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danger is equally great。 The princes who have dared in this
manner to rebel against the church； over and above this crime of
rebellion have generally been charged； too； with the additional
crime of heresy； notwithstanding their solemn protestations of
their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she
thought proper to prescribe to them。 But the authority of
religion is superior to every other authority。 The fears which it
suggests conquer all other fears。 When the authorized teachers of
religion propagate through the great body of the people doctrines
subversive of the authority of the sovereign； it is by violence
only； or by the force of a standing army； that he can maintain
his authority。 Even a standing army cannot in this case give him
any lasting security； because if the soldiers are not foreigners；
which can seldom be the case； but drawn from the great body of
the people； which must almost always be the case； they are likely
to be soon corrupted by those very doctrines。 The revolutions
which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually
occasioning at Constantinople； as long as the eastern empire
subsisted； the convulsions which； during the course of several
centuries； the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually
occasioning in every part of Europe； sufficiently demonstrate how
precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the
sovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of
the established and governing religion of his country。
Articles of faith； as well as all other spiritual matters；
it is evident enough； are not within the proper department of a
temporal sovereign； who； though he may be very well qualified for
protecting； is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the
people。 With regard to such matters； therefore； his authority can
seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of
the clergy of the established church。 The public tranquillity；
however； and his own security； may frequently depend upon the
doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning
such matters。 As he can seldom directly oppose their decision；
therefore； with proper weight and authority； it is necessary that
he should be able to influence it； and be can influence it only
by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater
part of the individuals of the order。 Those fears and
expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other
punishment； and in the expectation of further preferment。
In all Christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a
sort of freeholds which they enjoy； not during pleasure； but
during life or good behaviour。 If they held them by a more
precarious tenure； and were liable to be turned out upon every
slight disobligation either of the sovereign or of his ministers；
it would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their
authority with the people； who would then consider them as
mercenary dependents upon the court； in the security of whose
instructions they could no longer have any confidence。 But should
the sovereign attempt irregularly； and by violence； to deprive
any number of clergymen of their freeholds； on account； perhaps；
of their having propagated； with more than ordinary zeal； some
factious or seditious doctrine； he would only render； by such
persecution； both them and their doctrine ten times more popular；
and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous； than they
had been before。 Fear is in almost all cases a wretched
instrument of government； and ought in particular never to be
employed against any order of men who have the smallest
pretensions to independency。 To attempt to terrify them serves
only to irritate their bad humour； and to confirm them in an
opposition which more gentle usage perhaps might easily induce
them either to soften or to lay aside altogether。 The violence
which the French government usually employed in order to oblige
all their parliaments； or sovereign courts of justice； to
enregister any unpopular edict； very seldom succeeded。 The means
commonly employed； however； the imprisonment of all the
refractory members； one would think were forcible enough。 The
princes of the house of Stewart sometimes employed the like means
in order to influence some of the members of the Parliament of
England； and they generally found them equally intractable。 The
Parliament of England is now managed in another manner； and a
very small experiment which the Duke of Choiseul made about
twelve years ago upon the Parliament of Paris； demonstrated
sufficiently that all the parliaments of France might have been
managed still more easily in the same manner。 That experiment was
not pursued。 For though management and persuasion are always the
easiest and the safest instruments of governments； as force and
violence are the worst and the most dangerous； yet such； it
seems； is the natural insolence of man that he almost always
disdains to use the good instrument； except when he cannot or
dare not use the bad one。 The French government could and durst
use force； and therefore disdained to use management and
persuasion。 But there is no order of men； it appears； I believe；
from the experience of all ages； upon whom it is so dangerous； or
rather so perfectly ruinous； to employ force and violence； as
upon the respected clergy of any established church。 The rights；
the privileges； the personal liberty of every individual
ecclesiastic who is upon good terms with his own order are； even
in the most despotic governments； more respected than those of
any other person of nearly equal rank and fortune。 It is so in
every gradation of despotism； from that of the gentle and mild
government of Paris to that of the violent and furious government
of Constantinople。 But though this order of men can scarce ever
be forced； they may be managed as easily as any other； and the
security of the sovereign； as well as the public tranquillity；
seems to depend very much upon the means which he has of managing
them； and those means seem to consist altogether in the
preferment which he has to bestow upon them。
In the ancient constitution of the Christian church； the
bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the
clergy and of the people of the episcopal city。 The people did
not long retain their right of election； and while they did
retain it； they almost always acted under the influence of the
clergy； who in such spiritual matters appeared to be their
natural guides。 The clergy； however； soon grew weary of the
trouble of managing them； and found it easier to elect their own
bishops themselves。 The abbot； in the same manner； was elected by
the monks of the monastery； at least in the greater part of the
abbacies。 All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended
within the diocese were collated by the bishop； who bestowed them
upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper。 All church
preferments were