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c。 As regards the turning of the soul to God； Malebranche says what Spinoza said from his ethical
point of view： “It is impossible that God should have an end other than Himself （the Holy
Scriptures place this beyond doubt）；” the will of God can only have the good； what is without
doubt universal as its end。 “Hence not only is it essential that our natural love； i。e。； the emotion
which he brings forth in our spirit； should strive after Him〃 — 〃the will is really love towards God〃
— 〃but it is likewise impossible that the knowledge and the light He gives to our spirit should make
anything else known than what is in Him；” for thought only exists in unity with God。 “If God were
to make a spirit and give it the sun as an idea or as the immediate object of its knowledge； God
would have made this spirit and the idea of this spirit for the sun and not for Himself。” All natural
love； and still more knowledge； and the desire after truth； have God as their end。” All motions of
the will as regards the creatures are only determinations of motion as regards the creator。”
Malebranche quotes from Augustine “that we see God even from the time we first enter upon this
life （dès cette vie）； through the knowledge that we have of eternal truths。 The truth is uncreated；
unchangeable； immeasurable； eternal above all things； it is true through itself； and has its perfection
from no thing。 It makes the creator more perfect； and all spirits naturally seek to know it： now
there is nothing that has these perfections but God； and thus the truth is God。 We perceive these
unchangeable and eternal truths； hence we see God。” “God indeed sees but He does not feel
sensuous things。 If we see something sensuous； sensation and pure thought are to be found in our
consciousness。 Sensation is a modification of our spirit； God occasions this because He knows
that our soul is capable of it。 The Idea which is bound up with the sensation is in God； we see it；
etc。 This relation； this union of our mind and spirit with the Word （Verbe） of God； and of our will
with His love； is that we are formed after the image of God and in His likeness。〃（4） Thus the love
of God consists in relating one’ s affections to the Idea of God； whoever knows himself and
thinks his affections clearly； loves God。 We further find sundry empty litanies concerning God； a
catechism for children of eight years of age respecting goodness； justice； omnipresence； the moral
order of the world； in all their lifetime theologians do not get any further。
We have given the principal of Malebranche’ s ideas； the remainder of his philosophy is
composed partly of formal logic； and partly of empirical psychology。 He passes to the treatment of
errors； how they arise； how the senses； the imagination； the understanding； deceive us； and how
we must conduct ourselves in order to effect a remedy。 Then Malebranche goes on （T。 III。 L。 VI。
P。 I。 chap。 i。 pp。 1…3） to the rules and laws for recognizing the truth。 Thus here the term
Philosophy was even applied to the manner in which reflections on particular objects are drawn
from formal logic and external facts。
1。 Buhle： Gesch。 d。 neuern Philosophie； Vol。 III。 Sec。 2； pp。 430； 431。
2。 Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité （Paris； 1736）； T。 II。 L。 III。 Part I。 chap。 i。 pp。 4…6；
T。 I。 L。 I。 chap。 i。 pp。 6； 7； P。 II chap。 ii。 pp。 66…68； chap。 iii。 p。 72； chap。 iv。 p。 84； chap。 v。 p。
92； chap。 vi。 pp。 95； 96。
3。 Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité； T。 II。 L。 III。 Part II。 chap。 vi。 pp。 100…102。
4。 Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité； T。 II。 L。 III。 P。 II。 chap。 vi。 pp。 103…107；
109…111。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter I。 — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
B 1。 LOCKE。
When experience means that the Notion has objective actuality for consciousness； it is indeed a
necessary element in the totality； but as this reflection appears in Locke； signifying as it does that
we obtain truth by abstraction from experience and sensuous perception； it is utterly false； since；
instead of being a moment； it is made the essence of the truth。 It is no doubt true that against the
hypothesis of the inward immediacy of the Idea； and against the method of setting it forth in
definitions and axioms； as also against absolute substance； the demand that ideas should be
represented as results； and the claims of individuality and self…consciousness； assert their rights to
recognition。 In the philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz； however； these necessities make themselves
known in an imperfect manner only； the one fact which is common to both philosophers is that
they； in opposition to Spinoza and Malebranche； take for their principle the particular； finite
determinateness and the individual。 According to Spinoza and Malebranche substance or the
universal is the true； the sole existent； the eternal； that which is in and for itself； without origin； and
of which particular things are only modifications which are conceived through substance。 But
hereby Spinoza has done an injury to this negative； he hence arrived at no immanent determination；
for all that is determined and individual is merely annihilated in his system。 Now； on the contrary；
the general inclination of consciousness is to maintain the difference； partly in order to； mark itself
out as implicitly free in opposition to its object … Being； nature； and God； and partly in order to
recognize the unity in this opposition； and from the opposition itself to make the unity emerge。 But
those who were the instruments of this tendency comprehended themselves but little； they had still
no clear consciousness of their task； nor of the manner in which their claims could be satisfied。
With Locke； this principle makes its first entrance into Philosophy in a manner so completely at
variance with the inflexible undifferentiated identity of the substance of Spinoza； that the sensuous
and limited； the immediate present and existent； is the main and fundamental matter。 Locke does
not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness； viz。 that objects outside of us are the
real and the true。 The finite is thus not grasped by Locke as absolute negativity； i。e。； in its
infinitude； this we shall not find until we come to deal in the third place with Leibnitz。 It is in a
higher sense that Leibnitz asserts individuality； the differentiated； to be self…existent and indeed
objectless； to be true Being。 That is to say； it is not according to him finite； but is yet distinguished；
thus； each monad is itself the totality。 Leibnitz and Locke hence likewise stand in a position of
mutual independence and antagonism。
John Locke was born in 1632； at Wrington； in England。 He studied for himself the Cartesian
philosophy at Oxford； setting aside the scholastic philosophy which was still in vogue。 He devoted
himself to the study of medicine； which； however； on account of his delicate health； he never really
practised。 In 1664 he went with an English ambassador for a year to Berlin。 After his return to
England； he became acquainted with the intellectual Earl of Shaftesbury of tha