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life； and for that reason it is that； if I were now compelled to choose；
I should sooner； I think； consent to lose my sight； than my hearing and
speech。 The Athenians； and also the Romans； kept this exercise in great
honour in their academies； the Italians retain some traces of it to this
day； to their great advantage； as is manifest by the comparison of our
understandings with theirs。 The study of books is a languishing and
feeble motion that heats not； whereas conversation teaches and exercises
at once。 If I converse with a strong mind and a rough disputant； he
presses upon my flanks； and pricks me right and left； his imaginations
stir up mine； jealousy； glory； and contention； stimulate and raise me up
to something above myself； and acquiescence is a quality altogether
tedious in discourse。 But； as our mind fortifies itself by the
communication of vigorous and regular understandings； 'tis not to be
expressed how much it loses and degenerates by the continual commerce and
familiarity we have with mean and weak spirits； there is no contagion
that spreads like that； I know sufficiently by experience what 'tis worth
a yard。 I love to discourse and dispute； but it is with but few men； and
for myself； for to do it as a spectacle and entertainment to great
persons； and to make of a man's wit and words competitive parade is； in
my opinion； very unbecoming a man of honour。
Folly is a bad quality； but not to be able to endure it； to fret and vex
at it； as I do； is another sort of disease little less troublesome than
folly itself； and is the thing that I will now accuse in myself。 I enter
into conference； and dispute with great liberty and facility； forasmuch
as opinion meets in me with a soil very unfit for penetration； and
wherein to take any deep root； no propositions astonish me； no belief
offends me； though never so contrary to my own； there is no so frivolous
and extravagant fancy that does not seem to me suitable to the production
of human wit。 We； who deprive our judgment of the right of determining；
look indifferently upon the diverse opinions； and if we incline not our
judgment to them； yet we easily give them the hearing： Where one scale is
totally empty； I let the other waver under an old wife's dreams； and I
think myself excusable； if I prefer the odd number； Thursday rather than
Friday； if I had rather be the twelfth or fourteenth than the thirteenth
at table； if I had rather； on a journey； see a hare run by me than cross
my way； and rather give my man my left foot than my right； when he comes
to put on my stockings。 All such reveries as are in credit around us；
deserve at least a hearing： for my part； they only with me import
inanity； but they import that。 Moreover； vulgar and casual opinions are
something more than nothing in nature； and he who will not suffer himself
to proceed so far； falls； peradventure； into the vice of obstinacy； to
avoid that of superstition。
The contradictions of judgments； then； neither offend nor alter； they
only rouse and exercise； me。 We evade correction； whereas we ought to
offer and present ourselves to it； especially when it appears in the form
of conference； and not of authority。 At every opposition； we do not
consider whether or no it be dust； but； right or wrong； how to disengage
ourselves： instead of extending the arms； we thrust out our claws。 I
could suffer myself to be rudely handled by my friend； so much as to tell
me that I am a fool； and talk I know not of what。 I love stout
expressions amongst gentle men； and to have them speak as they think； we
must fortify and harden our hearing against this tenderness of the
ceremonious sound of words。 I love a strong and manly familiarity and
conversation： a friendship that pleases itself in the sharpness and
vigour of its communication； like love in biting and scratching： it is
not vigorous and generous enough； if it be not quarrelsome； if it be
civilised and artificial； if it treads nicely and fears the shock：
〃Neque enim disputari sine reprehensione potest。〃
＇〃Neither can a man dispute； but he must contradict。〃
（Or：） 〃Nor can people dispute without reprehension。〃
Cicero； De Finib。； i。 8。＇
When any one contradicts me； he raises my attention； not my anger： I
advance towards him who controverts； who instructs me； the cause of truth
ought to be the common cause both of the one and the other。 What will
the angry man answer？ Passion has already confounded his judgment；
agitation has usurped the place of reason。 It were not amiss that the
decision of our disputes should pass by wager： that there might be a
material mark of our losses； to the end we might the better remember
them； and that my man might tell me： 〃Your ignorance and obstinacy cost
you last year； at several times； a hundred crowns。〃 I hail and caress
truth in what quarter soever I find it； and cheerfully surrender myself；
and open my conquered arms as far off as I can discover it； and； provided
it be not too imperiously； take a pleasure in being reproved； and
accommodate myself to my accusers； very often more by reason of civility
than amendment； loving to gratify and nourish the liberty of admonition
by my facility of submitting to it； and this even at my own expense。
Nevertheless； it is hard to bring the men of my time to it： they have not
the courage to correct； because they have not the courage to suffer
themselves to be corrected； and speak always with dissimulation in the
presence of one another： I take so great a pleasure in being judged and
known； that it is almost indifferent to me in which of the two forms I am
so： my imagination so often contradicts and condemns itself； that 'tis
all one to me if another do it； especially considering that I give his
reprehension no greater authority than I choose； but I break with him；
who carries himself so high； as I know of one who repents his advice；
if not believed； and takes it for an affront if it be not immediately
followed。 That Socrates always received smilingly the contradictions
offered to his arguments； a man may say arose from his strength of
reason； and that； the advantage being certain to fall on his side； he
accepted them as a matter of new victory。 But we see； on the contrary；
that nothing in argument renders our sentiment so delicate； as the
opinion of pre…eminence； and disdain of the adversary； and that； in
reason； 'tis rather for the weaker to take in good part the oppositions
that correct him and set him right。 In earnest； I rather choose the
company of those who ruffle me than of those who fear me； 'tis a dull and
hurtful pleasure to have to do with people who admire us and approve of
all we say。 Antisthenes commanded his children never to take it kindly
or for a favour； when any man commended them。 I find I am much prouder
of the victory I obtain over myself； when； in the very ardour of dispute；
I make myself submit to my adversary's force of reason； than I am pleased
with the victory I obtain over him through his weakness。 In fine； I
receive and admit of all manner of attacks that are direct； how weak
soever； but I am too impatient of those that are made out of