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consumption of the people。
The revenue which； in any civilised monarchy； the crown
derives from the crown lands； though it appears to cost nothing
to individuals； in reality costs more to the society than perhaps
any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys。 It would； in all
cases； be for the interest of the society to replace this revenue
to the crown by some other equal revenue； and to divide the lands
among the people； which could not well be done better； perhaps；
than by exposing them to public sale。
Lands for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence… parks；
gardens； public walks； etc。； possessions which are everywhere
considered as causes of expense； not as sources of revenue… seem
to be the only lands which； in a great and civilised monarchy；
ought to belong to the crown。
Public stock and public lands； therefore； the two sources of
revenue which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or
commonwealth； being both improper and insufficient funds for
defraying the necessary expense of any great and civilised state；
it remains that this expense must； the greater part of it； be
defrayed by taxes of one kind or another； the people contributing
a part of their own private revenue in order to make up a public
revenue to the sovereign or commonwealth。
PART 2
Of Taxes
THE private revenue of individuals； it has been shown in the
first book of this Inquiry； arises ultimately from three
different sources： Rent； Profit； and Wages。 Every tax must
finally be paid from some one or other of those three different
sorts of revenue； or from all of them indifferently。 I shall
endeavour to give the best account I can； first； of those taxes
which； it is intended； should fall upon rent； secondly； of those
which； it is intended； should fall upon profit； thirdly； of those
which； it is intended； should fall upon wages； and； fourthly； of
those which； it is intended； should fall indifferently upon all
those three different sources of private revenue。 The particular
consideration of each of these four different sorts of taxes will
divide the second part of the present chapter into four articles；
three of which will require several other subdivisions。 Many of
those taxes； it will appear from the following review； are not
finally paid from the fund； or source of revenue； upon which it
was intended they should fall。
Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes； it
is necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to
taxes in general。
I。 The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards
the support of the government； as nearly as possible； in
proportion to their respective abilities； that is； in proportion
to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection
of the state。 The expense of government to the individuals of a
great nation is like the expense of management to the joint
tenants of a great estate； who are all obliged to contribute in
proportion to their respective interests in the estate。 In the
observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the
equality or inequality of taxation。 Every tax； it must be
observed once for all； which falls finally upon one only of the
three sorts of revenue above mentioned； is necessarily unequal in
so far as it does not affect the other two。 In the following
examination of different taxes I shall seldom take much further
notice of this sort of inequality； but shall； in most cases；
confine my observations to that inequality which is occasioned by
a particular tax falling unequally even upon that particular sort
of private revenue which is affected by it。
II。 The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to
be certain； and not arbitrary。 The time of payment； the manner of
payment； the quantity to be paid； ought all to be clear and plain
to the contributor； and to every other person。 Where it is
otherwise； every person subject to the tax is put more or less in
the power of the tax…gathered； who can either aggravate the tax
upon any obnoxious contributor； or extort； by the terror of such
aggravation； some present or perquisite to himself。 The
uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the
corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular； even
where they are neither insolent nor corrupt。 The certainty of
what each individual ought to pay is； in taxation； a matter of so
great importance that a very considerable degree of inequality；
it appears； I believe； from the experience of all nations； is not
near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty。
III。 Every tax ought to be levied at the time； or in the
manner； in which it is most likely to be convenient for the
contributor to pay it。 A tax upon the rent of land or of houses；
payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid； is
levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for
the contributor to pay； or； when he is most likely to have
wherewithal to pay。 Taxes upon such consumable goods as are
articles of luxury are all finally paid by the consumer； and
generally in a manner that is very convenient for him。 He pays
them by little and little； as he has occasion to buy the goods。
As he is at liberty； too； either to buy； or not to buy； as he
pleases； it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any
considerable inconveniency from such taxes。
IV。 Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out
and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as
possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury
of the state。 A tax may either take out or keep out of the
pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the
public treasury； in the four following ways。 First； the levying
of it may require a great number of officers； whose salaries may
eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax； and whose
perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people。
Secondly； it may obstruct the industry the people； and discourage
them from applying to certain branches of business which might
give maintenance and unemployment to great multitudes。 While it
obliges the people to pay； it may thus diminish； or perhaps
destroy； some of the funds which might enable them more easily to
do so。 Thirdly； by the forfeitures and other penalties which
those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to
evade the tax； it may frequently ruin them； and thereby put an
end to the benefit which the community might have received from
the employment of their capitals。 An injudicious tax offers a
great temptation to smuggling。 But the penalties of smuggling
must rise in proportion to the temptation。 The law； contrary to
all the ordinary principles of justice； first creates the
temptation； and then punishes those who yield to it； and it
commonly enhances the punishment； too； in proportion to the very
ci