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profess； or to decree that a certain faith shall be unalterably
held； and that the church may not reform itself。 For in doing so；
the supreme power would be mixing itself up in a scholastic wrangle；
on a footing of equality with its subjects； the monarch would be
making himself a priest； and the churchmen might even reproach the
supreme power with understanding nothing about matters of faith。
Especially would this hold in respect of any prohibition of internal
reform in the church； for what the people as a whole cannot
determine upon for themselves cannot be determined for the people by
the legislator。 But no people can ever rationally determine that
they will never advance farther in their insight into matters of
faith； or resolve that they will never reform the institutions of
the church； because this would be opposed to the humanity in their own
persons and to their highest rights。 And therefore the supreme power
cannot of itself resolve and decree in these matters for the people。
As regards the cost of maintaining the ecclesiastical establishment；
for similar reasons this must be derived not from the public funds
of the state； but from the section of the people who profess the
particular faith of the church； and thus only ought it to fall as a
burden on the community。
D。 The Right of Assigning Offices and Dignities in the State。
The right of the supreme authority in the state also includes：
1。 The distribution of offices； as public and paid employments；
2。 The conferring of dignities； as unpaid distinctions of rank；
founded merely on honour； but establishing a gradation of higher and
lower orders in the political scale； the latter； although free in
themselves； being under obligation determined by the public law to
obey the former so far as they are also entitled to command；
3。 Besides these relatively beneficent rights； the supreme power
in the state is also invested with the right of administering
punishment。
As regards civil offices； the question arises as to whether the
sovereign has the right； after bestowing an office on an individual；
to take it again away at his mere pleasure； without any crime having
been committed by the holder of the office。 I say； 〃No。〃 For what
the united will of the people would never resolve； regarding their
civil officers； cannot （constitutionally） be determined by the
sovereign regarding them。 The people have to bear the cost incurred by
the appointment of an official； and undoubtedly it must be their
will that any one in office should be completely competent for its
duties。 But such competency can only be acquired by a long preparation
and training； and this process would necessarily occupy the time
that would be required for acquiring the means of support by a
different occupation。 Arbitrary and frequent changes would
therefore； as a rule； have the effect of filling offices with
functionaries who have not acquired the skill required for their
duties； and whose judgements had not attained maturity by practice。
All this is contrary to the purpose of the state。 And besides it is
requisite in the interest of the people that it should be possible for
every individual to rise from a lower office to the higher offices； as
these latter would otherwise fall into incompetent hands； and that
competent officials generally should have some guarantee of
life…long provision。
Civil dignities include not only such as are connected with a public
office； but also those which make the possessors of them； without
any accompanying services to the state； members of a higher class or
rank。 The latter constitute the nobility； whose members are
distinguished from the common citizens who form the mass of the
people。 The rank of the nobility is inherited by male descendants； and
these again communicate it to wives who are not nobly born。 Female
descendants of noble families； however； do not communicate their
rank to husbands who are not of noble birth； but they descend
themselves into the common civil status of the people。 This being
so； the question then emerges as to whether the sovereign has the
right to found a hereditary rank and class； intermediate between
himself and the other citizens？ The import of this question does not
turn on whether it is conformable to the prudence of the sovereign；
from regard to his own and the people's interests； to have such an
institution； but whether it is in accordance with the right of the
people that they should have a class of persons above them； who； while
being subjects like themselves； are yet born as their commanders； or
at least as privileged superiors？ The answer to this question； as in
previous instances； is to be derived from the principle that 〃what the
people； as constituting the whole mass of the subjects； could not
determine regarding themselves and their associated citizens； cannot
be constitutionally determined by the sovereign regarding the people。〃
Now a hereditary nobility is a rank which takes precedence of merit
and is hoped for without any good reason… a thing of the imagination
without genuine reality。 For if an ancestor had merit； he could not
transmit it to his posterity； but they must always acquire it for
themselves。 Nature has in fact not so arranged that the talent and
will which give rise to merit in the state； are hereditary。 And
because it cannot be supposed of any individual that he will throw
away his freedom； it is impossible that the common will of all the
people should agree to such a groundless prerogative； and hence the
sovereign cannot make it valid。 It may happen； however； that such an
anomaly as that of subjects who would be more than citizens； in the
manner of born officials； or hereditary professors； has slipped into
the mechanism of government in olden times； as in the case of the
feudal system； which was almost entirely organized with reference to
war。 Under such circumstances； the state cannot deal otherwise with
this error of a wrongly instituted rank in its midst； than by the
remedy of a gradual extinction through hereditary positions being left
unfilled as they fall vacant。 The state has therefore the right
provisorily to let a dignity in title continue； until the public
opinion matures on the subject。 And this will thus pass from the
threefold division into sovereign； nobles； and people； to the
twofold and only natural division into sovereign and people。
No individual in the state can indeed be entirely without dignity；
for he has at least that of being a citizen； except when he has lost
his civil status by a crime。 As a criminal he is still maintained in
life； but he is made the mere instrument of the will of another；
whether it be the state or a particular citizen。 In the latter
position； in which he could only be placed by a juridical judgement；
he would practically become a slave； and would belong as property
（dominium） to another； who would be not merely his master （herus）
but his owner （d