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of the conception defined； so as to furnish a knowledge of the reality
of the object。 The nominal definition of the external 〃mine〃 would
thus be： 〃The external mine is anything outside of myself； such that
any hindrance of my use of it at will would be doing me an injury or
wrong as an infringement of that freedom of mine which may coexist
with the freedom of all others according to a universal law。〃 The real
definition of this conception may be put thus： 〃The external mine is
anything outside of myself； such that any prevention of my use of it
would be a wrong； although I may not be in possession of it so as to
be actually holding it as an object。〃 I must be in some kind of
possession of an external object； if the object is to be regarded as
mine； for； otherwise； anyone interfering with this object would not；
in doing so； affect me； nor； consequently； would he thereby do me
any wrong。 Hence； according to SS 4； a rational possession
（possessio noumenon） must be assumed as possible； if there is to be
rightly an external mine and thine。 Empirical possession is thus
only phenomenal possession or holding （detention） of the object in the
sphere of sensible appearance （possessio phenomenon）； although the
object which I possess is not regarded in this practical relation as
itself a phenomenon… according to the exposition of the Transcendental
Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason… but as a thing in itself。 For
in the Critique of Pure Reason the interest of reason turns upon the
theoretical knowledge of the nature of things and how far reason can
go in such knowledge。 But here reason has to deal with the practical
determination of the action of the will according to laws of
freedom； whether the object is perceivable through the senses or
merely thinkable by the pure understanding。 And right； as under
consideration； is a pure practical conception of the reason in
relation to the exercise of the will under laws of freedom。
And； hence； it is not quite correct to speak of 〃possessing〃 a right
to this or that object； but it should rather be said that an object is
possessed in a purely juridical way； for a right is itself the
rational possession of an object； and to 〃possess a possession；〃 would
be an expression without meaning。
6。 Deduction of the Conception of a Purely Juridical
Possession of an External Object （Possessio Noumenon）。
The question； 〃How is an external mine and thine possible？〃 resolves
itself into this other question： 〃How is a merely juridical or
rational possession possible？〃 And this second question resolves
itself again into a third： 〃How is a synthetic proposition in right
possible a priori？〃
All propositions of right… as juridical propositions… are
propositions a priori； for they are practical laws of reason
（dictamina rationis）。 But the juridical proposition a priori
respecting empirical possession is analytical； for it says nothing
more than what follows by the principle of contradiction； from the
conception of such possession； namely； that if I am the holder of a
thing in the way of being physically connected with it； any one
interfering with it without my consent… as； for instance； in wrenching
an apple out of my hand… affects and detracts from my freedom as
that which is internally mine； and consequently the maxim of his
action is in direct contradiction to the axiom of right。 The
proposition expressing the principle of an empirical rightful
possession does not therefore go beyond the right of a person in
reference to himself。
On the other hand； the proposition expressing the possibility of the
possession of a thing external to me； after abstraction of all the
conditions of empirical possession in space and time… consequently
presenting the assumption of the possibility of a possessio
noumenon… goes beyond these limiting conditions； and because this
proposition asserts a possession even without physical holding； as
necessary to the conception of the external mine and thine； it is
synthetical。 And thus it becomes a problem for reason to show how such
a proposition； extending its range beyond the conception of
empirical possession； is possible a priori。
In this manner； for instance； the act of taking possession of a
particular portion of the soil is a mode exercising the private
free…will without being an act of usurpation。 The possessor founds
upon the innate right of common possession of the surface of the
earth； and upon the universal will corresponding a priori to it； which
allows a private possession of the soil； because what are mere
things would be otherwise made in themselves and by a law into
unappropriable objects。 Thus a first appropriator acquires
originally by primary possession a particular portion of the ground；
and by right （jure） he resists every other person who would hinder him
in the private use of it； although； while the 〃state of nature〃
continues； this cannot be done by juridical means （de jure）； because a
public law does not yet exist。
And although a piece of ground should be regarded as free； or
declared to be such； so as to be for the public use of all without
distinction； yet it cannot be said that it is thus free by nature
and originally so； prior to any juridical act。 For there would be a
real relation already incorporated in such a piece of ground by the
very fact that the possession of it was denied to any particular
individual； and as this public freedom of the ground would be a
prohibition of it to every particular individual； this presupposes a
common possession of it which cannot take effect without a contract。 A
piece of ground； however； which can only become publicly free by
contract； must actually be in the possession of all those associated
together； who mutually interdict or suspend each other； from any
particular or private use of it。
This original community of the soil and of the things upon it
（communio fundi originaria）； is an idea which has objective and
practical juridical reality and is entirely different from the idea of
a primitive community of things； which is a fiction。 For the latter
would have had to be founded as a form of society； and must have taken
its rise from a contract by which all renounced the right of private
possession； so that by uniting the property owned by each into a
whole； it was thus transformed into a common possession。 But had
such an event taken place； history must have presented some evidence
of it。 To regard such a procedure as the original mode of taking
possession； and to hold that the particular possessions of every
individual may and ought to be grounded upon it； is evidently a
contradiction。
Possession （possessio） is to be distinguished from habitation as
mere residence （sedes）； and the act of taking possession of the soil
in the intention of acquiring it once for all； is also to be
distinguished from settlement or domicile （incolatus）； which is a
continuous private possession