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according to the postulate of the juridically practical reason； the
possibility of acquisition in whatever state men may happen to be
living beside one another； and therefore in the state of nature as
well； is a principle of private right。 And in accordance with this
principle； every one is justified or entitled to exercise that
compulsion by which it alone becomes possible to pass out of the state
of nature and to enter into that state of civil society which alone
can make all acquisition peremptory。
It is a question as to how far the right of taking possession of the
soil extends。 The answer is； So far as the capability of having it
under one's power extends； that is； just as far as he who wills to
appropriate it can defend it； as if the soil were to say： 〃If you
cannot protect me； neither can you command me。〃 In this way the
controversy about what constitutes a free or closed sea must be
decided。 Thus； within the range of a cannon…shot no one has a right to
intrude on the coast of a country that already belongs to a certain
state； in order to fish or gather amber on the shore； or such like。
Further； the question is put； 〃Is cultivation of the soil； by
building； agriculture； drainage； etc。； necessary in order to its
acquisition？〃 No。 For； as these processes as forms of specification
are only accidents； they do not constitute objects of immediate
possession and can only belong to the subject in so far as the
substance of them has been already recognized as his。 When it is a
question of the first acquisition of a thing； the cultivation or
modification of it by labour forms nothing more than an external
sign of the fact that it has been taken into possession； and this
can be indicated by many other signs that cost less trouble。 Again：
〃May any one be hindered in the act of taking possession； so that
neither one nor other of two competitors shall acquire the right of
priority； and the soil in consequence may remain for all time free
as belonging to no one？〃 Not at all。 Such a hindrance cannot be
allowed to take place； because the second of the two； in order to be
enabled to do this； would himself have to be upon some neighbouring
soil； where he also； in this manner； could be hindered from being； and
such absolute hindering would involve a contradiction。 It would；
however； be quite consistent with the right of occupation； in the case
of a certain intervening piece of the soil； to let it lie unused as
a neutral ground for the separation of two neighbouring states； but
under such a condition； that ground would actually belong to them both
in common； and would not be without an owner （res nullius）； just
because it would be used by both in order to form a separation between
them。 Again： 〃May one have a thing as his； on a soil of which no one
has appropriated any part as his own？〃 Yes。 In Mongolia； for
example； any one may let lie whatever baggage he has； or bring back
the horse that has run away from him into his possession as his own；
because the whole soil belongs to the people generally； and the use of
it accordingly belongs to every individual。 But that any one can
have a moveable thing on the soil of another as his own is only
possible by contract。 Finally； there is the question： 〃May one of
two neighbouring nations or tribes resist another when attempting to
impose upon them a certain mode of using a particular soil； as； for
instance； a tribe of hunters making such an attempt in relation to a
pastoral people； or the latter to agriculturists and such like？〃
Certainly。 For the mode in which such peoples or tribes may settle
themselves upon the surface of the earth； provided they keep within
their own boundaries； is a matter of mere pleasure and choice on their
own part （res merae facultatis）。
As a further question； it may be asked whether； when neither
nature nor chance； but merely our own will； brings us into the
neighbourhood of a people that gives no promise of a prospect of
entering into civil union with us； we are to be considered entitled in
any case to proceed with force in the intention of founding such a
union； and bringing into a juridical state such men as the savage
American Indians； the Hottentots；and the New Hollanders； or… and the
case is not much better… whether we may establish colonies by
deceptive purchase； and so become owners of their soil； and； in
general； without regard to their first possession； make use at will of
our superiority in relation to them？ Further； may it not be held
that Nature herself； as abhorring a vacuum； seems to demand such a
procedure； and that large regions in other continents； that are now
magnificently peopled； would otherwise have remained unpossessed by
civilized inhabitants and might have for ever remained thus； so that
the end of creation would have so far been frustrated？ It is almost
unnecessary to answer； for it is easy to see through all this flimsy
veil of injustice； which just amounts to the Jesuitism of making a
good end justify any means。 This mode of acquiring the soil is；
therefore； to be repudiated。
The indefiniteness of external acquirable objects in respect of
their quantity； as well as their quality； makes the problem of the
sole primary external acquisition of them one of the most difficult to
solve。 There must； however； be some one first acquisition of an
external object； for every Acquisition cannot be derivative。 Hence；
the problem is not to be given up as insoluble or in itself as
impossible。 If it is solved by reference to the original contract；
unless this contract is extended so as to include the whole human
race； acquisition under it would still remain but provisional。
16。 Exposition of the Conception of a Primary
Acquisition of the Soil。
All men are originally in a common collective possession of the soil
of the whole earth （communio fundi originaria）； and they have
naturally each a will to use it （lex justi）。 But on account of the
opposition of the free will of one to that of the other in the
sphere of action； which is inevitable by nature； all use of the soil
would be prevented did not every will contain at the same time a law
for the regulation of the relation of all wills in action； according
to which a particular possession can be determined to every one upon
the common soil。 This is the juridical law （lex juridica）。 But the
distributive law of the mine and thine； as applicable to each
individual on the soil； according to the axiom of external freedom；
cannot proceed otherwise than from a primarily united will a priori…
which does not presuppose any juridical act as requisite for this
union。 This Law can only take form in the civil state （lex justitiae
distributivae）； as it is in this state alone that the united common
will determines what is right； what is rightful； and what is the
constitution of Right。 In reference to this state； however… and
prior to its establishment and in view of it… it is pro