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prior to its establishment and in view of it… it is provisorily a duty
for every one to proceed according to the law of external acquisition；
and accordingly it is a juridical procedure on the part of the will to
lay every one under obligation to recognise the act of possessing
and appropriating； although it be only unilaterally。 Hence a provisory
acquisition of the soil； with all its juridical consequences； is
possible in the state of nature。
Such an acquisition； however； requires and also obtains the favour
of a permissive law （lex permissiva）； in respect of the
determination of the limits of juridically possible possession。 For it
precedes the juridical state； and as merely introductory to it is
not yet peremptory； and this favour does not extend farther than the
date of the consent of the other co…operators in the establishment
of the civil state。 But if they are opposed to entering into the civil
state； as long as this opposition lasts it carries all the effect of a
guaranteed juridical acquisition with it； because the advance from the
state of nature to the civil state is founded upon a duty。
17。 Deduction of the Conception of the Original
Primary Acquisition。
We have found the title of acquisition in a universal original
community of the soil； under the conditions of an external acquisition
in space； and the mode of acquisition is contained in the empirical
fact of taking possession （apprehensio）； conjoined with the will to
have an external object as one's own。 It is further necessary to
unfold； from the principles of the pure juridically practical reason
involved in the conception； the juridical acquisition proper of an
object… that is； the external mine and thine that follows from the two
previous conditions； as rational possession （possessio noumenon）。
The juridical conception of the external mine and thine； so far as
it involves the category of substance； cannot by 〃that which is
external to me〃 mean merely 〃in a place other than that in which I
am〃； for it is a rational conception。 As under the conceptions of
the reason only intellectual conceptions can be embraced； the
expression in question can only signify 〃something that is different
and distinct from me〃 according to the idea of a non…empirical
possession through； as it were； a continuous activity in taking
possession of an external object； and it involves only the notion of
having something in my power； which indicates the connection of an
object with myself； as a subjective condition of the possibility of
making use of it。 This forms a purely intellectual conception of the
understanding。 Now we can leave out or abstract from the sensible
conditions of possession； as relations of a person to objects which
have no obligation。 This process of elimination just gives the
rational relation of a person to persons； and it is such that he can
bind them all by an obligation in reference to the use of things
through his act of will； so far as it is conformable to the axiom of
freedom； the postulate of right； and the universal legislation of
the common will； conceived as united a priori。 This is therefore the
rational intelligible possession of things as by pure right；
although they are objects of sense。
It is evident that the first modification； limitation； or
transformation generally； of a portion of the soil cannot of itself
furnish a title to its acquisition； since possession of an accident
does not form a ground for legal possession of the substance。
Rather； conversely； the inference as to the mine and thine must be
drawn from ownership of the substance according to the rule：
Accessarium sequitur suum principale。 Hence one who has spent labour
on a piece of ground that was not already his own； has lost his effort
and work to the former owner。 This position is so evident of itself
that the old opinion to the opposite effect； that is still spread
far and wide； can hardly be ascribed to any other than the
prevailing illusion which unconsciously leads to the personification
of things； and； then； as if they could be bound under an obligation by
the labour bestowed upon them to be at the service of the person who
does the labour； to regard them as his by immediate right。 Otherwise
it is probable that the natural question… already discussed… would not
have been passed over with so light a tread； namely： 〃How is a right
in a thing possible？〃 For； right as against every possible possessor
of a thing means only the claim of a particular will to the use of
an object so far as it may be included in the all…comprehending
universal will； and can be thought as in harmony with its law。
As regards bodies situated upon a piece of ground which is already
mine； if they otherwise belong to no other person； they belong to me
without my requiring any particular juridical act for the purpose of
this acquisition； they are mine not facto； but lege。 For they may be
regarded as accidents inhering in the substance of the soil； and
they are thus mine jure rei meae。 To this category also belongs
everything which is so connected with anything of mine that it
cannot be separated from what is mine without altering it
substantially。 Examples of this are gilding on an object； mixture of a
material belonging to me with other things； alluvial deposit； or
even alteration of the adjoining bed of a stream or river in my favour
so as to produce an increase of my land； etc。 By the same
principles； the question must also be decided as to whether the
acquirable soil may extend farther than the existing land； so as
even to include part of the bed of the sea； with the right to fish
on my own shores； to gather amber and such like。 So far as I have
the mechanical capability from my own site； as the place I occupy；
to secure my soil from the attack of others… and； therefore； as far as
cannon can carry from the shore… all is included in my possession； and
the sea is thus far closed （mare clausum）。 But as there is no site for
occupation upon the wide sea itself； possible possession cannot be
extended so far； and the open sea is free （mare liberum）。 But in the
case of men； or things that belong to them； becoming stranded on the
shore； since the fact is not voluntary； it cannot be regarded by the
owner of the shore as giving him a right of acquisition。 For shipwreck
is not an act of will； nor is its result a lesion to him； and things
which may have come thus upon his soil； as still belonging to some
one； are not to be treated as being without an owner or res nullius。
On the other hand； a river； so far as possession of the bank
reaches； may be originally acquired； like any other piece of ground；
under the above restrictions； by one who is in possession of both
its banks。
PROPERTY。
An external object； which in respect of its substance can be claimed
by some one as his own； is called the property （dominium） of that
person t