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much mediated。 If I stand in America and see its soil； I must first of all have journeyed to it；
Columbus must first have discovered it； ships must have been built； &c。； all these discoveries and
inventions pertain to it。 That which we now know immediately is consequently a result of infinitely
many mediations。 Likewise when I see a right…angled triangle I know that the squares of the two
sides are equal to the square of the hypotenuse： I know this immediately； and yet I have merely
learned it and am convinced of it through the mediation of proof。 Immediate knowledge is thus
everywhere mediated； and Philosophy does nothing but bring this to consciousness —
demonstrating the mediation which in point of fact is already present there； e。g。 in religion； &c。
The philosophy of Jacobi； inasmuch as it says： “Thought cannot proceed further than to the feeling
of God；” has been accepted utiliter； it was more easily arrived at than in the case of Kant。
Knowledge； however； is something very different from what Jacobi calls such； against finite
knowledge his arguments are quite correct。 Immediate knowledge is not knowledge；
comprehension； for that implies that the content is determined in itself； i。e。 is grasped as concrete。
But in immediate knowledge it is the case that the only fact known of God is that He exists。 For
should there be determinations respecting God； they must； according to Jacobi； be grasped as a
finite； and the knowledge of them would again merely be a progression from finite to finite。 There
thus remains only the indeterminate conception of God； an “Above me；” an indeterminate
Beyond。 This gives accordingly the same result as does the Aufkl？rung； viz。 that the highest
reality is ultimate： we find the same in French philosophy and in Kant — only here we still have the
opinion that this emptiness is the highest philosophy possible。 But if each standpoint has an aspect
wherein it is justified； there always rests in the proposition that the human mind knows God
immediately； the important consideration that we have here a recognition of the freedom of the
human spirit： in it we have the source of the knowledge of God； and all externality of authority is
thus abrogated in this principle。 The principle is hereby gained； but only the principle of freedom of
spirit； and the greatness of our time rests in the fact that freedom； the peculiar possession of mind
whereby it is at home with itself in itself； is recognized； and that mind has this consciousness within
itself。 This however is merely abstract； for the next step is that the principle of freedom is again
purified and comes to its true objectivity； so that not everything which strikes me or springs up
within me must； because it is manifested in me； hold good its true。 It is only through thought； which
casts off the particular and accidental； that the principle receives this objectivity which is
independent of mere subjectivity and in and for itself — though in such a way that the freedom of
mind still remains respected。 One's own spirit must bear witness to spirit that God is Spirit； the
content must be true。 But this does not give authenticity to itself by its being revealed with certainty
to me。 This is the standpoint； and we have thus seen its deficiency and the greatness of the
principle which is involved in it。
1。 Tenneman's Grundriss von Wendt； § 406； p。 531； Rixner： Handbuch der geschichte der
Philosophie； Vol。 III。 § 145； p。 317； Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 1； p。 3。
2。 Jacobi： Brief über die Lehre des Spinoza （second edition； 1789）； pp。 85； 86 （Werke； Vol。 IV。
Sec。 1； p。 110）。
3。 Buhle： Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Part VIII。 pp。 386； 387； Mendelssohn's
Morgenstunden （second edition； 1786）； pp。 293…296。
4。 Jacobi： Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza； IV。 Prop。 pp。 225； 223 （pp。 223； 216）。
5。 Infra； pp。 418； 419。
6。 Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 II； pp。 7 seq。； p。 221； note。
7。 Jacobi： Brief über die Lehre des Spinoza； supplement vii。 pp。 419…421； and note （Werke； Vol。
IV。 Sec。 2； pp。 149…151）。
8。 Jacobi： Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza； supplement vii。 pp。 422…426 （pp。 151…156）。
9。 Ibidem； pp。 426； 427 （pp。 155； 156）。
10。 Cf。 Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 III。 p。 277。
11。 Jacobi： Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza； pp。 216； 217 （p。 211）。
Section Three： Recent German Philosophy
B。 Kant。
The philosophy of Kant； which we have now more parcularly to consider； made its appearance at
the same time as the above。 While Descartes asserted certainty to be the unity of thought and
Being； we now have the consciousness of thought in its subjectivity； i。e。 in the first place； as
determinateness in contrast with objectivity； and then as finitude and progression in finite
determinations。 Abstract thought； as personal conviction is that which is maintained as certain； its
contents are experience； but the methods adopted by experience are once more formal thought
and argument。 Kant turns back to the standpoint of Socrates； we see in him the freedom of the
subject as we saw it with the Stoics； but the task in respect of content is now placed on a higher
level。 An endless aiming at the concrete is required for thought； a filling up in accordance with the
rule which completion prescribes； which signifies that the content is itself the Idea as the unity of
the Notion and reality。 With Jacobi thought； demonstration； does not in the first place reach
beyond the finite and conditioned； and in the Second place； even when God is likewise the
metaphysical object； the demonstration is really the making Him conditioned and finite； in the third
place the unconditioned； what is then immediately certain； only exists in faith； a subjectively fixed
point of view but an unknowable one； that is to say an undetermined； indeterminable； and
consequently an unfruitful one。 The standpoint of the philosophy of Kant； on the contrary； is in the
first place to be found in the fact that thought has through its reasoning got so far as to grasp itself
not as contingent but rather as in itself the absolute ultimate。 In the finite； in connection with the
finite； an absolute standpoint is raised which acts as a connecting bond； it binds together the finite
and leads up to the infinite。 Thought grasped itself as all in all； as absolute in judgment； for it
nothing external is authoritative； since all authority can receive validity only through thought。 This
thought； determining itself within itself and concrete； is； however； in the second place； grasped as
subjective； and this aspect of subjectivity is the form which from Jacobi’s point of view is
predominant； the fact that thought is concrete Jacobi has on the other hand for the most part set
aside。 Both standpoints remain philosophies of subjectivity； since thought is subjective； the
capacity of knowing the absolute is denied to it。 To Kant God cannot on the one hand be found in
experience； He can neither be found in outward experience — as Lalande discovered when he
swept the whole heavens and found no God — nor can He be discovered within； though no doubt
mystics and enthusiasts can experience many thing