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though a canal does。 The proprietors of the tolls upon a high
road； therefore； might neglect altogether the repair of the road；
and yet continue to levy very nearly the same tolls。 It is
proper； therefore； that the tolls for the maintenance of such a
work should be put under the management of commissioners or
trustees。
In Great Britain； the abuses which the trustees have
committed in the management of those tolls have in many cases
been very justly complained of。 At many turnpikes； it has been
said； the money levied is more than double of what is necessary
for executing； in the completest manner； the work which is often
executed in very slovenly manner； and sometimes not executed at
all。 The system of repairing the high roads by tolls of this
kind； it must be observed； is not of very long standing。 We
should not wonder； therefore； if it has not yet been brought to
that degree of perfection of which it seems capable。 If mean and
improper persons are frequently appointed trustees； and if proper
courts of inspection and account have not yet been established
for controlling their conduct； and for reducing the tolls to what
is barely sufficient for executing the work to be done by them；
the recency of the institution both accounts and apologizes for
those defects； of which； by the wisdom of Parliament； the greater
part may in due time be gradually remedied。
The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain
is supposed to exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the
roads； that the savings； which； with proper economy； might be
made from it； have been considered； even by some ministers； as a
very great resource which might at some time or another be
applied to the exigencies of the state。 Government； it has been
said； by taking the management of the turnpikes into its own
hands； and by employing the soldiers； who would work for a very
small addition to their pay； could keep the roads in good order
at a much less expense than it can be done by trustees； who have
no other workmen to employ but such as derive their whole
subsistence from their wages。 A great revenue； half a million
perhaps；* it has been pretended； might in this manner be gained
without laying any new burden upon the people； and the turnpike
roads might be made to contribute to the general expense of the
state； in the same manner as the post office does at present。
* Since publishing the two first editions of this book； I have
got good reasons to believe that all the turnpike tolls levied in
Great Britain do not produce a net revenue that amounts to half a
million； a sum which； under the management of Government； would
not be sufficient to keep in repair five of the principal roads
in the kingdom。
That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner I
have no doubt； though probably not near so much as the projectors
of this plan have supposed。 The plan itself； however； seems
liable to several very important objections。
First； if the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should
ever be considered as one of the resources for supplying the
exigencies of the state； they would certainly be augmented as
those exigencies were supposed to require。 According to the
policy of Great Britain； therefore； they would probably be
augmented very fast。 The facility with which a great revenue
could be drawn from them would probably encourage administration
to recur very frequently to this resource。 Though it may；
perhaps； be more than doubtful whether half a million could by
any economy be saved out of the present tolls； it can scarce be
doubted but that a million might be saved out of them if they
were doubled： and perhaps two millions if they were tripled。*
This great revenue； too； might be levied without the appointment
of a single new officer to collect and receive it。 But the
turnpike tolls being continually augmented in this manner；
instead of facilitating the inland commerce of the country as at
present； would soon become a very great incumbrance upon it。 The
expense of transporting all heavy goods from one part of the
country to another would soon be so much increased； the market
for all such goods； consequently； would soon be so much narrowed；
that their production would be in a great measure discouraged；
and the most important branches of the domestic industry of the
country annihilated altogether。 * I have now good reasons to
believe that all these conjectural sums are by much too large。
Secondly； a tax upon carriages in proportion to their
weight； though a very equal tax when applied to the sole purpose
of repairing the roads； is a very unequal one when applied to any
other purpose； or to supply the common exigencies of the state。
When it is applied to the sole purpose above mentioned； each
carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the wear and tear which
that carriage occasions of the roads。 But when it is applied to
any other purpose； each carriage is supposed to pay for more than
that wear and tear； and contributes to the supply of some other
exigency of the state。 But as the turnpike toll raises the price
of goods in proportion to their weight； and not to their value；
it is chiefly paid by the consumers of coarse and bulky； not by
those of precious and light； commodities。 Whatever exigency of
the state therefore this tax might be intended to supply； that
exigency would be chiefly supplied at the expense of the poor；
not the rich； at the expense of those who are least able to
supply it； not of those who are most able。
Thirdly； if government should at any time neglect the
reparation of the high roads； it would be still more difficult
than it is at present to compel the proper application of any
part of the turnpike tolls。 A large revenue might thus be levied
upon the people without any part of it being applied to the only
purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be
applied。 If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of turnpike
roads render it sometimes difficult at present to oblige them to
repair their wrong； their wealth and greatness would render it
ten times more so in the case which is here supposed。
In France； the funds destined for the reparation of high
roads are under the immediate direction of the executive power。
Those funds consist partly in a certain number of days' labour
which the country people are in most parts of Europe obliged to
give to the reparation of the highways； and partly in such a
portion of the general revenue of the state as the king chooses
to spare from his other expenses。
By the ancient law of France； as well as by that of most
other parts of Europe； the labour of the country people was under
the direction of a local or provincial magistracy； which had no
immediate dependency upon the king's council。 But by the present
practice both the labour of the people； and whatever other fund
the king may choose to assign for the rep