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he Roman or Bolognian schools would have produced a more learned and more noble work。
This leads us to another important province of taste； of weighing the value of the different classes of the art； and of estimating them accordingly。
All arts have means within them of applying themselves with success both to the intellectual and sensitive part of our natures。 It can be no dispute； supposing both these means put in practice with equal abilities； to which we ought to give the preference： to him who represents the heroic arts and more dignified passions of man； or to him who； by the help of meretricious ornaments； however elegant and graceful； captivates the sensuality； as it may be called； of our taste。 Thus the Roman and Bolognian schools are reasonably preferred to the Venetian； Flemish； or Dutch schools； as they address themselves to our best and noblest faculties。
Well…turned periods in eloquence； or harmony of numbers in poetry； which are in those arts what colouring is in painting； however highly we may esteem them； can never be considered as of equal importance with the art of unfolding truths that are useful to mankind； and which make us better or wiser。 Nor can those works which remind us of the poverty and meanness of our nature； be considered as of equal rank with what excites ideas of grandeur； or raises and dignifies humanity； or； in the words of a late poet； which makes the beholder learn to venerate himself as man。
It is reason and good sense therefore which ranks and estimates every art； and every part of that art； according to its importance； from the painter of animated down to inanimated nature。 We will not allow a man； who shall prefer the inferior style； to say it is his taste； taste here has nothing； or at least ought to have nothing to do with the question。 He wants not taste； but sense； and soundness of judgment。
Indeed； perfection in an inferior style may be reasonably preferred to mediocrity in the highest walks of art。 A landscape of Claude Lorraine may be preferred to a history of Luca Jordano； but hence appears the necessity of the connoisseur's knowing in what consists the excellence of each class； in order to judge how near it approaches to perfection。
Even in works of the same kind； as in history painting； which is composed of various parts； excellence of an inferior species； carried to a very high degree； will make a work very valuable； and in some measure compensate for the absence of the higher kind of merits。 It is the duty of the connoisseur to know and esteem； as much as it may deserve； every part of painting； he will not then think even Bassano unworthy of his notice； who； though totally devoid of expression； sense； grace； or elegance； may be esteemed on account of his admirable taste of colours； which； in his best works； are little inferior to those of Titian。
Since I have mentioned Bassano； we must do him likewise the justice to acknowledge that； though he did not aspire to the dignity of expressing the characters and passions of men； yet； with respect to the facility and truth in his manner of touching animals of all kinds； and giving them what painters call their character； few have ever excelled him。
To Bassano we may add Paul Veronese and Tintoret； for their entire inattention to what is justly esteemed the most essential part of our art； the expression of the passions。 Notwithstanding these glaring deficiencies； we justly esteem their works； but it must be remembered that they do not please from those defects； but from their great excellences of another kind； and in spite of such transgressions。 These excellences； too； as far as they go； are founded in the truth of general nature。 They tell the truth； though not the whole truth。
By these considerations； which can never be too frequently impressed； may be obviated two errors which I observed to have been； formerly at least； the most prevalent； and to be most injurious to artists： that of thinking taste and genius to have nothing to do with reason； and that of taking particular living objects for nature。
I shall now say something on that part of taste which； as I have hinted to you before； does not belong so much to the external form of things； but is addressed to the mind； and depends on its original frame； or； to use the expression； the organisation of the soul； I mean the imagination and the passions。 The principles of these are as invariable as the former； and are to be known and reasoned upon in the same manner； by an appeal to common sense deciding upon the common feelings of mankind。 This sense； and these feelings； appear to me of equal authority； and equally conclusive。
Now this appeal implies a general uniformity and agreement in the minds of men。 It would be else an idle and vain endeavour to establish rules of art； it would be pursuing a phantom to attempt to move affections with which we were entirely unacquainted。 We have no reason to suspect there is a greater difference between our minds than between our forms； of which； though there are no two alike； yet there is a general similitude that goes through the whole race of mankind； and those who have cultivated their taste can distinguish what is beautiful or deformed； or； in other words； what agrees with or what deviates from the general idea of nature； in one case as well as in the other。
The internal fabric of our mind； as well as the external form of our bodies； being nearly uniform； it seems then to follow； of course； that as the imagination is incapable of producing anything originally of itself； and can only vary and combine these ideas with which it is furnished by means of the senses； there will be； of course； an agreement in the imaginations as in the senses of men。 There being this agreement； it follows that in all cases； in our lightest amusements as well as in our most serious actions and engagements of life； we must regulate our affections of every kind by that of others。 The well…disciplined mind acknowledges this authority； and submits its own opinion to the public voice。
It is from knowing what are the general feelings and passions of mankind that we acquire a true idea of what imagination is； though it appears as if we had nothing to do but to consult our own particular sensations； and these were sufficient to ensure us from all error and mistake。
A knowledge of the disposition and character of the human mind can be acquired only by experience： a great deal will be learned； I admit； by a habit of examining what passes in our bosoms； what are our own motives of action； and of what kind of sentiments we are conscious on any occasion。 We may suppose a uniformity； and conclude that the same effect will be produced by the same cause in the minds of others。 This examination will contribute to suggest to us matters of inquiry； but we can never be sure that our own sensations are true and right till they are confirmed by more extensive observation。
One man opposing another determines nothing but a general union of minds； like a general combination of the forces of all mankind； makes a strength that is irresistible。 In fact； as he who does not know himself does not know others； so it may be said with e