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the Constitution in the Executive； and in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice President。 The question has often been raised in subsequent times of high excitement； and the practice of the Government has nevertheless conformed in all cases to the decision thus early made。 * * * Chancellor Kent's remarks on the subject are as follows：
〃On the first organization of the Government it was made a question whether the power of removal in case of officers appointed to hold at pleasure resided nowhere but in the body which appointed； and； of course； whether the consent of the Senate was not requisite to remove。 This was the construction given to the Constitution while it was pending for ratification before the State conventions by the author of the Federalist。 But the construction which was given to the Constitution by Congress； after great consideration and discussion； was different。 The words of the act （establishing the Treasury Department） are： 'And whenever the same shall be removed from office by the President of the United States； or in any other case of vacancy in the office； the assistant shall act。' This amounted to a legislative construction of the Constitution； and it has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon as decisive authority in the case。 It applies equally to every other officer of the Government appointed by the President； whose term of duration is not specially declared。 It is supported by the weighty reason that the subordinate officers in the executive department ought to hold at the pleasure of the head of the Department； because he is invested generally with the executive authority； and the participation in that authority by the Senate was an exception to a general principle and ought to be taken strictly。 The President is the great responsible officer for the faithful execution of the law； and the power of removal was incidental to that duty； and might often be requisite to fulfill it。〃
Thus has the important question presented by this bill been settled； in the language of the late Daniel Webster （who； while dissenting from it； admitted that it was settled）； by construction； settled by precedent； settled by the practice of the Government； and settled by statute。
The events of the last war furnished a practical confirmation of the wisdom of the Constitution as it has hitherto been maintained in many of its parts； including that which is now the subject of consideration。 When the war broke out rebel enemies； traitors； abettors； and sympathizers were found in every department of the Government； as well in the civil service as in the land and naval military service。 They were found in Congress and among the keepers of the Capitol； in foreign missions； in each and all of the Executive Departments； in the judicial service； in the Post Office； and among the agents for conducting Indian affairs； and upon probable suspicion they were promptly displaced by my predecessor； so far as they held their offices under executive authority； and their duties were confided to new and loyal successors。 No complaints against that power or doubts of its wisdom； were entertained in any quarter。
Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the concurrence of its founders； I have found no sufficient grounds in the arguments now opposed to that construction or in any assumed necessity of the times for changing those opinions。 For these reasons I return the bill to the Senate； in which House it originated； for the further consideration of Congress； which the Constitution prescribes。 Insomuch as the several parts of the bill which I have not considered are matters chiefly of detail； and are based altogether upon the theory of the Constitution from which I am obliged to dissent； I have not thought it necessary to examine them with a view to make them an occasion of distinct and special objections。 Experience； I think； has shown that it is the easiest； as it is also the most attractive； of studies to frame constitutions for the self…government of free States and nations。
But I think experience has equally shown that it is the most difficult of all political labors to preserve and maintain such free constitutions of self government when once happily established。 I know no other way in which they can be preserved and maintained except by a constant adherence to them through the various vicissitudes of national existence； with such adaptations as may become necessary； always to be effected； however； through the agencies and in the forms prescribed in the original constitutions themselves。 Whenever administration fails or seems to fail in securing any of the great ends for which Republican Government is established； the proper course seems to be to renew the original spirit and forms of the Constitution itself。
Andrew Johnson
The bill was promptly passed in both Houses over the President's veto and became a law。
As pertinent and incident to the history of this controversy； is the communication of the President notifying the Senate of the suspension of Mr。 Stanton； Aug。 12； 1867。 The President said：
The Tenure…of…Office Act did not pass without notice。 Like other acts； it was sent to the President for approval。 As is my custom I submitted it to the consideration of my Cabinet for their advice whether I should approve it or not。 I was a grave question of constitutional law； in which I would of course rely mostly upon the opinion of the Attorney General； and of Mr。 Stanton； who had once been Attorney General。 EVERY MEMBER OF MY CABINET ADVISED ME THAT THE PROPOSED LAW WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL。 All spoke without doubt or reservation； but MR。 STANTON'S CONDEMNATION OF THE LAW WAS THE MOST ELABORATE AND EMPHATIC。 He referred to the Constitutional provisions； the debates in Congress； especially to the speech of Mr。 Buchanan when a Senator； to the decisions of the Supreme Court； and to the usage from the beginning of the Government through every successive administration； all concurring to establish the right of removal as vested in the President。 To all these he added the weight of his own deliberate judgment； and advised me that it was my duty to defend the power of the President from usurpation and veto the law。
During the recess of Congress in the Summer of 1867； the President suspended Mr。 Stanton from the War Office and appointed Gen。 Grant Secretary of War ad interim。 Gen。 Grant was then understood as supporting the President in his controversy with Mr。 Stanton； and promptly accepted the appointment； holding it until the following December； when the change was duly reported to the Senate。 The Senate refused to sanction Mr。 Stanton's suspension； and he consequently resumed his position of Secretary of War and retained it until the close of the Impeachment trialthe Senate then； in effect； by rejecting the Impeachment； declaring that the President had the right to remove him。
Very naturally； after Mr。 Stanton's restoration to the War Office by the refusal of the Senate to sanction his suspension； the relations between himself and the President were embittered and many efforts were made by mutual friends to induce Mr。 Stanton