按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
thus： “I place in opposition to the ego；” and indeed “to the divisible ego； a divisible non…ego。”
The non…ego I destroy as a complete sphere； which it was according to the second principle； and
posit it as divisible； I likewise posit the ego as divisible in so far as the non…ego is present in it。 The
whole sphere which I have before me is supposed indeed to be the ego； but in it I have not one
but two。 The proposition of ground is thus the relation of reality and negation； i。e。 it is limitation； it
contains the ego limited by the non…ego； and the non…ego limited by the ego。（14） Of this synthesis
there is nothing； properly speaking； contained in the two earlier propositions。 Even this first
presentation of the three principles does away with the immanence of real knowledge。 Thus the
presentation is here also subject to an opposite from the first； as it is with Kant； even if these are
two acts of the ego merely； and we remain entirely in the ego。
Now that limitation may take place for me in two different ways： at one time the one is passive； at
another time the other is so。 In this limitation the ego may posit the non…ego as limiting and itself as
limited； in such a way that the ego posits itself as requiring to have an object； I know myself indeed
as ego； but determined by the non…ego； non…ego is here active and ego passive。 Or； on the other
hand； the ego； as abrogating other…being； is that which limits； and non…ego is the limited。 I know
myself then as clearly determining the non…ego； as the absolute cause of the non…ego as such； for I
can think。 The first is the proposition of the theoretic reason； of intelligence： the second the
proposition of practical reason； of will。（15） The will is this； that I am conscious of myself as limiting
the object； thus I make myself exercise activity upon the object and maintain myself。 The theoretic
proposition is that the object is before me and it determines me。 The ego is； since I perceive； a
content； and I have this content in me； which is thus outside of me。 This is on the whole the same
thing as we meet with in the experience of Kant： it comes to the same thing whether it is by matter
or the non…ego that the ego is here determined。
b。 In the theoretic consciousness the ego； although the assertive generally； finds itself limited by the
non…ego。 But it is identical with itself； hence its infinite activity ever sets itself to abrogate the
non…ego and to bring forth itself。 Now the different methods whereby the ego sets forth itself are
the different methods of its activity； these we have to understand in their necessity。 But since
philosophic knowledge is the consideration of consciousness itself （supra； p。 483）； I can only
know knowledge； the act of the ego。 Fichte thus appeals to consciousness； postulates ego and
non…ego in their abstraction； and since philosophic knowledge is the consciousness of
consciousness； it is not sufficient that I should find its determinations in consciousness； for I
produce them with consciousness。 Common consciousness； indeed； likewise brings forth all the
determinations of the ordinary conception and of thought； but without — on the theoretic side at
least — having any knowledge of it； for it is the fact of being limited alone that is present to it。 Thus；
when I see a large square object； such as a wall； my ordinary consciousness accepts these
determinations as they are given to it； the object is。 In so doing I do not think of seeing； but of the
object； seeing； however； is my activity； the determinations of my faculty of sensation are thus
posited through me。（16） The ego as theoretic is； indeed； aware in philosophic consciousness that it
is the ego which posits； but here it posits that the non…ego posits somewhat in me。 The ego thus
posits itself as that which is limited by the non…ego。 I make this limitation mine； thus is it for me in
me； this passivity of the ego is itself the activity of the ego。 As a matter of fact； all reality which
appears in the object for the ego is a determination of the ego；（17） just as the categories and other
determinations were in Kant's case。 Thus it is here more especially that we should expect Fichte to
demonstrate the return of other…Being into absolute consciousness。 However； because after all the
other…Being was regarded as unconditioned； as implicit； this return does not come to pass。 The
ego determines the 'other；' indeed； but this unity is an altogether finite unity； non…ego has thus
immediately escaped from determination once more and gone forth from this unity。 What we find
is merely an alternation between self…consciousness and the consciousness of another； and the
constant progression of this alternation； which never reaches any end。（18）
The development of theoretic reason is the following…out of the manifold relationships between the
ego and non…ego； the forms of this limitation which Fichte now goes through are the determinations
of the object。 These particular thought…determinations he calls categories； and he seeks to
demonstrate them in their necessity； from the time of Aristotle onwards no one had thought of so
doing。 The first of these forms is the determination of reciprocity； which we already met with in the
third proposition： “By the determination of the reality or negation of the ego； the negation or reality
of the non…ego is equally determined；” the two in one is reciprocal action。 In the second place；
“Causality is the same degree of activity in the one as of passivity in the other。” In so far as
something is considered as the reality of the non…ego； the ego is considered as passive； and； on the
other hand； in so far as 'I' am real； the object is passive； this relation； that the passivity of the
object is my activity or reality； and the opposite； is the conception of Causality。 “As many parts of
negation as the ego posits in itself； so many parts of reality it posits in the non…ego； it therefore
posits itself as self…determining in so far as it is determined； and as suffering determination in so far
as it determines itself。 In so far；” in the third place； “as the ego is regarded as embracing the
whole absolutely determined realm of all reality； it is substance； on the other hand when it is
posited in a not absolutely determined sphere of this realm； in so far there is an accidence in the
ego。” （19） That is the first rational attempt that has ever been made to deduce the categories； this
progress from one determination to another is； however； only an analysis from the standpoint of
consciousness； and is not in and for itself。
The ego is so far the ideal ground of all conceptions of the object； all determination of this object is
a determination of the ego。 But in order that it may be object； it must be placed in opposition to
the ego； i。e。 the determinations set forth through the ego are another； the non…ego； this placing of
the object in opposition is the real ground of conceptions。 The ego is； however； likewise the real
ground of the object； for it is likewise a determination of the ego that the non…ego as object is set
in opposition to the ego。 Both； the real ground and the ideal ground of the conception； are thu