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we should assert to be its essence would rather be； not the truth of knowledge； but only our
knowledge of it。 The essence or the criterion would lie in us； and that which was to be compared
with this standard； and on which a decision was to be passed as a result of this comparison； would
not necessarily have to recognize that criterion。
§ 15
But the nature of the object which we are examining surmounts this separation； or semblance of
separation； and presupposition。 Consciousness furnishes its own criterion in itself； and the inquiry
will thereby be a comparison of itself with its own self ； for the distinction； just made； falls inside
itself。 In consciousness there is one element for an other； or； in general； consciousness implicates
the specific character of the moment of knowledge。 At the same time this 〃other〃 is to
consciousness not merely for it； but also outside this relation； or has a being in itself； i。e。 there is
the moment of truth。 Thus in what consciousness inside itself declares to be the essence or truth
we have the standard which itself sets up； and by which we are to measure its knowledge。
§ 16
Suppose we call knowledge the notion； and the essence or truth 〃being〃 or the object； then the
examination consists in seeing whether the notion corresponds with the object。 But if we call the
inner nature of the object； or what it is in itself； the notion； and； on the other side； understand by
object the notion qua object； i。e。 the way the notion is for an other； then the examination consists
in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its own notion。 It is clear； of course； that both of
these processes are the same。 The essential fact； however； to be borne in mind throughout the
whole inquiry is that both these moments； notion and object； 〃being for another〃 and 〃being in
itself〃； themselves fall within that knowledge which we are examining。 Consequently we do not
require to bring standards with us； nor to apply our fancies and thoughts in the inquire； and just by
our leaving these aside we are enabled to treat and discuss the subject as it actually is in itself and
for itself； as it is in its complete reality。
§ 17
But not only in this respect； that notion and object； the criterion and what is to be tested； are ready
to hand in consciousness itself； is any addition of ours superfluous； but we are also spared the
trouble of comparing these two and of making an examination in the strict sense of the term； so
that in this respect； too； since consciousness tests and examines itself； all we are left to do is simply
and solely to look on。 For consciousness is； on the one hand； consciousness of the object； on the
other； consciousness of itself； consciousness of what to it is true； and consciousness of its
knowledge of that truth。 Since both are for the same consciousness； it is itself their comparison； it
is the same consciousness that decides and knows whether its knowledge of the object
corresponds with this object or not。 The object； it is true； appears only to be in such wise for
consciousness as consciousness knows it。 Consciousness does not seem able to get； so to say；
behind it as it is； not for consciousness； but in itself； and consequently seems also unable to test
knowledge by it。 But just because consciousness has； in general； knowledge of an object； there is
already present the distinction that the inherent nature； what the object is in itself； is one thing to
consciousness； while knowledge； or the being of the object for consciousness； is another moment。
Upon this distinction； which is present as a fact； the examination turns。 Should both； when thus
compared； not correspond； consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge； in order to make it
fit the object。 But in the alteration of the knowledge； the object itself also； in point of fact； is
altered； for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object； with change in
the knowledge； the object also becomes different； since it belonged essentially to this knowledge。
Hence consciousness comes to find that what formerly to it was the essence is not what is per se；
or what was per se was only per se for consciousness。 Since； then； in the case of its object
consciousness finds its knowledge not corresponding with this object； the object likewise fails to
hold out； or the standard for examining is altered when that； whose criterion this standard was to
be； does not hold its ground in the course of the examination； and the examination is not only an
examination of knowledge； but also of the criterion used in the process。
§ 18
This dialectic process which consciousness executes on itself…on its knowledge as well as on its
object — in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises； is precisely； what is termed
Experience。 In this connection； there is a moment in the process just mentioned which should be
brought into more decided prominence； and by which a new light is cast on the scientific aspect of
the following exposition。 Consciousness knows something； this something is the essence or is per
se。 This object； however； is also the per se； the inherent reality； for consciousness。 Hence comes
ambiguity of this truth。 Consciousness； as we see； has now two objects： one is the first per se； the
second is the existence for consciousness of this per se。 The last object appears at first sight to
be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself； i。e。 an idea not of an object； but solely of its
knowledge of that first object。 But； as was already indicated； by that very process the first object
is altered； it ceases to be what is per se； and becomes consciously something which is per se only
for consciousness。 Consequently； then； what this real per se is for consciousness is truth： which；
however； means that this is the essential reality； or the object which consciousness has。 This new
object contains the nothingness of the first； the new object is the experience concerning that first
object。
§ 19
In this treatment of the course of experience； there is an element in virtue of which it does not seem
to be in agreement with what is ordinarily understood by experience。 The transition from the first
object and the knowledge of it to the other object； in regard to which we say we have had
experience； was so stated that the knowledge of the first object； the existence for consciousness
of the first ens per se； is itself to be the second object。 But it usually seems that we learn by
experience the untruth of our first notion by appealing to some other object which we may happen
to find casually and externally； so that； in general； what we have is merely the bare and simple
apprehension of what is in and for itself。 On the view above given； however； the new object is
seen to have come about by a transformation or conversion of consciousness itself。 This way of
looking at the matter is our doing； what we contribute； by its means the series of experiences
through which consc