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e can look for； as the world is constituted； is imperfect。 But he can learn to bear its imperfections； if they are at all bearable； and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections； but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify。 It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied； better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied。 And if the fool； or the pig； are a different opinion； it is because they only know their own side of the question。 The other party to the comparison knows both sides。 It may be objected； that many who are capable of the higher pleasures； occasionally； under the influence of temptation； postpone them to the lower。 But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher。 Men often； from infirmity of character； make their election for the nearer good； though they know it to be the less valuable； and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures； than when it is between bodily and mental。 They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health； though perfectly aware that health is the greater good。 It may be further objected； that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble； as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness。 But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change； voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher。 I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one； they have already become incapable of the other。 Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant； easily killed； not only by hostile influences； but by mere want of sustenance； and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them； and the society into which it has thrown them； are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise。 Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes； because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them； and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures； not because they deliberately prefer them； but because they are either the only ones to which they have access； or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying。 It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures； ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower； though many； in all ages； have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both。 From this verdict of the only competent judges； I apprehend there can be no appeal。 On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures； or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings； apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences； the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both； or； if they differ； that of the majority among them； must be admitted as final。 And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures； since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity。 What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains； or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations； except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both？ Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous； and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure。 What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain； except the feelings and judgment of the experienced？ When； therefore； those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind； apart from the question of intensity； to those of which the animal nature； disjoined from the higher faculties； is suspectible； they are entitled on this subject to the same regard。 I have dwelt on this point； as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness； considered as the directive rule of human conduct。 But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard； for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness； but the greatest amount of happiness altogether； and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness； there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier； and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it。 Utilitarianism； therefore； could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character； even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others； and his own； so far as happiness is concerned； were a sheer deduction from the benefit。 But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last； renders refutation superfluous。
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle； as above explained； the ultimate end； with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable （whether we are considering our own good or that of other people）； is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain； and as rich as possible in enjoyments； both in point of quantity and quality； the test of quality； and the rule for measuring it against quantity； being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience； to which must be added their habits of self…consciousness and self…observation； are best furnished with the means of comparison。 This； being； according to the utilitarian opinion； the end of human action； is necessarily also the standard of morality； which may accordingly be defined； the rules and precepts for human conduct； by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be； to the greatest extent possible； secured to all mankind； and not to them only； but； so far as the nature of things admits； to the whole sentient creation。 Against this doctrine； however； arises another class of objectors； who say that happiness； in any form； cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action； because； in the first place； it is unattainable： and they contemptuously ask； what right hast thou to be happy？ a question which Mr。 Carlyle clenches by the addition； What right； a short time ago； hadst thou even to be？ Next； they say； that men can do without happiness； that all noble human beings have felt this； and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen； or renunciation； which lesson； thoroughly learnt and submitted to； they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue。 The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were it well founded； for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings； the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality； or of any rational conduct。 Though； even in that case； something might still be said for the utilitarian theory； since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness； but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness； and if the former aim be chimerical； there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter； so long at least as mankind think fit to live； and do not take refug