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is not something contingent and restricted； its essential nature lies in pure duty。 This pure duty
constitutes the sole entire purpose； and the act； whatever may be the limitation of the content；
being the actualization of that purpose； is the accomplishment of the entire absolute purpose。 Or； if
again we take the reality in the sense of nature； which has laws of its own and stands over against
pure duty； and take it in such a way that duty cannot realize its law within nature； then； since duty
as such is the essential element； we are； when acting； not in fact concerned about the
accomplishment of pure duty which is the whole purpose； for the accomplishment would then
rather have as its end not pure duty； but the opposite； viz。 reality。 But there is again a 〃shifting〃
from the position that it is not reality with which we have to do。 For by the very notion of moral
action； pure duty is essentially an active consciousness。 Action thus ought certainly to take place；
absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of nature； and 〃moral law〃 to become 〃natural
law〃。
If； then； we allow this highest good to stand for the essentially real； consciousness is altogether not
in earnest with morality。 For； in this highest good； nature has not a different law from what morality
has。 Moral action itself； in consequence； drops； for action takes place only under the assumption
of a negative element which is to be cancelled by means of the act。 But if nature conforms to the
moral law； then assuredly this moral law would be violated by acting； by cancelling what already
exists。
On that mode of interpretation； then； there has been admitted as the essential situation one which
renders moral action superfluous and in which moral action does not take place at all。 Hence the
postulate of the harmony between morality and realitya harmony posited by the very notion of
moral action； which means bringing the two into agreementfinds on this view； too； an expression
which takes the form：〃because moral action is the absolute purpose； the absolute purpose
isthat moral action do not take place at all〃。
If we put these moments together； through which consciousness has moved in presenting its ideas
of its moral life； we see that it cancels each one again in its opposite。 It starts from the position
that； for it； morality and reality do not make a harmony； but it is not in earnest with that； for in the
moral act it is conscious of the presence of this harmony。 But neither is it in earnest with this
action； since the action is something individual； for it has such a high purpose； the highest good。
This； however； is once more merely a dissemblance of the actual fact； for thereby all action and all
morality would fall to the ground。 In other words； it is not strictly in earnest with moral action； on
the contrary； it really feels that； what is most to be wished for； the absolutely desirable； is that the
highest good were carried out and moral action superfluous。
From this result consciousness must go on still further in its contradictory process； and must of
necessity again dissemble the abolition of moral action。 Morality is the inherently essential
（Ansich）； in order that it may have place； the final end of the world cannot be carried out； rather；
the moral consciousness must exist for itself； and must find lying before it a nature opposing it。 But
it must per se； be completed。 This leads to the second postulate of the harmony of itself and
sensibility； the 〃nature〃 immediately within it。 Moral self…consciousness sets up its purpose as pure
purpose； as independent of inclinations and impulses； so that this bare purpose has abolished
within itself the ends of sensibility。 But this cancelling of the element of sense is no sooner set up
than it is again dissembled。 The moral consciousness acts； it brings its purpose into reality； and
self…conscious sensibility； which should be done away with； is precisely the mediating element
between pure consciousness and realityis the instrument used by the former for the realization of
itself； or is the organ； and what is called impulse； inclinations。 It is thus not really in earnest in
cancelling inclinations and impulses； for these are just self…consciousness making itself actual。
Moreover； they ought not to be suppressed； but merely to be in conformity with reason。 They are；
too； in conformity with it； for moral action is nothing else than self…realizing
consciousnessconsciousness taking on the form of an impulse； i。e。 it is immediately the realized
actually present harmony of impulse and morality。 But； in point of fact； impulse is not only this
empty conscious form； which might possibly have within itself a spring of action other than the
impulse in question； and be driven on by that。 For sensibility is a kind of nature； which contains
within itself its own laws and springs of action： consequently； morality cannot seriously mean to be
the inciting motive （Triebfeder） for impulses （Triebe）； the angle of inclination for inclinations。 For；
since these latter have their own fixed character and peculiar content； the consciousness； to which
they were to conform； would rather be in conformity with thema conformity which moral
self…consciousness declines to adopt。 The harmony between the two is thus merely implicit and
postulated。
In moral action the realized or present harmony of morality and sensibility was set up just now；
and is now again 〃displaced〃。 The harmony is in a misty distance beyond consciousness； where
nothing can any more be accurately distinguished or grasped； for； to grasp this unity； which we
have just tried to do； has proved impossible。
In this merely immanent or implicit harmony； however； consciousness gives up itself altogether。
This immanent state is its moral completion； where the struggle of morality and sensibility has
ceased； and the latter is in conformity to the former in a way which cannot be made out。 On that
account this completion is again merely a dissemblance of the actual case； for in point of fact
morality would be really giving up itself in that completion； because it is only consciousness of the
absolute purpose qua pure purpose； i。e。 in opposition to all other purposes。 Morality is both the
activity of this pure purpose； and at the same time the consciousness of rising above sensibility； of
being mixed up with sensibility and of opposing and struggling with it。 That this moral completion is
not taken seriously is directly expressed by consciousness itself in the fact that it shifts this
completion away into infinity； i。e。 asserts that the completion is never completed。
Thus it is really only the middle state of being incomplete that is admitted to have any value： a state
nevertheless which at least is supposed to be one of progress towards completion。 Yet it cannot
be so； for advancing in morality would really mean approaching its disappearance。 For the goal
would be the nothingness above mentioned； the abolition of morality and consciousness itself： but
to come ever nearer and nearer to nothing means to decrease。 Besides； 〃advancing〃 would； in
general； in the same way as 〃decreasing；〃 assume distinctions o