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this history。 The na？ve consciousness； too； for that reason； is of itself always coming to this result；
which is the real truth in this case； and is always having experience of it： but is always forgetting it
again and beginning the process all over。 It is therefore astonishing when； in defiance of this
experience； it is announced as 〃universal experience〃 — nay； even as a philosophical doctrine； the
outcome； in fact； of scepticism — that the reality or being of external things in the sense of 〃Thises〃；
particular sense objects； has absolute validity and truth for consciousness。 One who makes such
an assertion really does not know what he is saying； does not know that he is stating the opposite
of what he wants to say。 The truth for consciousness of a 〃This〃 of sense is said to be universal
experience； but the very opposite is universal experience。 Every consciousness of itself cancels
again； as soon as made； such a truth as e。g。 the Here is a tree； or the Now is noon； and expresses
the very opposite： the Here is not a tree but a house。 And similarly it straightway cancels again the
assertion which here annuls the first； and which is also just such an assertion of a sensuous This。
And in all sense…certainty what we find by experience is in truth merely； as we have seen； that
〃This〃 is a universal； the very opposite of what that assertion maintained to be universal
experience。
We may be permitted here； in this appeal to universal experience； to anticipate（5） with a reference
to the practical sphere。 In this connection we may answer those who thus insist on the truth and
certainty of the reality of objects of sense； by saying that they had better be sent back to the most
elementary school of wisdom； the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus； they have
not yet learnt the inner secret of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine。 For one who is
initiated into these mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of things of sense； but gets into a
state of despair about it altogether； and in dealing with them he partly himself brings about the
nothingness of those things； partly he sees these bring about their own nothingness。 Even animals
are not shut off from this wisdom； but show they are deeply initiated into it。 For they do not stand
stock still before things of sense as if these were things per se； with being in themselves： they
despair of this reality altogether； and in complete assurance of the nothingness of things they fall…to
without more ado and eat them up。 And all nature proclaims； as animals do； these open secrets；
these mysteries revealed to all； which teach what the truth of things of sense is。
Those who put forward such assertions really themselves say； if we bear in mind what we
remarked before； the direct opposite of what they mean： a fact which is perhaps best able to bring
them to reflect on the nature of the certainty of sense…experience。 They speak of the 〃existence〃 of
external objects； which can be more precisely characterized as actual； absolutely particular； wholly
personal； individual things； each of them not like anything or anyone else； this is the existence
which they say has absolute certainty and truty。 They 〃mean〃 this bit of paper I am writing on； or
rather have written on： but they do not say what they 〃mean〃。 If they really wanted to say this bit
of paper which they 〃mean〃； and they wanted to say so； that is impossible； because the This of
sense； which is 〃meant〃； cannot be reached by language； which belongs to consciousness； i。e。 to
what is inherently universal。 In the very attempt to say it； it would； therefore； crumble in their
hands； those who have begun to describe it would not be able to finish doing so： they would have
to hand it over to others； who would themselves in the last resort have to confess to speaking
about a thing that has no being。 They mean； then； doubtless this bit of paper here； which is quite
different from that bit over there； but they speak of actual things； external or sensible objects；
absolutely individual； real； and so on； that is； they say about them what is simply universal。
Consequently what is called unspeakable is nothing else than what is untrue； irrational； something
barely and simply meant。
If nothing is said of a thing except that it is an actual thing； an external object； this only makes it the
most universal of all possible things； and thereby we express its likeness； its identity； with
everything； rather than its difference from everything else。 When I say 〃an individual thing〃； I at
once state it to be really quite a universal； for everything is an individual thing： and in the same way
〃this thing〃 is everything and anything we like。 More precisely； as this bit of paper； each and every
paper is a 〃this bit of paper〃； and I have thus said all the while what is universal。 If I want；
however； to help out speech…which has the divine nature of directly turning the mere 〃meaning〃
right round about； making it into something else； and so not letting it ever come the length of words
at all…by pointing out this bit of paper； then I get the experience of what is； in point of fact； the real
truth of sense…certainty。 I point it out as a Here； which is a Here of other Heres； or is in itself
simply many Heres together； i。e。 is a universal。 I take it up then； as in truth it is； and instead of
knowing something immediate； I 〃take〃 something 〃truly〃； I per…ceive （wahrnehme； per…cipio）。
1。 In addition to the works mentioned on p。 40 （note）； the reader may be referred to the analysis
of Sensation and Perception in Plato's Theaetetus； and to Bradley's Appearance and Reality；
Chaps。 II； V； VIII and XIX。
2。 Ie。 For the purposes of philosophical analysis。
3。 I。e。 the na？ve consciousness here analyzed。
4。 Cf。 Encyclo。 § 250。
5。 Cf。 Analysis of Desire； p。 220 ff。
II。 Perception
Or Things and their Deceptiveness （1）
Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own； for its truth is something universal； whereas
certainty wants to deal with the This。 Perception； on the other hand； takes what exists for it to be a
universal。 Universality being its principle in general； its moments immediately distinguished within it
are also universal； I is a universal； and the object is a universal。 That principle has arisen and
come into being for us who are tracing the course of experience； and our process of apprehending
what perception is； therefore； is no longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension； as is the
case with the apprehension of sense…certainty； it is a logically necessitated process。 With the
origination of the principle； both the moments； which as they appear merely fall apart as
happenings； have at once together come into being： the one； the process of pointing out and
indicating； the other the same process； but as a simple fact…the former the process of perceiving；
the latter the object perceived。 The object is in its essential nature the same as the process； the
latter is the unfolding and distinguishing of the elements involved； the object is these same elements
taken and held together as a single totality。 For us （