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to come ever nearer and nearer to nothing means to decrease。 Besides； 〃advancing〃 would； in
general； in the same way as 〃decreasing；〃 assume distinctions of quantity in morality： but these are
quite inadmissible in such a sphere。 In morality as the consciousness which takes the ethical end to
be pure duty； we cannot think at all of difference； least of all of the superficial difference of
quantity： there is only one virtue； only one pure duty； only one morality。
Since； then； it is not moral completion that is taken seriously； but rather the middle state； i。e。 as just
explained； the condition of no morality； we thus come by another way back to the content of the
first postulate。 For we cannot perceive how happiness is to be demanded for this moral
consciousness on the ground of its worthiness to be happy。 It is well aware of its not being
complete； and cannot； therefore； in point of fact； demand happiness as a desert； as something of
which it is worthy。 It can ask happiness to be given merely as an act of free grace； i。e。 it can only
ask for happiness as such and as a substantive element by itself； it cannot expect it except as the
result of chance and caprice； not because there is any absolute reason of the above sort。 The
condition of non…morality herein expresses just what it isthat it is concerned； not about morality；
but about happiness alone； without reference to morality。
By this second aspect of the moral point of view； the assertion of the first aspect； wherein
disharmony between morality and happiness is presupposed； is also cancelled。 One may pretend
to have found by experience that in the actual present the man who is moral often fares badly；
while the man who is not； often comes off happily。 Yet the middle state of incomplete morality； the
condition which has proved to be the essential one； shows clearly that this perception that morality
fares badly； this supposed experience of it； is merely a dissemblance of the real facts of the case。
For； since morality is not completed； i。e。 since morality in point of fact is not； what can there be in
the 〃experience〃 that morality fares badly？
Since； at the same time； it has turned out that the point at issue concerns happiness alone； it is
manifest that； in making the criticism； 〃the man without morality comes off well；〃 there was no
intention to convey thereby that there is something wrong in such a case。。 The designation of an
individual as one devoid of morality necessarily falls to the ground； when morality in general is
incomplete； such a characterization rests； indeed； on pure caprice。 Hence the sense and content of
that judgment of experience is simply this； that happiness as such should not have fallen to some
who have got it； i。e。 the judgment is an expression of envy； which covers itself up in the cloak of
morality。 The reason； however； why we think good luck； as we call it； should fall to the lot of
others is good friendship； which ungrudgingly grants and wishes them； and wishes itself too； this
favour； this accident of good fortune。
（2） The Resolution of Morality into its Opposite
Morality； then； in the moral consciousness； is not completed。 This is what is now established。 But
its essence consists in being only what is complete； and so pure morality： incomplete morality is；
therefore； impure in other words； is Immorality。 Morality itself thus exists in another being than the
actual concrete consciousness。 This other is a holy moral legislator。
Morality which is not completed in consciousness the morality which is the reason for making
those postulates； means； in the first instance； that morality； when it is set up as actual in
consciousness； stands in relation to something else； to an existence； and thus itself acquires
otherness or distinction； whence arises a manifold plurality of moral commands。 The moral
self…consciousness at the same time； however； looks on these many duties as unessential； for it is
concerned with merely the one pure duty； and this plurality of duties； so far as they are determinate
duties； has no true reality for self…consciousness。 They can thus have their real truth only in another
consciousness； and are （what they are not for the actual moral self…consciousness） sacred through
a holy law…giver。
But this； too； is again merely a dissembling of the actual fact。 For moral self…consciousness is to
itself the absolute； and duty is simply and solely what it knows to be duty。 It； however； knows only
pure duty as duty： what is not sacred in its view is not per se sacred at all； and what is not per se；
sacred cannot be rendered so by the being that is sacred。 Moral consciousness； further； is not
really serious in allowing something to be made sacred by another consciousness than its own。
For； only that is without qualification sacred in its eyes which is made sacred through its own
action； and is sacred within it。 It is thus just as little in earnest in treating this other being as a holy
being； for this would mean that； within that holy being something was to attain an essential
significance； which； for the moral consciousness； i。e。 in itself； has none。
If the sacred being was postulated； in order that duty might have binding validity within the moral
consciousness； not qua pure duty； but as a plurality of specific duties； then this must again be
dissembled and this other being must be solely sacred in so far as only pure duty has binding
validity within it。 Pure duty has also； in point of fact； binding validity only in another being； not in
the moral consciousness。 Although； within the latter； pure morality seems alone to hold good； still
this must be put in another form； for it is； at the same time； a natural consciousness。 Morality is； in
it； affected and conditioned by sensibility； and thus is not something substantial； but a contingent
result of free will； in it； however； qua pure will； morality is a contingency of knowledge。 Taken by
itself； therefore； morality is in another being； is self…complete only in another reality than the actual
moral consciousness。
This other being； then； is here absolutely complete morality； because in it morality does not stand
in relation to nature and sensibility。 Yet the reality of pure duty is its actualization in nature and
sensibility。 The moral consciousness accounts for its incompleteness by the fact that morality； in its
case； has a positive relation to nature and sensibility； since it holds that an essential moment of
morality is that morality should have simply and solely a negative relation towards nature and
sensibility。 The pure moral being； on the other hand； because far above the struggle with nature
and sense； does not stand in a negative relation to them。 Thus； in point of fact； the positive relation
to them alone remains in its case； i。e。 there remains just what a moment ago passed for the
incomplete； for what was not moral。 Pure morality； however； entirely cut off from actual reality so
as likewise to be even without positive relation to reality； would be an unconscious unreal
abstraction； where the very notion of morality； which consists in thinking of pure duty and in willing
and do