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at the same time its own form of government； as in a separate
parliament under the presidency of a viceroy （civitas hybrida）。 Such
was Athens in relation to different islands； and such is at present
（1796） the relation of Great Britain to Ireland。
Still less can slavery be deduced as a rightful institution； from
the conquest of a people in war； for this would assume that the war
was of a punitive nature。 And least of all can a basis be found in war
for a hereditary slavery； which is absurd in itself； since guilt
cannot be inherited from the criminality of another。
Further； that an amnesty is involved in the conclusion of a treaty
of peace is already implied in the very idea of a peace。
59。 The Rights of Peace。
The rights of peace are：
1。 The right to be in peace when war is in the neighbourhood； or the
right of neutrality。
2。 The right to have peace secured so that it may continue when it
has been concluded； that is； the right of guarantee。
3。 The right of the several states to enter into a mutual
alliance； so as to defend themselves in common against all external or
even internal attacks。 This right of federation； however； does not
extend to the formation of any league for external aggression or
internal aggrandizement。
60。 Right as against an Unjust Enemy。
The right of a state against an unjust enemy has no limits； at least
in respect of quality as distinguished from quantity or degree。 In
other words； the injured state may use… not； indeed any means； but
yet… all those means that are permissible and in reasonable measure in
so far as they are in its power； in order to assert its right to
what is its own。 But what then is an unjust enemy according to the
conceptions of the right of nations； when； as holds generally of the
state of nature； every state is judge in its own cause？ It is one
whose publicly expressed will； whether in word or deed； betrays a
maxim which； if it were taken as a universal rule； would make a
state of peace among the nations impossible； and would necessarily
perpetuate the state of nature。 Such is the violation of public
treaties； with regard to which it may be assumed that any such
violation concerns all nations by threatening their freedom； and
that they are thus summoned to unite against such a wrong and to
take away the power of committing it。 But this does not include the
right to partition and appropriate the country； so as to make a
state as it were disappear from the earth； for this would be an
injustice to the people of that state； who cannot lose their
original right to unite into a commonwealth； and to adopt such a new
constitution as by its nature would be unfavourable to the inclination
for war。
Further； it may be said that the expression 〃an unjust enemy in
the state of nature〃 is pleonastic； for the state of nature is
itself a state of injustice。 A just enemy would be one to whom I would
do wrong in offering resistance； but such a one would really not be my
enemy。
61。 Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of Nations。
The natural state of nations as well as of individual men is a state
which it is a duty to pass out of； in order to enter into a legal
state。 Hence； before this transition occurs； all the right of
nations and all the external property of states acquirable or
maintainable by war are merely provisory； and they can only become
peremptory in a universal union of states analogous to that by which a
nation becomes a state。 It is thus only that a real state of peace
could be established。 But with the too great extension of such a union
of states over vast regions； any government of it； and consequently
the protection of its individual members； must at last become
impossible； and thus a multitude of such corporations would again
bring round a state of war。 Hence the perpetual peace； which is the
ultimate end of all the right of nations； becomes in fact an
impracticable idea。 The political principles； however； which aim at
such an end； and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the
states as may promote a continuous approximation to a perpetual peace；
are not impracticable； they are as practicable as this approximation
itself； which is a practical problem involving a duty； and founded
upon the right of individual men and states。
Such a union of states； in order to maintain peace； may be called
a permanent congress of nations； and it is free to every
neighbouring state to join in it。 A union of this kind； so far at
least as regards the formalities of the right of nations in respect of
the preservation of peace； was presented in the first half of this
century； in the Assembly of the States…General at the Hague。 In this
Assembly most of the European courts； and even the smallest republics；
brought forward their complaints about the hostilities which were
carried on by the one against the other。 Thus the whole of Europe
appeared like a single federated state； accepted as umpire by the
several nations in their public differences。 But in place of this
agreement； the right of nations afterwards survived only in books；
it disappeared from the cabinets； or； after force had been already
used； it was relegated in the form of theoretical deductions to the
obscurity of archives。
By such a congress is here meant only a voluntary combination of
different states that would be dissoluble at any time； and not such
a union as is embodied in the United States of America； founded upon a
political constitution； and therefore indissoluble。 It is only by a
congress of this kind that the idea of a public right of nations can
be established； and that the settlement of their differences by the
mode of a civil process； and not by the barbarous means of war； can be
realized。
III。 The Universal Right of Mankind。
（Jus Cosmopoliticum）
62。 Nature and Conditions of Cosmopolitical Right。
The rational idea of a universal； peaceful； if not yet friendly；
union of all the nations upon the earth that may come into active
relations with each other； is a juridical principle； as
distinguished from philanthropic or ethical principles。 Nature has
enclosed them altogether within definite boundaries； in virtue of
the spherical form of their abode as a globus terraqueus； and the
possession of the soil upon which an inhabitant of the earth may
live can only be regarded as possession of a part of a limited whole
and； consequently； as a part to which every one has originally a
right。 Hence all nations originally hold a community of the soil；
but not a juridical community of possession （communio）； nor
consequently of the use or proprietorship of the soil； but only of a
possible physical intercourse （commercium） by means of it。 In other
words； they are placed in such thoroughgoing relations of each to
all the rest that they may claim to enter into intercourse with one
anot