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as though men could set forth upon the search for truth with spears and staves。 And a further claim
is made when it is said that we must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know。 For to
investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them； but how we are to know without
knowing； how we are to apprehend the truth before the truth； it is impossible to say。 It is the old
story of the who would not go into the water till he could swim。 Thus since the investigation of the
faculties of knowledge is itself knowing； it cannot in Kant attain to what it aims at because it is that
already — it cannot come to itself because it is already with itself； the same thing happens as
happened with the Jews； the Spirit passes through the midst of them and they know it not。 At the
same time the step taken by Kant is a great and important one — that is； the fact that he has made
knowledge the subject of his consideration。
On the one hand this critique of knowledge applies to the empirical knowledge of Locke； which
asserts itself to be grounded on experience； and； on the other hand； it also deals with what claims
to be on the whole a more metaphysical kind of philosophy — the Wolffian and German — which
had also taken up the line of proceeding on the more empiric method which has been depicted。
But this last has at the same time kept itself separate from the merely empiric method； inasmuch as
its main efforts have been directed towards making such categories of thought as those of
potentiality； actuality； God； &c。； have as their foundation categories of the understanding； and then
reasoning from them。 The Kantian philosophy is in the first instance directed against both。 Kant
takes away the objective significance of the determinations of the Wolffian metaphysics； and
shows how they must be ascribed to subjective thought alone。 At the same time Jacobi likewise
declared himself against this metaphysic； but since he started more especially from the standpoint
of the French and Germans； his point of view was different： he asserts that our finite thought can
set forth finite determinations alone； and thus can only consider God and Spirit in accordance with
finite relationships。 On the practical side there reigned at that time the so…called happiness theory；
since man’s inherent Notion and the way to realize this Notion was apprehended in morality as a
satisfaction of his desires。 As against this Kant has very rightly shown that it involves a heteronomy
and not an autonomy of reason — a determination through nature and consequently an absence of
freedom。 But because the rational principle of Kant was formal； and his successors could not
make any further progress with reason； and yet morality had to receive a content； Fries and others
must still be called Hedonists though they avoid giving themselves the name。
In the third place； as regards the relation of the categories to the material which is given through
experience； there is according to Kant already inherent in the subjective determinations of thought；
e。g。 in those of cause and effect； the capacity of themselves to bind together the differences which
are present in that material。 Kant considers thought as in great measure a synthetic activity； and
hence he represents the main question of Philosophy to be this； “How are synthetic judgments a
priori possible？”（4） Judgment signifies the combination of thought…determinations as subject and
predicate。 Synthetic judgments a priori are nothing else than a connection of opposites through
themselves； or the absolute Notion； i。e。 the relations of different determinations such as those of
cause and effect； given not through experience but through thought。 Space and time likewise form
the connecting element； they are thus a priori； i。e。 in self…consciousness。 Since Kant shows that
thought has synthetic judgments a priori which are not derived from perception； he shows that
thought is so to speak concrete in itself。 The idea which is present here is a great one； but； on the
other hand； quite an ordinary signification is given it； for it is worked out from points of view which
are inherently rude and empirical； and a scientific form is the last thing that can be claimed for it。 In
the presentation of it there is a lack of philosophical abstraction； and it is expressed in the most
commonplace way； to say nothing more of the barbarous terminology； Kant remains restricted and
confined by his psychological point of view and empirical methods。
To mention one example only of big barbarous expressions； Kant calls his philosophy （Kritik der
reinen Vernunft； p。 19） a Transcendental philosophy； i。e。 a system of principles of pure reason
which demonstrate the universal and necessary elements in the self…conscious understanding；
without occupying themselves with objects or inquiring what universality and necessity are； this last
would be transcendent。 Transcendent and transcendental have accordingly to be clearly
distinguished。 Transcendent mathematics signifies the mathematics in which the determination of
infinitude is made use of in a preeminent degree： in this sphere of mathematics we say； for instance；
that the circle consists of an infinitude of straight lines； the periphery is represented as straight； and
since the curve is represented as straight this passes beyond the geometric category and is
consequently transcendent。 Kant； on the contrary； defines the transcendental philosophy as not a
philosophy which by means of categories passes beyond its own sphere； but one which points out
in subjective thought； in consciousness； the sources of what may become transcendent。 Thought
would thus be transcendent if the categories of universality； of cause and effect； were predicated
of the object； for in this way men would from the subjective element ‘transcend’ into another
sphere。 We are not justified in so doing as regards the result nor even to begin with； since we
merely contemplate thought within thought itself。 Thus we do not desire to consider the categories
in their objective sense； but in so far as thought is the source of such synthetic relationships； the
necessary and universal thus here receive the significance of resting in our faculties of knowledge。
But from this faculty of knowledge Kant still separates the implicit； the thing…in…itself； so that the
universality and necessity are all the time a subjective conditionment of knowledge merely； and
reason with its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the truth。（5） For it
requires perception and experience； a material empirically given in order； as subjectivity； to attain
to knowledge。 As Kant says； these form its “constituent parts”； one part it has in itself； but the
other is empirically given。（6） When reason desires to be independent； to exist in itself and to derive
truth from itself； it becomes transcendent； it transcends experience because it lacks the other
constituent； and then creates mere hallucinations of the brain。 It is hence not constitutive in
knowledge but only regulative； it is the unity and rule for the sensuous manifold。 But this unity on its
own account is the unconditioned；