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equality have arisen。 It is the basis of all individualism。 From
the standpoint of mankind there may be other demands； mankind and
its interests demand sacrifices in the upper as well as in the
lower ranks。 The practical representatives of this standpoint in
political life must； therefore； necessarily seek to combat or to
weaken the conclusions resulting from this fundamental principle
of individualism。 And from their standpoint they are justified in
so doing。 But equally justified on the other hand is the
standpoint of individualism； and it is this which demands
justice； proportionality of duties and rights； it demands
equality for equal； inequality for unequal men。 The principle of
civil； political and social equality will never have a firm
foundation unless one seeks it in this connection。 Every
limitation of the principle of equality； other than that which is
prompted by the qualities and merits of men； is arbitrary。
Material justice demands equal rights only in so far as it
observes equal qualities； as it presumes the possibility of equal
achievement and fulfillment of duties。
II
Thus the approving or disapproving judgment of the justice of
human actions or institutions always rests on the same
psychological processes。 But the results to which it comes may be
very different。 How would it otherwise be possible that the
conceptions of justice of barbarians； of heathens； of Christians；
of men of modern culture； differ so much that something different
is always demanded under the plea of justice？ Even within the
same nation and the same period the controversy as to what
constitutes justice will never cease； but from time to time
certain judgments will succeed in placing themselves in the
dominating centre of the progressive movement； certain results of
former intellectual contests will descend to posterity as a
secured inheritance； and as long as the night of barbarism does
not break in again they will rule and influence it more and more。
If we now try to explain somewhat more fully the
psychological processes in question； the first step always seems
to be to group in our conceptions a number of men into bodies of
moral community。 These bodies are then compared and tested
according to their qualities and actions。 The equalities are
searched for and found by the judgment； the inequalities and
their degrees are tried by the estimating and valuing sense。 It
is in the realm of the feelings in which all the final decisions
on this most important point are reached。 All feelings finally
resolve themselves into an adjudging or disparaging； into an
estimation and a sensation of that which furthers and that which
impedes us； they are decisions on the worth of men and things。
And upon this now follows finally the simple logical conclusion：
the persons whom I am to conceive as a moral community must； as
far as human intervention reaches； be treated equally in the
measure of their equality； unequally in the measure of their
inequality。
The groups of persons into which our conceptions necessarily
classify mankind are manifold。 The members of the family and the
tribe； the bellows of a society and a community； the citizens of
a State and of a federation； the members of a church and of a
race； finally all humanity in a certain sense can be so grouped；
but only in so far as they form a moral community and pursue
certain common ends。 Whosoever stands without the group is
foreign to the comparison； is not comprised in the judgment of
what is just。 Hence a barbarian does not think it unjust to kill
the stranger； only the conception of a moral community between
all nations and all men prevents this。 Likewise it does not seem
to me unjust that an Englishman pays double the taxes paid by a
German of equal income。 With the variety of different human
purposes and communities the same man appears at one time like
his fellows； at another unlike。 In a club of any kind which
claims but a small fraction of our interest； we see no injustice
in a per capita assessment which we would consider unbearable in
a State or community。 It accords with our idea of justice that
all young and vigorous men have an equal duty in the defence of
our country； whereas for other public and social purposes they
show the greatest dissimilarities； and are accordingly treated
differently。
The judgment of equality or inequality is； therefore； always
a very complicated one。 Not only must the human qualities and
deeds be considered per se； but also in their relations to the
aims of human society。 In one grouping and classification we have
in view only some one certain well…defined quality of mankind； in
another we attempt a weighing of all qualities； we seek the
average human being。 A shipwrecked party； which has saved itself
in a boat too small to carry all； will be apt to value all their
companions equally in the question of life and death； and cast
lots equally for all。 But the provisions which have been saved
will be distributed according to the various needs； i。e。； the
seaman at the oar will be given twice as much as the
three…year…old child。 In a tribe of warlike nomads the bravest
fighter； in the jockey club the best rider； is fairly given a
preference which would appear unjust in other groups of men。 Even
in the family and in the State a certain kind only of qualities
or actions often forms the basis of judgment。 The judge on the
bench cares only for certain wrongful acts； the father who
wishes to bequeath the same to each child； because he thinks this
just； will not deny their dissimilarity in many respects。 The
State； however； will distribute honors and dignities in the
nearest possible relation to the average of qualities most
important to it。 Every election； every promotion is governed by
an average of composite impressions。 The judgment upon a just or
unjust distribution of wealth and income will always rest on a
similar basis。
Whether it be a single quality or action； or a sum of them；
those which are considered are such as relate to the aims and
ends of the community。 And they may naturally be of the greatest
variety； may include； for instance； even physical strength or
beauty。 In an athletic club it seems just to give a prize to the
strongest man； in tableaux vivants to favor a beautiful woman。 As
a rule； however； in social bodies of a higher order those
qualities are to be considered which； like virtue and talent； are
of the greatest service to them； which manifest themselves in
actions advantageous to the community。 Often there are very
heterogeneous qualities to be compared； as the aims of the great
moral communities； especially of the State； are the most various。
The question can arise； is the brave general or the great
statesman； the great painter or the great singer； of greater
Universal value？ The decision is given by public sentiment
according to that classification of purposes which appears at the
moment to be the correct one； and following it we find a verdict
of the public which declares the salary of a general； of a
secretary of state or of a singer to be just or unjust。
Quite as difficult as