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come forth into infinity in our consciousness； it pledges itself to deduce from the determining
faculties of the ego； and it must actually be able to deduce these； so certainly as it is a theory of
knowledge。 This knowledge； however； is not transcendent but transcendental。 It undoubtedly
explains all consciousness from something independent of all consciousness； but it does not forget
that this independent somewhat is again a product of its own power of thought； and consequently
something dependent on the ego； in so far as it has to be there for the ego。 Everything is； in its
ideality； dependent upon the ego； but in its reality even the ego is dependent。 The fact that the finite
spirit must posit for itself somewhat outside of itself； which last exists only for it； is that circle which
it may infinitely extend but never break through。” The further logical determination of the object is
that which in subject and object is identical； the true connection is that in which the objective is the
possession of the ego； as thought； the ego in itself determines the object。 But Fichte's theory of
knowledge regards the struggle of the ego with the object as that of the continuous process of
determining the object through the ego as subject of consciousness； without the identity of the
restfully self…developing Notion。
Thirdly； because the ego is thus fixed in its one…sidedness； there proceeds from it； as representing
one extreme； the whole of the progress that is made in the content of knowledge； and the
deduction of the philosophy of Fichte； cognition in its content and form； is a progression from
certain determinations to others which do not turn back into unity； or through a succession of
finitenesses which do not have the Absolute in them at all。 The absolute point of view； like an
absolute content； is wanting。 Thus the contemplation of nature； for instance； is a contemplation of it
as of pure finitenesses from the point of view of another； as though the organic body were
regarded thus： “Consciousness requires a sphere entirely its own for its activity。 This sphere is
posited through an original； necessary activity of the ego； in which it does not know itself as free。 It
is a sensuous perception； a drawing of lines； the sphere of activity thereby becomes something
extended in space。 As quiescent； continuous； and yet unceasingly changing； this sphere is matter；
which； as body； has a number of parts which in relation to one another are called limbs。 The
person can ascribe to himself no body without positing it as being under the influence of another
person。 But it is likewise essential that I should be able to check this same influence； and external
matter is also posited as resisting my influences on it； i。e。 as a tough； compact matter。” （29） These
tough matters must further be separated from one another — the different persons cannot hold
together like one mass of dough。 For “my body is my body and not that of another； it must further
operate and be active without my working through it。 It is only through the operation of another
that I can myself be active and represent myself as a rational being who can be respected by him。
But the other being should treat me immediately as a rational being； I should be for him a rational
being even before my activity begins。 Or my form must produce an effect through its mere
existence in space； without my activity； i。e。 it must be visible。 The reciprocal operation of rational
beings must take place without activity； thus a subtle matter must be assumed in order that it way
be modified by means of the merely quiescent form。 In this way are deduced first Light and then
Air。” （30） This constitutes a very external manner of passing from one step to another； resembling
the method of the ordinary teleology； which makes out； for instance； that plants and animals are
given for the nourishment of mankind。 This is how it is put： Man must eat； and thus there must be
something edible — consequently plants and animals are at once deduced； plants must have their
root in something； and consequently the earth is forthwith deduced。 What is altogether lacking is
any consideration of the object as what it is in itself； it is plainly considered only in relation to
another。 In this way the animal organism appears as a tough； tenacious matter which is
“articulated” and can be modified； light is a subtle matter which is the medium of communication
of mere existence； &c。 — just as in the other case plants and animals are merely edible。 As regards
a philosophic consideration of the content there is nothing at all to be found。
Fichte likewise wrote both a Science of Morals and of Natural Rights； but he treats them as
sciences pertaining to the understanding only； and his method of procedure is destitute of ideas
and carried on by means of a limited understanding。 The Fichtian deduction of the conceptions of
justice and morality thus remains within the limitations and rigidity of self…consciousness； as against
which Fichte's popular presentations of religion and morality present inconsistencies。 The treatise
on Natural Rights is a special failure； e。g。 where he； as we have just seen （p。 502）； deduces even
nature just as far as he requires it。 The organization of the state which is described in Fichte's
Science of Rights is furthermore as unspiritual as was the deduction of natural objects just
mentioned； and as were many of the French constitutions which have appeared in modern times
— a formal； external uniting and connecting； in which the individuals as such are held to be
absolute； or in which Right is the highest principle。 Kant began to ground Right upon Freedom；
and Fichte likewise makes freedom the principle in the Rights of Nature； but； its was the case with
Rousseau； it is freedom in the form of the isolated individual。 This is a great commencement； but in
order to arrive at the particular； they have to accept certain hypotheses。 The universal is not the
spirit； the substance of the whole； but an external； negative power of the finite understanding
directed against individuals。 The state is not apprehended in its essence； but only as representing a
condition of justice and law； i。e。 as an external relation of finite to finite。 There are various
individuals； the whole constitution of the state is thus in the main characterized by the fact that the
freedom of individuals must be limited by means of the freedom of the whole。（31） The individuals
always maintain a cold attitude of negativity as regards one another； the confinement becomes
closer and the bonds more stringent as time goes on； instead of the state being regarded as
representing the realization of freedom。
This philosophy contains nothing speculative； but it demands the presence of the speculative
element。 As the philosophy of Kant seeks in unity its Idea of the Supreme Good； wherein the
opposites have to be united； so the Fichtian philosophy demands union in the ego and in the
implicitude of faith； in this self…consciousness in all its actions makes its starting…point conviction； so
that in themselves its actions may bring forth the highest end and realize the good。 In th