按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
though it is one thing to believe that we have natural feelings of justice； and another to acknowledge them as an ultimate criterion of conduct； these two opinions are very closely connected in point of fact。 Mankind are always predisposed to believe that any subjective feeling； not otherwise accounted for； is a revelation of some objective reality。 Our present object is to determine whether the reality； to which the feeling of justice corresponds； is one which needs any such special revelation； whether the justice or injustice of an action is a thing intrinsically peculiar； and distinct from all its other qualities； or only a combination of certain of those qualities； presented under a peculiar aspect。 For the purpose of this inquiry it is practically important to consider whether the feeling itself； of justice and injustice； is sui generis like our sensations of colour and taste； or a derivative feeling； formed by a combination of others。 And this it is the more essential to examine； as people are in general willing enough to allow； that objectively the dictates of justice coincide with a part of the field of General Expediency； but inasmuch as the subjective mental feeling of justice is different from that which commonly attaches to simple expediency； and； except in the extreme cases of the latter； is far more imperative in its demands； people find it difficult to see； in justice； only a particular kind or branch of general utility； and think that its superior binding force requires a totally different origin。 To throw light upon this question； it is necessary to attempt to ascertain what is the distinguishing character of justice； or of injustice： what is the quality； or whether there is any quality； attributed in common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust （for justice； like many other moral attributes； is best defined by its opposite）； and distinguishing them from such modes of conduct as are disapproved； but without having that particular epithet of disapprobation applied to them。 If in everything which men are accustomed to characterise as just or unjust； some one common attribute or collection of attributes is always present； we may judge whether this particular attribute or combination of attributes would be capable of gathering round it a sentiment of that peculiar character and intensity by virtue of the general laws of our emotional constitution； or whether the sentiment is inexplicable； and requires to be regarded as a special provision of Nature。 If we find the former to be the case； we shall； in resolving this question； have resolved also the main problem： if the latter； we shall have to seek for some other mode of investigating it。
To find the common attributes of a variety of objects； it is necessary to begin by surveying the objects themselves in the concrete。 Let us therefore advert successively to the various modes of action； and arrangements of human affairs； which are classed； by universal or widely spread opinion； as Just or as Unjust。 The things well known to excite the sentiments associated with those names are of a very multifarious character。 I shall pass them rapidly in review； without studying any particular arrangement。 In the first place； it is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal liberty； his property； or any other thing which belongs to him by law。 Here； therefore； is one instance of the application of the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense； namely； that it is just to respect； unjust to violate； the legal rights of any one。 But this judgment admits of several exceptions； arising from the other forms in which the notions of justice and injustice present themselves。 For example； the person who suffers the deprivation may （as the phrase is） have forfeited the rights which he is so deprived of： a case to which we shall return presently。 But also； Secondly； the legal rights of which he is deprived； may be rights which ought not to have belonged to him； in other words； the law which confers on him these rights； may be a bad law。 When it is so； or when （which is the same thing for our purpose） it is supposed to be so； opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it。 Some maintain that no law； however bad； ought to be disobeyed by an individual citizen； that his opposition to it； if shown at all； should only be shown in endeavouring to get it altered by competent authority。 This opinion （which condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of mankind； and would often protect pernicious institutions against the only weapons which； in the state of things existing at the time； have any chance of succeeding against them） is defended； by those who hold it； on grounds of expediency； principally on that of the importance； to the common interest of mankind； of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law。 Other persons； again； hold the directly contrary opinion； that any law； judged to be bad； may blamelessly be disobeyed； even though it be not judged to be unjust； but only inexpedient； while others would confine the licence of disobedience to the case of unjust laws： but again； some say； that all laws which are inexpedient are unjust； since every law imposes some restriction on the natural liberty of mankind； which restriction is an injustice； unless legitimated by tending to their good。 Among these diversities of opinion； it seems to be universally admitted that there may be unjust laws； and that law； consequently； is not the ultimate criterion of justice； but may give to one person a benefit； or impose on another an evil； which justice condemns。 When； however； a law is thought to be unjust； it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is unjust； namely； by infringing somebody's right； which； as it cannot in this case be a legal right； receives a different appellation； and is called a moral right。 We may say； therefore； that a second case of injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right。 Thirdly； it is universally considered just that each person should obtain that （whether good or evil） which he deserves； and unjust that he should obtain a good； or be made to undergo an evil； which he does not deserve。 This is； perhaps； the clearest and most emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind。 As it involves the notion of desert； the question arises； what constitutes desert？ Speaking in a general way； a person is understood to deserve good if he does right； evil if he does wrong； and in a more particular sense； to deserve good from those to whom he does or has done good； and evil from those to whom he does or has done evil。 The precept of returning good for evil has never been regarded as a case of the fulfilment of justice； but as one in which the claims of justice are waived； in obedience to other considerations。 Fourthly； it is confessedly unjust to break faith with any one： to violate an engagement； either express or implied； or disappoint expectations raised by our conduct； at least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily。 Like the other obligations of justice already spoken