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University to another expounding the generalizations discovered or made。
It was impossible therefore for any philosopher who attempted to discuss comprehensively
the methods and procedure of observational science to ignore the claims made by these
pseudo…sciences or to refuse to examine the validity of the laws they proposed to
formulate。 This was all the more necessary because the object they dealt with — the
relation of mind to its physical embodiment — was and is unquestionably an important fact
of experience and presents a serious problem to philosophy； especially to idealism。 Hence
we have in the following section an elaborate analysis of the observational 〃sciences〃 of
physiognomy and phrenology — an analysis the length of which can only be explained and
justified by the historical circumstances above indicated。
B。 Realization of rational self…consciousness through itself
Translator's comments： In this section we have the second form in which rational experience
is realized。 In 〃observation〃 mind is directly aware of itself as in conscious unity with its
object： it makes no effort of its own to realize this unity： it finds the unity by looking on；
so to say。 But it may have the same experience by creating through its own effort an
object constituted and determined solely by its self。 Here it does not find the unity of itself
and its object； it makes the object at one with itself by moulding the character and content
of the object after its own nature。 As contrasted with observation； which may be called the
operation of 〃theoretical〃 reason； this new way of having a rational experience may be
called the operation of 〃practical〃 reason。 In the first we have reason in the form of
knowledge and science； in the second； reason in the sense of rational action and practice。
It is this second way of establishing the experience of reason which is analysed in the
following sections。 The immediately succeeding section describes the experience in its
general features。 We have here the sphere of conscious purpose and the foundation of
moral and social life。
a。 Pleasure and Necessity
Translator's comments： The succeeding three sections discuss the procedure of one…sided
subjective individualism — the attempt to realize the individual and yet not transcend the
particular individuality。 The first thought of self…consciousness when it seeks to realize or
objectify itself as a mere individual is to make the objective element return directly to itself
and bring a sense of increase of its own individual being or private Pleasure。 This is all its
interest in the practical realization of its purposes。 But the realization of purposes is an
expression of the life of reason； and reason means universality and systematic connexion
of the content realized。 Hence to seek solely private satisfaction or pleasure by a process
which is inherently universal is a contradiction in terms。 This contradiction the individual
discovers in the shape of a sharp and painful contrast between its private feeling of
individuation on the one hand and a network of universal connexion on the other…the
contrast between 〃pleasure〃 and 〃necessity〃。 Both fall within the individual's experience as
a rational agent； and hence this necessity is his own necessity as much as the pleasure is
his own pleasure。 In the opposition between these factors there is no question as to which
must triumph； and which must surrender。
This is the type of experience analysed in the following section。 It is an experience that
constantly recurs in the life…history of most if not all human beings at one stage or another
in their development。 The analysis contained in this section is indirectly a searching
criticism of Hedonism in all its forms。
b。 The law of the heart； and the frenzy of self…conceit
Translator's comments： The following section is an analysis of the mood of moral
Sentimentalism。 It is a mood of all times and appears in many forms； but about Hegel's
time it became prominent in the Romantic school and was frankly adopted as a practical
attitude by certain of its representatives。 Perhaps one of the most remarkable historic
examples of sentimentalism was Rousseau； to whom so much in the romantic movement
may be traced。 In the literature of Hegel's time； and indeed in all literature； no more
perfect type of sentimentalism can be found than Goethe's Werther。 With such instances as
these in our minds the succeeding analysis requires neither explanation nor comment。
c。 Virtue and the course of the world
C。 Individuality
a。 Self…contained individuals associated as a community of animals
and the deception thence arising： the real fact
Translator's comments： The title of this section sounds unfamiliar； but the purpose of the
analysis is plain； and the argument is essential as a stage in the unfolding of what rational
self…contained individuality implies。 It also； with the immediately succeeding sections；
prepares the way for the constructive interpretation of organized society。 Indeed； without
individuals constituted as rational self…conscious units； each self…contained； a free
self…conscious community could not exist。 They form the component separate cells of the
〃organism〃 of a society； the elements out of which the compact structure of a society is
made。 In the first instance and as an abstract aspect of associated life； they can be
regarded； and for certain purposes are in fact regarded； as merely distinct and detached
units living together。 Each functions as an individuality； endowed with certain powers and
capacities for self…expression； pursuing his ends for his own interest； spontaneously
putting forth his energies without being clearly aware of or concerned with any universal
result which his essentially universal nature must bring about。 In realizing his individuality
he goes out of himself in one sense； in another sense he does not。 By expressing himself
he carries out some 〃end〃 in which he has an 〃interest〃； he〃does〃something： he does a
deed or a 〃work〃； which qua mere action is nothing more than a mode of purposed
self…expression； and is not； as such； either good or bad （at this stage）。 What he does
appears as external to himself； but is his own all the while； something which he has
formed and in which he specifically is interested。 Such a result at once objective； framed by
himself and r