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volumes。
Berkeley advocated an idealism which came very near to that of Malebranche。 As against the
metaphysic of the understanding； we have the point of view that all existence and its determinations
arise from feeling； and are constituted by self…consciousness。 Berkeley's first and fundamental
thought is consequently this： “The Being of whatever is called by us a thing consists alone in its
being perceived；” i。e。； our determinations are the objects of our knowledge。 “All objects of
human knowledge are ideas” （so called by Berkeley as by Locke）； “which arise either from the
impressions of the outward senses； or from perceptions of the inward states and activities of the
mind； or finally； they are such as are constituted by means of memory and imagination through their
separation and rearrangement。 A union of different sensuous feelings appears to us to be a
particular thing； e。g。； the feeling of colour； taste； smell； figure； &c。； for by colours； smells； sounds；
something of which we have a sensation is always understood。”（2） This is the matter and the
object of knowledge； the knower is the percipient “I；” which reveals itself in relation to those
feelings in various activities； such as imagination； remembrance； and will。
Berkeley thus indeed acknowledges the distinction between Being…for…self and Other…Being；
which in his case； however； itself falls within the “I。” Of the matter on which activity is directed； it
is no doubt in regard to one portion allowed that it does not exist outside of mind — that is to say；
so far as our thoughts； inward feelings and states； or the operations of our imaginary powers are
concerned。 But in like manner the manifold sensuous conceptions and feelings can only exist in a
mind。 Locke certainly distinguished extension and movement； for example； as fundamental
qualities； i。e。； as qualities which pertain to the objects in themselves。 But Berkeley very pertinently
points out inconsistency here from the point of view that great and small； quick and slow； hold
good as something relative； thus were extension and movement to be inherent or implicit； they
could not be either large or small； quick or slow； that is； they could not be； for these
determinations rest in the conception（3） of such qualities。 In Berkeley the relation of things to
consciousness is alone dealt with； and beyond this relationship they do not in his view come。 From
this it follows that it is only self…consciousness that possesses them； for a perception which is not in
a conceiving mind is nothing： it is a direct contradiction。 There can be no substance； he says； which
neither conceives nor perceives； and which is yet the substratum of perceptions and conceptions。
If it is represented that there is something outside of consciousness which is similar to the
conceptions； this is likewise contradictory； a conception can alone be similar to a conception； the
idea to the idea alone。（4）
Thus； while Locke's ultimate point is abstract substance； Being generally with the real
determination of a substratum of accidents； Berkeley declares this substance to be the most
incomprehensible assumption of all； but the incomprehensibility does not make this Being into an
absolute nullity； nor does it make it in itself incomprehensible。（5） For Berkeley brings forward
against the present existence of external objects only the inconceivability of the relation of a Being
to mind。 This inconceivability； however； is destroyed in the Notion； for the Notion is the negative
of things； and this moved Berkeley and Leibnitz to shut up the two sides in themselves。 There
nevertheless remains a relationship of what is “other” to us； these feelings do not develop from us
as Leibnitz represents； but are determined through somewhat else。 When Leibnitz speaks of
development within the monads； it is nothing but empty talk； for the monads as they follow in
succession have no inward connection。 Each individual is thus determined through another； and not
through us； and it does not matter what this external is； since it remains a contingent。 Now in
relation to the two sides of Leibnitz which are indifferent to one another； Berkeley says that such
an “other” is quite superfluous。 Berkeley calls the other the objects； but these； he says； cannot be
what we call matter； for spirit and matter cannot come together。（6） But the necessity of
conceptions directly contradicts this Being…within…self of the conceiver； for the Being…within…self is
the freedom of the conceiver； the latter does not； however； produce the conceptions with
freedom； they have for him the form and determinateness of an independent “other。” Berkeley
likewise does not accept idealism in the subjective sense； but only in respect that there are spirits
which impart themselves （in the other case the subject forms his own conceptions）； and
consequently； that it is God alone who brings to pass such conceptions； thus the imaginations or
conceptions which are produced by us with our individual activity remain separate from these
others；（7） i。e。 from the implicit。
This conception gives an instance of the difficulties which appear in regard to these questions； and
which Berkeley wished to escape from in a quite original way。 The inconsistency in this system
God has again to make good； He has to bear it all away； to Him the solution of the contradiction is
left。 In this idealism； in short； the common sensuous view of the universe and the separation of
actuality； as also the system of thought； of judgments devoid of Notion； remain exactly as before；
plainly nothing in the content is altered but the abstract form that all things are perceptions only。（8）
Such idealism deals with the opposition between consciousness and its object merely； and leaves
the extension of the conceptions and the antagonisms of the empirical and manifold content quite
untouched； and if we ask what then is the truth of these perceptions and conceptions； as we asked
formerly of things； no answer is forthcoming。 It is pretty much a matter of indifference whether we
believe in things or in perceptions； if self…consciousness remains possessed entirely by finalities； it
receives the content in the ordinary way； and that content is of the ordinary kind。 In its individuality
it stumbles about amid the conceptions of an entirely empirical existence； without knowing and
understanding anything else about the content： that is to say in this formal idealism reason has no
content of its own。
As to what Berkeley further states in respect of the empirical content； where the object of his
investigation becomes entirely psychological； it relates in the main to finding out the difference
between the sensations of sight and feeling； and to discovering which kind of sensations belong to
the one and which to the other。 This kind of investigation keeps entirely to the phenomenal； and
only therein distinguishes the various sorts of phenomena； or comprehension only reaches as far as
to distinctions。 The only point of interest is that these investigations have in their course chiefly
lighted on space； and a dispute is carried on as to whether we obtain the conception of distance