
this opposite； it finds itself； viz。 the purpose； and also finds this purpose in the shape of a thing。 But
the purpose is seen to lie； in the first instance； apart from the thing presenting itself as a purpose。 In
the second place； this purpose qua purpose is at the same time objective； it is taken to fall； there。
fore； not within the observing consciousness； but within another intelligence。
Looked at more closely； this character lies also just as much in the notion of the thingthat of
being in itself purpose。 It preserves itself； this means at one and the same time it is its nature to
conceal the controlling necessity and to present that necessity in the form of a contingent relation。
For its freedom； its being on its own account； means just that it behaves towards its necessary
condition as something indifferent。 It thus presents itself as if it were something whose notion falls
apart from its existence。 In this way reason is compelled to look on its own proper notion as falling
outside it； to look at it as a thing； as that towards which it is indifferent； and which in consequence
is reciprocally indifferent towards it ＇reason＇ and towards its own notion。 Qua instinct it continues
to remain within this state of being； this condition of indifference； and the thing expressing the
notion remains for it something other than this notion； and the notion other than the thing。 Thus for
reason the thing organized is only per se a purpose in the sense that the necessity； which is
presented as concealed within the action of the thingfor the active agency there takes up the
attitude of being indifferent and independentfalls outside the organism itself。
Since； however； the organic qua purpose per se can not behave in any other way than as organic；
the fact of its being per se a purpose is also apparent and sensibly present； and as such it is
observed。 What is organic shows itself when observed to be something self…preserving； returning
and returned into itself。 But in this state of being； observation does not recognize the concept of
purpose； or does not know that the notion of purpose is not in an intelligence anywhere else； but
just exists here and in the form of a thing。 Observation makes a distinction between the concept of
purpose and self…existence and self…preservation； which is not a distinction at all。 That it is no
distinction is something of which it is not aware； what it is aware of is an activity which appears
contingent and indifferent towards what is brought about by that activity； and towards the unity
which is all the while the principle connecting both； that activity and this purpose are taken to fall
asunder。
On this view the special function of the organic is the inner operating activity lying between its first
and last stage； so far as this activity implies the character of singleness。 So far； however； as the
activity has the character of universality； and the active agent is equated with what is the outcome
of its operation； this purposive activity as such would not belong to organic beings。 That single
activity； which is merely a means； comes； owing to its individual form； to