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again； who might be paid his wages due to the end of his year of
service in a coinage that became depreciated within that period； so
that it would not be of the same value to him as it was when he
entered on his engagement； cannot claim by right to be kept from
loss on account of the unequal value of the money if he receives the
due amount of it。 He can only make an appeal on the ground of equity；…
a dumb goddess who cannot claim a bearing of right；… because there was
nothing bearing on this point in the contract of service； and a
judge cannot give a decree on the basis of vague or indefinite
conditions。
Hence it follows； that a court of equity； for the decision of
disputed questions of right； would involve a contradiction。 It is only
where his own proper rights are concerned； and in matters in which
he can decide； that a judge may or ought to give a hearing to
equity。 Thus； if the Crown is supplicated to give an indemnity to
certain persons for loss or injury sustained in its service； it may
undertake the burden of doing so； although； according to strict right；
the claim might be rejected on the ground of the pretext that the
parties in question undertook the performance of the service
occasioning the loss； at their own risk。
The dictum of equity may be put thus： 〃The strictest right is the
greatest wrong〃 （summum jus summa injuria）。 But this evil cannot be
obviated by the forms of right； although it relates to a matter of
right； for the grievance that it gives rise to can only be put
before a 〃court of conscience〃 （forum poli）； whereas every question of
right must be taken before a civil court （forum soli）。
II。 The Right of Necessity。
The so…called right of necessity （jus necessitatis） is the
supposed right or title； in case of the danger of losing my own
life； to take away the life of another who has； in fact； done me no
harm。 It is evident that； viewed as a doctrine of right； this must
involve a contradiction； For this is not the case of a wrongful
aggressor making an unjust assault upon my life； and whom I anticipate
by depriving him of his own （jus inculpatae tutelae）； nor consequently
is it a question merely of the recommendation of moderation which
belongs to ethics as the doctrine of virtue； and not to
jurisprudence as the doctrine of right。 It is a question of the
allowableness of using violence against one who has used none
against me。
It is clear that the assertion of such a right is not to be
understood objectively as being in accordance with what a law would
prescribe； but merely subjectively； as proceeding on the assumption of
how a sentence would be pronounced by a court in the case。 There
can； in fact； be no criminal law assigning the penalty of death to a
man who； when shipwrecked and struggling in extreme danger for his
life； and in order to save it； may thrust another from a plank on
which he had saved himself。 For the punishment threatened by the law
could not possibly have greater power than the fear of the loss of
life in the case in question。 Such a penal law would thus fail
altogether to exercise its intended effect； for the threat of an
evil which is still uncertain… such as death by a judicial sentence…
could not overcome the fear of an evil which is certain； as drowning
is in such circumstances。 An act of violent self…preservation； then；
ought not to be considered as altogether beyond condemnation
（inculpabile）； it is only to be adjudged as exempt from punishment
（impunibile）。 Yet this subjective condition of impunity； by a
strange confusion of ideas； has been regarded by jurists as equivalent
to objective lawfulness。
The dictum of the right of necessity is put in these terms：
〃Necessity has no law〃 （Necessitas non habet legem）。 And yet there
cannot be a necessity that could make what is wrong lawful。
It is apparent； then； that in。 judgements relating both to
〃equity〃 and 〃the right of necessity；〃 the equivocations involved
arise from an interchange of the objective and subjective grounds that
enter into the application of the principles of right； when viewed
respectively by reason or by a judicial tribunal。 What one may have
good grounds for recognising as right； in itself； may not find
confirmation in a court of justice； and what he must consider to be
wrong； in itself； may obtain recognition in such a court。 And the
reason of this is that the conception of right is not taken in the two
cases in one and the same sense。
DIVISION
DIVISION OF THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT。
A。 General Division of the Duties of Right。
（Juridical Duties）。
In this division we may very conveniently follow Ulpian； if his
three formulae are taken in a general sense； which may not have been
quite clearly in his mind； but which they are capable of being
developed into or of receiving。 They are the following：
1。 Honeste vive。 〃Live rightly。〃 juridical rectitude； or honour
（honestas juridica）； consists in maintaining one's own worth as a
man in relation to others。 This duty may be rendered by the
proposition： 〃Do not make thyself a mere means for the use of
others； but be to them likewise an end。〃 This duty will be explained
in the next formula as an obligation arising out of the right of
humanity in our own person （lex justi）。
2。 Neminem laede。 〃Do wrong to no one。〃 This formula may be rendered
so as to mean： 〃Do no wrong to any one； even if thou shouldst be under
the necessity； in observing this duty； to cease from all connection
with others and to avoid all society〃 （lex juridica）。
3。 Suum cuique tribue。 〃Assign to every one what is his own。〃 This
may be rendered； 〃Enter； if wrong cannot be avoided； into a society
with others in which every one may have secured to him what is his
own。〃 If this formula were to be simply translated； 〃Give every one
his own；〃 it would express an absurdity； for we cannot give any one
what he already has。 If it is to have a definite meaning； it must
therefore run thus： 〃Enter into a state in which every one can have
what is his own secured against the action of every other〃 （lex
justitiae）。
These three classical formulae； at the same time； represent
principles which suggest a division of the system of juridical
duties into internal duties； external duties； and those connecting
duties which contain the latter as deduced from the principle of the
former by subsumption。
B。 Universal Division of Rights。
I。 Natural Right and Positive Right。 The system of rights； viewed as
a scientific system of doctrines； is divided into natural right and
positive right。 Natural right rests upon pure rational principles a
priori； positive or statutory right is what proceeds from the will
of a legislator。
II。 Innate Right and Acquired Right。 The system of rights may
again be regarded in reference to the implied powers of dealing
morally with others as bound by obligat