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According to Fichte； the ego is the source of the categories and ideas； but all conceptions and
thoughts are a manifold reduced to a synthesis through Thought。 Thus while with Descartes in
connection with the ego other thoughts appear which we simply find already in us； such as God；
nature； &c。； Fichte sought for a philosophy entirely of a piece； in which nothing empiric was to be
admitted from without。 With this reflection a false point of view was at once introduced； namely
that contained in the old conception of knowledge； of commencing with principles in this form and
proceeding from them； so that the reality which is derived from such a principle is brought into
opposition with it； and hence in truth is something different； i。e。 it is not derived： or that principle
for this same reason expresses only the absolute certainty of itself and not the truth。 The ego is
certain； it cannot be doubted； but Philosophy desires to reach the truth。 The certainty is subjective；
and because it is made to remain the basis； all else remains subjective also without there being any
possibility of this form being removed。 Fichte now analyzes the ego； reducing it to three principles
from which the whole of knowledge has to be evolved。
The first proposition must be simple； in it predicate and subject must be alike； for were they unlike；
their connection — since in accordance with their diversity the determinations are not directly one
— would have to be first of all proved by means of a third。 The first principle must thus be
identical。 Fichte now proceeds further to distinguish in this first principle the form and content； but
in order that this same may be immediately true through itself； form and content must be again the
same； and the principle conditioned by neither。 It signifies A = A； the abstract undetermined
identity； that is the proposition of contradiction； wherein A is an indifferent content。 Fichte says；
“Thought is by no means essence； but only a particular determination of Being； there are outside of
it many other determinations of our Being。 I merely remark this； that when 'I am' is overstepped；
Spinozism is necessarily reached。 Its unity is something which ought to be produced through us；
but which cannot be so； it is not anything that is。” The first proposition is then that I am identical
with myself； Ego = Ego；（12） that undoubtedly is the definition of the ego。 The subject and the
predicate are the content； and this content of the two sides is likewise their relation； i。e。 form。
Relation requires two sides； the relating and the related are here； however； the same； for on
account of the simplicity of the ego； there is nothing but a relation of the ego to the ego。 I have
knowledge of myself； but in so far as I am consciousness； I know of an object which is different
from me； and which is then likewise mine。 But the ego is in such a way identical with its difference
that what is different is immediately the same； and what is identical is likewise different； we have a
difference without a difference。 Self…consciousness is not dead identity； or non…Being； but the
object which is identical with me。 This is immediately certain； all else must be as certain to me；
inasmuch as it must be my relation to myself。 The content must be transformed into the ego； so that
in it I have my determination alone。 This principle is at first abstract and deficient； because in it no
difference； or a formal difference only is expressed； whereas the principle should possess a
content： a subject and a predicate are indeed distinguished in it； but only for us who reflect upon it；
i。e。 in itself there is no difference； and consequently no true content。 In the second place； this
principle is indeed the immediate certainty of self…consciousness； but self…consciousness is likewise
consciousness； and in it there is likewise the certainty that other things exist to which it stands in an
attitude of opposition。 In the third place； that principle has not the truth in it； for the very reason
that the certainty of itself possessed by the ego has no objectivity； it has not the form of the
differentiated content within it — or it stands in opposition to the consciousness of an “other。”
Now in order that determination should come to pass； i。e。 a content and difference； it is essential
for Fichte that a second principle should be established； which in regard to form is unconditioned；
but the content of which is conditioned； because it does not belong to the ego。 This second
principle； set forth under the first； is； “I assert a non…ego in opposition to the ego；” and in this
something other than absolute self…consciousness is set forth。（13） To this pertains the form therein
present； relation； but the content is the non…ego； another content from the ego。 We might say that
through this content the proposition is independent； since the negative therein is an absolute； as
truly as the reverse — that it is independent through the form of opposition which cannot be
derived from the original。 Here； then； we have no more to do with derivation； although this
derivation of opposition from the first proposition was all the same demanded。 Inasmuch as I posit
another in opposition to the ego； I posit myself as not posited； this non…ego is the object generally；
i。e。 that which is opposed to me。 This other is the negative of the ego； thus when Fichte called it
the non…ego he was expressing himself in a very happy； suitable； and consistent manner。 There has
been a good deal of ridicule cast on the ego and non…ego； the expression is new； and therefore to
us Germans it seems strange at first。 But the French say Moi and Non…moi； without finding
anything laughable in it。 In this principle the positing belongs； however； to the ego； but because the
non…ego is independent of the ego； we have two sides； and self…consciousness relates itself to
another。 This second proposition thus signifies that I posit myself as limited； as non…ego； but
non…ego is something quite new to be added。 On the one side we thus have before us a field which
is merely appropriated from the ego； and in this way we have before us the non…ego as our object。
To these is added yet a third proposition； in which I now make this division into ego and non…ego：
it is the synthetic principle； the proposition of ground； which in content is unconditioned； just as in
the second was the case in regard to form。 This third proposition is the determination of the first
two through one another； in such a way that the ego limits the non…ego。 “In and through the ego
both the ego and the non…ego are posited as capable of being mutually limited by means of one
another； i。e。 in such a way that the reality of the one abrogates the reality of the other。” In
limitation both are negated； but “only in part” ； only thus are synthesis and deduction possible。 I
posit the non…ego； which is for me； in myself； in my identity with myself； thus I take it from its
non…identity； its not…being…I； that is to say I limit it。 This limitation of the non…ego Fichte expresses
thus： “I place in opposition to the ego；” and indeed “to the divisible ego； a divisible non…ego。”
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