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at different times； been imposed upon houses； seem to have
imagined that there was some great difficulty in ascertaining；
with tolerable exactness； what was the real rent of every house。
They have regulated their taxes； therefore； according to some
more obvious circumstances； such as they had probably imagined
would； in most cases； bear some proportion to the rent。
The first tax of this kind was hearth…money； or a tax of two
shillings upon every hearth。 In order to ascertain how many
hearths were in the house； it was necessary that the tax…gatherer
should enter every room in it。 This odious visit rendered the tax
odious。 Soon after the revolution； therefore； it was abolished as
a badge of slavery。
The next tax of this kind was a tax of two shillings upon
every dwelling…house inhabited。 A house with ten windows to pay
four shillings more。 A house with twenty windows and upwards to
pay eight shillings。 This tax was afterwards so far altered that
houses with twenty windows； and with less than thirty； were
ordered to pay ten shillings； and those with thirty windows and
upwards to pay twenty shillings。 The number of windows can； in
most cases； be counted from the outside； and； in all cases；
without entering every room in the house。 The visit of the
tax…gatherer； therefore； was less offensive in this tax than in
the hearth…money。
This tax was afterwards repealed； and in the room of it was
established the window…tax； which has undergone； too； several
alterations and augmentations。 The window…tax； as it stands at
present （January 1775）； over and above the duty of three
shillings upon every house in England； and of one shilling upon
every house in Scotland； lays a duty upon every window； which； in
England； augments gradually from twopence； the lowest rate； upon
houses with not more than seven windows； to two shillings； the
highest rate； upon houses with twenty…five windows and upwards。
The principal objection to all such taxes of the worst is
their inequality； an inequality of the worst kind； as they must
frequently fall much heavier upon the poor than upon the rich。 A
house of ten pounds rent in a country town may sometimes have
more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London；
and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much
poorer man than that of the latter； yet so far as his
contribution is regulated by the window…tax； he must contribute
more to the support of the state。 Such taxes are； therefore；
directly contrary to the first of the four maxims above
mentioned。 They do not seem to offend much against any of the
other three。
The natural tendency of the window…tax； and of all other
taxes upon houses； is to lower rents。 The more a man pays for the
tax； the less； it is evident； he can afford to pay for the rent。
Since the imposition of the window…tax； however； the rents of
houses have upon the whole risen； more or less； in almost every
town and village of Great Britain with which I am acquainted。
Such has been almost everywhere the increase of the demand for
houses； that it has raised the rents more than the window…tax
could sink them； one of the many proofs of the great prosperity
of the country； and of the increasing revenue of its inhabitants。
Had it not been for the tax； rents would probably have risen
still higher。
ARTICLE II
Taxes on Profit； or upon the Revenue arising from Stock
The revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides
itself into two parts； that which pays the interest； and which
belongs to the owner of the stock； and that surplus part which is
over and above what is necessary for paying the interest。
This latter part of profit is evidently a subject not
taxable directly。 It is the compensation； and in most cases it is
no more than a very moderate compensation； for the risk and
trouble of employing the stock。 The employer must have this
compensation； otherwise he cannot； consistently with his own
interest； continue the employment。 If he was taxed directly；
therefore； in proportion to the whole profit； he would be obliged
either to raise the rate of his profit； or to charge the tax upon
the interest of money； that is； to pay less interest。 If he
raised the rate of his profit in proportion to the tax； the whole
tax； though it might be advanced by him； would be finally paid by
one or other of two different sets of people； according to the
different ways in which he might employ the stock of which he had
the management。 If he employed it as a farming stock in the
cultivation of land； he could raise the rate of his profit only
by retaining a greater portion； or； what comes to the same thing；
the price of a greater portion of the produce of the land； and as
this could be done only by a reduction of rent； the final payment
of the tax would fall upon the landlord。 If he employed it as a
mercantile or manufacturing stock； he could raise the rate of his
profit only by raising the price of his goods； in which case the
final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the consumers
of those goods。 If he did not raise the rate of his profit； he
would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it
which was allotted for the interest of money。 He could afford
less interest for whatever stock he borrowed； and the whole
weight of the tax would in this case fall ultimately upon the
interest of money。 So far as he could not relieve himself from
the tax in the one way； he would be obliged to relieve himself in
the other。
The interest of money seems at first sight a subject equally
capable of being taxed directly as the rent of land。 Like the
rent of land； it is a net produce which remains after completely
compensating the whole risk and trouble of employing the stock。
As a tax upon the rent of land cannot raise rents； because the
net produce which remains after replacing the stock of the
farmer； together with his reasonable profit； cannot be greater
after the tax than before it； so； for the same reason； a tax upon
the interest of money could not raise the rate of interest； the
quantity of stock or money in the country； like the quantity of
land； being supposed to remain the same after the tax as before
it。 The ordinary rate of profit； it has been shown in the first
book； is everywhere regulated by the quantity of stock to be
employed in proportion to the quantity of the employment； or of
the business which must be done by it。 But the quantity of the
employment； or of the business to be done by stock； could neither
be increased nor diminished by any tax upon the interest of
money。 If the quantity of the stock to be employed； therefore；
was neither increased nor diminished by it； the ordinary rate of
profit would necessarily remain the same。 But the portion of this
profit necessary for compensating the risk and trouble of the
employer would likewise remain the same； that risk and tr