liberty-第4章

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s　though　it　seeme　hard；　yet　we　must　yeeld　to；　since　it　is　so　clearly　declar'd　by　holy　writ）　but　also　wicked　by　nature　（which　cannot　be　granted　without　impiety）。　But　this；　that　men　are　evill　by　nature；　followes　not　from　this　principle；　for　though　the　wicked　were　fewer　then　the　righteous；　yet　because　we　cannot　distinguish　them；　there　is　a　necessity　of　suspecting；　heeding；　anticipating；　subjugating；　selfe…defending；　ever　incident　to　the　most　honest；　and　fairest　condition'd；　much　lesse　do's　it　follow　that　those　who　are　wicked　are　so　by　nature；　for　though　from　nature；　that　is　from　their　first　birth；　as　they　are　meerly　sensible　Creatures；　they　have　this　disposition；　that　immediately　as　much　as　in　them　lies；　they　desire　and　doe　whatsoever　is　best　pleasing　to　them；　that　either　through　feare　they　fly　from；　or　through　hardnesse　repell　those　dangers　which　approach　them；　yet　are　they　not　for　this　reason　to　be　accounted　wicked；　for　the　affections　of　the　minde　which　arise　onely　from　the　lower　parts　of　the　soule　are　not　wicked　themselves；　but　the　actions　thence　proceeding　may　be　so　sometimes；　as　when　they　are　either　offensive；　or　against　duty。　Unlesse　you　give　Children　all　they　aske　for；　they　are　peevish；　and　cry；　I　and　strike　their　parents　sometimes；　and　all　this　they　have　from　nature；　yet　are　they　free　from　guilt；　neither　may　we　properly　call　them　wicked；　first；　because　they　cannot　hurt；　next；　because　wanting　the　free　use　of　reason　they　are　exempted　from　all　duty；　these　when　they　come　to　riper　yeares　having　acquired　power　whereby　they　may　doe　hurt；　if　they　shall　continue　to　doe　the　same　things；　then　truly　they　both　begin　to　be；　and　are　properly　accounted　wicked；　In　so　much　as　a　wicked　man　is　almost　the　same　thing　with　a　childe　growne　strong　and　sturdy；　or　a　man　of　a　childish　disposition；　and　malice　the　same　with　a　defect　of　reason　in　that　age；　when　nature　ought　to　be　better　governed　through　good　education　and　experience。　Unlesse　therefore　we　will　say　that　men　are　naturally　evill；　because　they　receive　not　their　education　and　use　of　reason　from　nature；　we　must　needs　acknowledge　that　men　may　derive　desire；　feare；　anger；　and　other　passions　from　nature；　and　yet　not　impute　the　evill　effects　of　those　unto　nature。　The　foundation　therefore　which　I　have　laid　standing　firme；　I　demonstrate　in　the　first　place；　that　the　state　of　men　without　civill　society　（which　state　we　may　properly　call　the　state　of　nature）　is　nothing　else　but　a　meere　warre　of　all　against　all；　and　in　that　warre　all　men　have　equall　right　unto　all　things；　Next；　that　all　men　as　soone　as　they　arrive　to　understanding　of　this　hatefull　condition；　doe　desire　（even　nature　it　selfe　compelling　them）　to　be　freed　from　this　misery。　But　that　this　cannot　be　done　except　by　compact；　they　all　quitt　that　right　which　they　have　unto　all　things。　Furthermore　I　declare；　and　confirme　what　the　nature　of　compacts　is；　how　and　by　what　meanes　the　right　of　one　might　be　transfer'd　unto　another　to　make　their　compacts　valid；　also　what　rights；　and　to　whom　they　must　necessarily　be　granted　for　the　establishing　of　peace；　I　meane　what　those　dictates　of　reason　are；　which　may　properly　be　term'd　the　Lawes　of　nature；　and　all　these　are　contain'd　in　that　part　of　this　booke　which　I　entitle　Liberty。　　　　　These　grounds　thus　layd；　I　shew　farther　what　civill　government；　and　the　supreme　power　in　it；　and　the　divers　kinds　of　it　are；　by　what　meanes　it　becomes　so；　&　what　rights　particular　men；　who　intend　to　constitute　this　civill　government；　must　so　necessarily　transfer　from　themselves　on　the　supreme　power；　whether　it　be　one　man；　or　an　assembly　of　men；　that　except　they　doe　so　it　will　evidently　appeare　to　be　no　civill　government；　but　the　rights　which　all　men　have　to　all　things；　that　is　the　rights　of　tarre　will　still　remaine。　Next；　I　distinguish　the　divers　kindes　of　it；　to　wit；　Monarchie；　Aristocratie；　Democratie；　and　paternall　Dominion；　and　that　of　Masters　over　their　Servants；　I　declare　how　they　are　constituted；　and　I　compare　their　severall　conveniences　and　inconveniences　each　with。　other。　furthermore；　I　unfold　what　those　things　are　which　destroy　it；　and　what　his　or　their　duty　is　who　rule　in　chiefe。　Last　of　all；　I　explicate　the　natures　of　the　Law；　and　of　sinne；　and　I　distinguish　Law　from　Counsell；　from　compact；　from　that　which　I　call　Right；　all　which　I　comprehend　under　the　title　of　Dominion。　　　　　In　the　last　part　of　it　which　is　entituled　Religion；　lest　that　right　which　by　strong　reason　I　had　confirm'd　the　Soveraigne　powers　in　the　preceding　discourse　have　over　their　Subjects；　might　seem　to　be　repugnant　to　the　sacred　Scriptures；　I　shew　in　the　first　place　how　it　repugns　not　the　Divine　right；　for　as　much　as　God　overrules　all　rulers　by　nature；　（i。e。）　by　the　Dictates　of　naturall　reason。　In　the　second；　for　as　much　as　God　himselfe　had　a　peculiar　dominion　over　the　Jewes　by　vertue　of　that　antient　Covenant　of　Circumcision。　In　the　third；　because　God　doth　now　rule　over　us　Christians　by　vertue　of　our　Covenant　of　Baptisme；　and　therefore　the　authority　of　Rulers　in　chiefe；　or　of　civill　government；　is　not　at　all；　we　see；　contrary　to　Religion。　　　　　In　the　last　place　I　declare　what　duties　are　necessarily　requir'd　from　us；　to　enter　into　the　Kingdome　of　Heaven；　and　of　those　I　plainly　demonstrate；　and　conclude　out　of　evident　testimonies　of　holy　writ；　according　to　the　interpretation　made　by　all；　that　the　obedience　which　I　have　affirm'd　to　be　due　from　particular　Christian　Subjects　unto　their　Christian　princes　cannot　possibly　in　the　least　sort　be　repugnant　unto　Christian　Religion。　You　have　seene　my　Method；　receive　now　the　reason　which　mov'd　me　to　write　this；　I　was　studying　philosophie　for　my　minde　sake；　and　I　had　gathered　together　its　first　Elements　in　all　kinds；　and　having　digested　them　into　three　Sections　by　degrees；　I　thought　to　have　written　them　so　as　in　the　first　I　would　have　treated　of　a　body；　and　its　generall　properties；　in　the　second　of　man　and　his　speciall　faculties；　and　affections；　in　the　third；　of　civill　government　and　the　duties　of　Subjects：　therefore　the　first　Section　would　have　contained　the　first　philosophie；　and　certaine　elements　of　physick；　in　it　we　would　have　considered　the　reasons　of　Time；　Place；　Cause；　Power；　Relation；　Proportion；　Quantity；　Figure；　and　motion。　In　the　second　we　would　have　beene　conversant　about　imagination；　Memory；　intellect；　ratiocination；　appetite；　till；　good　and　Evill；　honest　and　dishonest；　and　the　like。　what　this　last　Section　handles；　I　have　now　already　shewed　you。　Whilest　I　contrive；　order；　pensively　and　slowly　compose　these　matters；　for　I　onely　doe　reason；　I　dispute　not；　it　so　happen'd　in　the　interim；　that　my　Country　some　few　yeares　before　the　civill　tarres　did　rage；　was　boyling　hot　with　questions　concerning　the　rights　of　Dominion；　and　the　obedience　due　from　Subjects；　the　true　forerunners　of　an　approaching　tar。　And　was　the　cause　which　（all　those　other　matters　deferr'd）　ripen'd；　and　pluckt　from　me　this　third　part。　Therefore　it　happens　that　what　was　last　in　order；　is　yet　come　forth　first　in　time；　and　the　rather；　because　I　saw　that　grounded　on　its　owne　principles　sufficiently　knowne　by　experience　it　would　not　stand　in　need　of　the　former　Sections。　I　have　not　yet　made　it　out　of　a　desire　of　praise　（although　if　I　had；　I　might　have　defende