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the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies；
that is （II。 xii。； xiii。）； the idea in God will necessarily be
adequate； both in so far as he constitutes the human mind； and in
so far as he has the ideas； which are in the human mind。
Therefore the mind （II。 xi。 Cor。） necessarily perceives A
adequately； and has this adequate perception； both in so far as
it perceives itself； and in so far as it perceives its own or
any external body； nor can A be conceived in any other manner。
Q。E。D。
ProofIf A be that； which is common to and a property of
the human body and external bodies； and equally present in the
human body and in the said external bodies； in each part of each
external body and in the whole； there will be an adequate idea of
A in God （II。 vii。 Cor。）； both in so far as he has the idea of
the human body； and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
external bodies。 Let it now be granted； that the human body is
affected by an external body through that； which it has in common
therewith； namely； A； the idea of this modification will involve
the property A （II。 xvi。）； and therefore （II。 vii。 Cor。） the
idea of this modification； in so far as it involves the property
A； will be adequate in God； in so far as God is affected by the
idea of the human body； that is （II。 xiii。）； in so far as he
constitutes the nature of the human mind； therefore （II。 xi。
Cor。） this idea is also adequate in the human mind。 Q。E。D。
ProofThis proposition is self…evident。 For when we say
that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
therein adequate； we say； in other words （II。 xi。 Cor。）； that an
idea is in the divine intellect； whereof God is the cause； not in
so far as he is infinite； nor in so far as he is affected by the
ideas of very many particular things； but only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind。
*****Note II have thus set forth the cause of those notions；
which are common to all men； and which form the basis of our
ratiocinations。 But there are other causes of certain axioms or
notions； which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
method of ours； for it would thus appear what notions are more
useful than others； and what notions have scarcely any use at
all。 Furthermore； we should see what notions are common to all
men； and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
are unshackled by prejudice； and we should detect those which
are ill…founded。 Again we should discern whence the notions
called 〃secondary〃 derived their origin； and consequently the
axioms on which they are founded； and other points of interest
connected with these questions。 But I have decided to pass over
the subject here； partly because I have set it aside for another
treatise； partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
too great prolixity。 Nevertheless； in order not to omit
anything necessary to be known； I will briefly set down the
causes； whence are derived the terms styled 〃transcendental；〃
such as Being； Thing； Something。 These terms arose from the
fact； that the human body； being limited； is only capable of
distinctly forming a certain number of images （what an image is
I explained in the II。 xvii。 note） within itself at the same
time； if this number be exceeded； the images will begin to be
confused； if this number of images； of which the body is capable
of forming distinctly within itself； be largely exceeded； all
will become entirely confused one with another。 This being so；
it is evident （from II。 Prop。 xvii。 Cor。； and xviii。） that the
human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously；
as its body can form images simultaneously。 When the images
become quite confused in the body； the mind also imagines all
bodies confusedly without any distinction； and will comprehend
them； as it were； under one attribute； namely； under the
attribute of Being； Thing； &c。 The same conclusion can be drawn
from the fact that images are not always equally vivid； and from
other analogous causes； which there is no need to explain here；
for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
consider one only。 All may be reduced to this； that these terms
represent ideas in the highest degree confused。 From similar
causes arise those notions； which we call 〃general；〃 such as
man； horse； dog； &c。 They arise； to wit； from the fact that so
many images； for instance； of men； are formed simultaneously in
the human mind； that the powers of imagination break down； not
indeed utterly； but to the extent of the mind losing count of
small differences between individuals （e。g。 colour； size； &c。）
and their definite number； and only distinctly imagining that； in
which all the individuals； in so far as the body is affected by
them； agree； for that is the point； in which each of the said
individuals chiefly affected the body； this the mind expresses by
the name man； and this it predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals。 For； as we have said； it is unable to
imagine the definite number of individuals。 We must； however；
bear in mind； that these general notions are not formed by all
men in the same way； but vary in each individual according as
the point varies； whereby the body has been most often affected
and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers。 For
instance； those who have most often regarded with admiration the
stature of man； will by the name of man understand an animal of
erect stature； those who have been accustomed to regard some
other attribute； will form a different general image of man； for
instance； that man is a laughing animal； a two…footed animal
without feathers；