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the compulsion of constraint which is opposed to it is right； as being
a hindering of a hindrance of freedom； and as being in accord with the
freedom which exists in accordance with universal laws。 Hence；
according to the logical principle of contradiction； all right is
accompanied with an implied title or warrant to bring compulsion to
bear on any one who may violate it in fact。
E。 Strict Right may be also Represented as the Possibility
of a Universal Reciprocal Compulsion in harmony with
the Freedom of All according to Universal Laws。
This proposition means the right is not to be regarded as composed
of two different elements… obligation according to a law； and a
title on the part of one who has bound another by his own free
choice to compel him to perform。 But it imports that the conception of
right may be viewed as consisting immediately in the possibility of
a universal reciprocal compulsion； in harmony with the freedom of all。
As right in general has for its object only what is external in
actions； strict right； as that with which nothing ethical is
intermingled； requires no other motives of action than those that
are merely external； for it is then pure right and is unmixed with any
prescriptions of virtue。 A strict right； then； in the exact sense of
the term； is that which alone can be called wholly external。 Now
such right is founded； no doubt； upon the consciousness of the
obligation of every individual according to the law； but if it is to
be pure as such； it neither may nor should refer to this consciousness
as a motive by which to determine the free act of the will。 For this
purpose； however； it founds upon the principle of the possibility of
an external compulsion； such as may coexist with the freedom of
every one according to universal laws。 Accordingly； then； where it
is said that a creditor has a right to demand from a debtor the
payment of his debt； this does not mean merely that he can bring him
to feel in his mind that reason obliges him to do this； but it means
that he can apply an external compulsion to force any such one so to
pay； and that this compulsion is quite consistent with the freedom
of all； including the parties in question； according to a universal
law。 Right and the title to compel； thus indicate the same thing。
The law of right； as thus enunciated； is represented as a reciprocal
compulsion necessarily in accordance with the freedom of every one；
under the principle of a universal freedom。 It is thus； as it were；
a representative construction of the conception of right； by
exhibiting it in a pure intuitive perception a priori； after the
analogy of the possibility of the free motions of bodies under the
physical law of the equality of action and reaction。 Now； as in pure
mathematics； we cannot deduce the properties of its objects
immediately from a mere abstract conception； but can only discover
them by figurative construction or representation of its
conceptions； so it is in like manner with the principle of right。 It
is not so much the mere formal conception of right； but rather that of
a universal and equal reciprocal compulsion as harmonizing with it；
and reduced under general laws； that makes representation of that
conception possible。 But just as those conceptions presented in
dynamics are founded upon a merely formal representation of pure
mathematics as presented in geometry； reason has taken care also to
provide the understanding as far as possible with intuitive
presentations a priori in behoof of a construction of the conception
of right。 The right in geometrical lines （rectum） is opposed； as the
straight； to that which is curved and to that which is oblique。 In the
first opposition； there is involved an inner quality of the lines of
such a nature that there is only one straight or right line possible
between two given points。 In the second case； again； the positions
of two intersecting or meeting lines are of such a nature that there
can likewise be only one line called the perpendicular； which is not
more inclined to the one side than the other； and it divides space
on either side into two equal parts。 After the manner of this analogy；
the science of right aims at determining what every one shall have
as his own with mathematical exactness； but this is not to be expected
in the ethical science of virtue； as it cannot but allow a certain
latitude for exceptions。 But； without passing into the sphere of
ethics； there are two cases… known as the equivocal right of equity
and necessity… which claim a juridical decision； yet for which no
one can be found to give such a decision； and which； as regards
their relation to rights； belong； as it were； to the 〃Intermundia〃
of Epicurus。 These we must at the outset take apart from the special
exposition of the science of right； to which we are now about to
advance； and we may consider them now by way of supplement to these
introductory explanations； in order that their uncertain conditions
may not exert a disturbing influence on the fixed principles of the
proper doctrine of right。
F。 Supplementary Remarks on Equivocal Right。
（Jus Aequivocum）。
With every right； in the strict acceptation （jus strictum）； there is
conjoined a right to compel。 But it is possible to think of other
rights of a wider kind （jus latum） in which the title to compel cannot
be determined by any law。 Now there are two real or supposed rights of
this kind… equity and the right of necessity。 The first alleges a
right that is without compulsion； the second adopts a compulsion
that is without right。 This equivocalness； however； can be easily
shown to rest on the peculiar fact that there are cases of doubtful
right； for the decision of which no judge can be appointed。
I。 Equity。
Equity （aequitas）； regarded objectively； does not properly
constitute a claim upon the moral duty of benevolence or beneficence
on the part of others； but whoever insists upon anything on the ground
of equity； founds upon his right to the same。 In this case； however；
the conditions are awanting that are requisite for the function of a
judge in order that be might determine what or what kind of
satisfaction can be done to this claim。 When one of the partners of
a mercantile company； formed under the condition of equal profits；
has； however； done more than the other members； and in consequence has
also lost more； it is in accordance with equity that he should
demand from the company more than merely an equal share of advantage
with the rest。 But； in relation to strict right… if we think of a
judge considering his case… he can furnish no definite data to
establish how much more belongs to him by the contract； and in case of
an action at law； such a demand would be rejected。 A domestic servant；
again； who might be paid his wages due to the end of his year of
service in a coinage t