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n grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it； I think that no one； who can realise this conception； will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality。 To any ethical student who finds the realisation difficult； I recommend； as a means of facilitating it； the second of M。 Comte's two principle works； the Traite de Politique Positive。 I entertain the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that treatise； but I think it has superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity； even without the aid of belief in a Providence； both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion； making it take hold of human life； and colour all thought； feeling； and action； in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste； and of which the danger is； not that it should be insufficient but that it should be so excessive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality。 Neither is it necessary to the feeling which constitutes the binding force of the utilitarian morality on those who recognise it； to wait for those social influences which would make its obligation felt by mankind at large。 In the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live； a person cannot indeed feel that entireness of sympathy with all others； which would make any real discordance in the general direction of their conduct in life impossible； but already a person in whom the social feeling is at all developed； cannot bring himself to think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness； whom he must desire to see defeated in their object in order that he may succeed in his。 The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being； tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures。 If differences of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for him to share many of their actual feelings… perhaps make him denounce and defy those feelings… he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do not conflict； that he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for； namely their own good； but is； on the contrary； promoting it。 This feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings； and is often wanting altogether。 But to those who have it； it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling。 It does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education； or a law despotically imposed by the power of society； but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without。 This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality。 This it is which makes any mind； of well…developed feelings； work with； and not against； the outward motives to care for others； afforded by what I have called the external sanctions； and when those sanctions are wanting； or act in an opposite direction； constitutes in itself a powerful internal binding force； in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character； since few but those whose mind is a moral blank； could bear to lay out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels。 Chapter 4 Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible。
IT HAS already been remarked； that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof； in the ordinary acceptation of the term。 To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles； to the first premises of our knowledge； as well as to those of our conduct。 But the former； being matters of fact； may be the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact… namely； our senses； and our internal consciousness。 Can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions of practical ends？ Or by what other faculty is cognisance taken of them？ Questions about ends are； in other words； questions what things are desirable。 The utilitarian doctrine is； that happiness is desirable； and the only thing desirable； as an end； all other things being only desirable as means to that end。 What ought to be required of this doctrine… what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil… to make good its claim to be believed？ The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible； is that people actually see it。 The only proof that a sound is audible； is that people hear it： and so of the other sources of our experience。 In like manner； I apprehend； the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable； is that people do actually desire it。 If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not； in theory and in practice； acknowledged to be an end； nothing could ever convince any person that it was so。 No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable； except that each person； so far as he believes it to be attainable； desires his own happiness。 This； however； being a fact； we have not only all the proof which the case admits of； but all which it is possible to require； that happiness is a good： that each person's happiness is a good to that person； and the general happiness； therefore； a good to the aggregate of all persons。 Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct； and consequently one of the criteria of morality。 But it has not； by this alone； proved itself to be the sole criterion。 To do that； it would seem； by the same rule； necessary to show； not only that people desire happiness； but that they never desire anything else。 Now it is palpable that they do desire things which； in common language； are decidedly distinguished from happiness。 They desire； for example； virtue； and the absence of vice； no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain。 The desire of virtue is not as universal； but it is as authentic a fact； as the desire of happiness。 And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides happiness； and that happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation。 But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue； or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired？ The very reverse。 It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired； but that it is to be desired disinterestedly； for itself。 Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue； however they may believe （as they do） that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue； yet this being granted； and it having been decided； from considerations of this description； what is virtuous； they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end； but they also recognise as a psychological fact the possibility of its being； to the individual； a good in itself； w