utilitarianism-第13章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


cognise　as　a　psychological　fact　the　possibility　of　its　being；　to　the　individual；　a　good　in　itself；　without　looking　to　any　end　beyond　it；　and　hold；　that　the　mind　is　not　in　a　right　state；　not　in　a　state　conformable　to　Utility；　not　in　the　state　most　conducive　to　the　general　happiness；　unless　it　does　love　virtue　in　this　manner…　as　a　thing　desirable　in　itself；　even　although；　in　the　individual　instance；　it　should　not　produce　those　other　desirable　consequences　which　it　tends　to　produce；　and　on　account　of　which　it　is　held　to　be　virtue。　This　opinion　is　not；　in　the　smallest　degree；　a　departure　from　the　Happiness　principle。　The　ingredients　of　happiness　are　very　various；　and　each　of　them　is　desirable　in　itself；　and　not　merely　when　considered　as　swelling　an　aggregate。　The　principle　of　utility　does　not　mean　that　any　given　pleasure；　as　music；　for　instance；　or　any　given　exemption　from　pain；　as　for　example　health；　is　to　be　looked　upon　as　means　to　a　collective　something　termed　happiness；　and　to　be　desired　on　that　account。　They　are　desired　and　desirable　in　and　for　themselves；　besides　being　means；　they　are　a　part　of　the　end。　Virtue；　according　to　the　utilitarian　doctrine；　is　not　naturally　and　originally　part　of　the　end；　but　it　is　capable　of　becoming　so；　and　in　those　who　love　it　disinterestedly　it　has　become　so；　and　is　desired　and　cherished；　not　as　a　means　to　happiness；　but　as　a　part　of　their　happiness。　　　To　illustrate　this　farther；　we　may　remember　that　virtue　is　not　the　only　thing；　originally　a　means；　and　which　if　it　were　not　a　means　to　anything　else；　would　be　and　remain　indifferent；　but　which　by　association　with　what　it　is　a　means　to；　comes　to　be　desired　for　itself；　and　that　too　with　the　utmost　intensity。　What；　for　example；　shall　we　say　of　the　love　of　money？　There　is　nothing　originally　more　desirable　about　money　than　about　any　heap　of　glittering　pebbles。　Its　worth　is　solely　that　of　the　things　which　it　will　buy；　the　desires　for　other　things　than　itself；　which　it　is　a　means　of　gratifying。　Yet　the　love　of　money　is　not　only　one　of　the　strongest　moving　forces　of　human　life；　but　money　is；　in　many　cases；　desired　in　and　for　itself；　the　desire　to　possess　it　is　often　stronger　than　the　desire　to　use　it；　and　goes　on　increasing　when　all　the　desires　which　point　to　ends　beyond　it；　to　be　compassed　by　it；　are　falling　off。　It　may；　then；　be　said　truly；　that　money　is　desired　not　for　the　sake　of　an　end；　but　as　part　of　the　end。　From　being　a　means　to　happiness；　it　has　come　to　be　itself　a　principal　ingredient　of　the　individual's　conception　of　happiness。　The　same　may　be　said　of　the　majority　of　the　great　objects　of　human　life…　power；　for　example；　or　fame；　except　that　to　each　of　these　there　is　a　certain　amount　of　immediate　pleasure　annexed；　which　has　at　least　the　semblance　of　being　naturally　inherent　in　them；　a　thing　which　cannot　be　said　of　money。　Still；　however；　the　strongest　natural　attraction；　both　of　power　and　of　fame；　is　the　immense　aid　they　give　to　the　attainment　of　our　other　wishes；　and　it　is　the　strong　association　thus　generated　between　them　and　all　our　objects　of　desire；　which　gives　to　the　direct　desire　of　them　the　intensity　it　often　assumes；　so　as　in　some　characters　to　surpass　in　strength　all　other　desires。　In　these　cases　the　means　have　become　a　part　of　the　end；　and　a　more　important　part　of　it　than　any　of　the　things　which　they　are　means　to。　What　was　once　desired　as　an　instrument　for　the　attainment　of　happiness；　has　come　to　be　desired　for　its　own　sake。　In　being　desired　for　its　own　sake　it　is；　however；　desired　as　part　of　happiness。　The　person　is　made；　or　thinks　he　would　be　made；　happy　by　its　mere　possession；　and　is　made　unhappy　by　failure　to　obtain　it。　The　desire　of　it　is　not　a　different　thing　from　the　desire　of　happiness；　any　more　than　the　love　of　music；　or　the　desire　of　health。　They　are　included　in　happiness。　They　are　some　of　the　elements　of　which　the　desire　of　happiness　is　made　up。　Happiness　is　not　an　abstract　idea；　but　a　concrete　whole；　and　these　are　some　of　its　parts。　And　the　utilitarian　standard　sanctions　and　approves　their　being　so。　Life　would　be　a　poor　thing；　very　ill　provided　with　sources　of　happiness；　if　there　were　not　this　provision　of　nature；　by　which　things　originally　indifferent；　but　conducive　to；　or　otherwise　associated　with；　the　satisfaction　of　our　primitive　desires；　become　in　themselves　sources　of　pleasure　more　valuable　than　the　primitive　pleasures；　both　in　permanency；　in　the　space　of　human　existence　that　they　are　capable　of　covering；　and　even　in　intensity。　　　Virtue；　according　to　the　utilitarian　conception；　is　a　good　of　this　description。　There　was　no　original　desire　of　it；　or　motive　to　it；　save　its　conduciveness　to　pleasure；　and　especially　to　protection　from　pain。　But　through　the　association　thus　formed；　it　may　be　felt　a　good　in　itself；　and　desired　as　such　with　as　great　intensity　as　any　other　good；　and　with　this　difference　between　it　and　the　love　of　money；　of　power；　or　of　fame；　that　all　of　these　may；　and　often　do；　render　the　individual　noxious　to　the　other　members　of　the　society　to　which　he　belongs；　whereas　there　is　nothing　which　makes　him　so　much　a　blessing　to　them　as　the　cultivation　of　the　disinterested　love　of　virtue。　And　consequently；　the　utilitarian　standard；　while　it　tolerates　and　approves　those　other　acquired　desires；　up　to　the　point　beyond　which　they　would　be　more　injurious　to　the　general　happiness　than　promotive　of　it；　enjoins　and　requires　the　cultivation　of　the　love　of　virtue　up　to　the　greatest　strength　possible；　as　being　above　all　things　important　to　the　general　happiness。　　　It　results　from　the　preceding　considerations；　that　there　is　in　reality　nothing　desired　except　happiness。　Whatever　is　desired　otherwise　than　as　a　means　to　some　end　beyond　itself；　and　ultimately　to　happiness；　is　desired　as　itself　a　part　of　happiness；　and　is　not　desired　for　itself　until　it　has　become　so。　Those　who　desire　virtue　for　its　own　sake；　desire　it　either　because　the　consciousness　of　it　is　a　pleasure；　or　because　the　consciousness　of　being　without　it　is　a　pain；　or　for　both　reasons　united；　as　in　truth　the　pleasure　and　pain　seldom　exist　separately；　but　almost　always　together；　the　same　person　feeling　pleasure　in　the　degree　of　virtue　attained；　and　pain　in　not　having　attained　more。　If　one　of　these　gave　him　no　pleasure；　and　the　other　no　pain；　he　would　not　love　or　desire　virtue；　or　would　desire　it　only　for　the　other　benefits　which　it　might　produce　to　himself　or　to　persons　whom　he　cared　for。　　　We　have　now；　then；　an　answer　to　the　question；　of　what　sort　of　proof　the　principle　of　utility　is　susceptible。　If　the　opinion　which　I　have　now　stated　is　psychologically　true…　if　human　nature　is　so　constituted　as　to　desire　nothing　which　is　not　either　a　part　of　happiness　or　a　means　of　happiness；　we　can　have　no　other　proof；　and　we　require　no　other；　that　these　are　the　only　things　desirable。　If　so；　happiness　is　the　sole　end　of　human　action；　and　the　promotion　of　it　the　test　by　which　to　judge　of　all　human　conduct；　from　whence　it　necessarily　follows　that　it　must　be　the　criterion　of　morality；　since　a　part　is　included　in　the　whole。　　　And　now　to　decide　whether　this　is　really　so；　whether　mankind　do　desire　nothing　for　itself　but　that　which　is　a　pleasure　to　them；　or　of　which　the　absence　is　a　pain；　we　h