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I will go farther。 It is by our reflective and reasoning powers； with which we seem to be exclusively endowed； that we know that it is injurious； first to others and then to ourselves； to resist the social instinct which governs us； and which we call JUSTICE。 It is our reason which teaches us that the selfish man； the robber； the murdererin a word； the traitor to societysins against Nature； and is guilty with respect to others and himself； when he does wrong wilfully。 Finally； it is our social sentiment on the one hand； and our reason on the other； which cause us to think that beings such as we should take the responsibility of their acts。 Such is the principle of remorse； revenge； and penal justice。
But this proves only an intellectual diversity between the animals and man； not at all an affectional one； for； although we reason upon our relations with our fellows； we likewise reason upon our most trivial actions；such as drinking； eating； choosing a wife； or selecting a dwelling…place。 We reason upon things earthly and things heavenly； there is nothing to which our reasoning powers are not applicable。 Now； just as the knowledge of external phenomena； which we acquire； has no influence upon their causes and laws； so reflection； by illuminating our instinct； enlightens us as to our sentient nature； but does not alter its character； it tells us what our morality is； but neither changes nor modifies it。 Our dissatisfaction with ourselves after doing wrong； the indignation which we feel at the sight of injustice； the idea of deserved punishment and due remuneration； are effects of reflection； and not immediate effects of instinct and emotion。 Our appreciation （I do not say exclusive appreciation； for the animals also realize that they have done wrong； and are indignant when one of their number is attacked； but）； our infinitely superior appreciation of our social duties； our knowledge of good and evil； does not establish； as regards morality； any vital difference between man and the beasts。
％ 2。Of the first and second degrees of Sociability。
I insist upon the fact； which I have just pointed out； as one of the most important facts of anthropology。
The sympathetic attraction； which causes us to associate； is； by reason of its blind； unruly nature； always governed by temporary impulse； without regard to higher rights； and without distinction of merit or priority。 The bastard dog follows indifferently all who call it； the suckling child regards every man as its father and every woman as its nurse； every living creature； when deprived of the society of animals of its species； seeks companionship in its solitude。 This fundamental characteristic of the social instinct renders intolerable and even hateful the friendship of frivolous persons； liable to be infatuated with every new face； accommodating to all whether good or bad； and ready to sacrifice； for a passing liaison； the oldest and most honorable affections。 The fault of such beings is not in the heartit is in the judgment。 Sociability； in this degree； is a sort of magnetism awakened in us by the contemplation of a being similar to ourselves； but which never goes beyond the person who feels it； it may be reciprocated； but not communicated。 Love； benevolence； pity； sympathy； call it what you will； there is nothing in it which deserves esteem；nothing which lifts man above the beast。
The second degree of sociability is justice； which may be defined as the RECOGNITION OF THE EQUALITY BETWEEN ANOTHER'S PERSONALITY AND OUR OWN。 The sentiment of justice we share with the animals； we alone can form an exact idea of it； but our idea； as has been said already； does not change its nature。 We shall soon see how man rises to a third degree of sociability which the animals are incapable of reaching。 But I must first prove by metaphysics that SOCIETY； JUSTICE； and EQUALITY； are three equivalent terms；three expressions meaning the same thing； whose mutual conversion is always allowable。
If； amid the confusion of a shipwreck； having escaped in a boat with some provisions； I see a man struggling with the waves； am I bound to go to his assistance？ Yes； I am bound under penalty of being adjudged guilty of murder and treason against society。
But am I also bound to share with him my provisions？
To settle this question； we must change the phraseology。 If society is binding on the boat； is it also binding on the provisions？ Undoubtedly。 The duty of an associate is absolute。 Man's occupancy succeeds his social nature； and is subordinate to it； possession can become exclusive only when permission to occupy is granted to all alike。 That which in this instance obscures our duty is our power of foresight； which； causing us to fear an eventual danger； impels us to usurpation； and makes us robbers and murderers。 Animals do not calculate the duty of instinct any more than the disadvantages resulting to those who exercise it； it would be strange if the intellect of man the most sociable of animalsshould lead him to disobey the law。
He betrays society who attempts to use it only for his own advantage； better that God should deprive us of prudence； if it is to serve as the tool of our selfishness。
〃What！〃 you will say； 〃must I share my bread； the bread which I have earned and which belongs to me； with the stranger whom I do not know； whom I may never see again； and who； perhaps； will reward me with ingratitude？ If we had earned this bread together； if this man had done something to obtain it； he might demand his share； since his co…operation would entitle him to it； but as it is； what claim has he on me？ We have not produced togetherwe shall not eat together。〃
The fallacy in this argument lies in the false supposition； that each producer is not necessarily associated with every other producer。
When two or more individuals have regularly organized a society；when the contracts have been agreed upon； drafted； and signed；there is no difficulty about the future。 Everybody knows that when two men associatefor instancein order to fish； if one of them catches no fish； he is none the less entitled to those caught by his associate。 If two merchants form a partnership； while the partnership lasts； the profits and losses are divided between them； since each produces； not for himself； but for the society： when the time of distribution arrives； it is not the producer who is considered； but the associate。 That is why the slave； to whom the planter gives straw and rice； and the civilized laborer； to whom the capitalist pays a salary which is always too small；not being associated with their employers； although producing with them；are disregarded when the product is divided。 Thus； the horse who draws our coaches； and the ox who draws our carts produce with us； but are not associated with us； we take their product； but do not share it with them。 The animals and laborers whom we employ hold the same relation to us。 Whatever we do for them； we do； not from a sense of justice； but out of pure benevolence。＇1＇
＇1＇ To perform an act of benevolence towards one's neighbor is called； in Hebrew； to do justice； in Greek； to take compassion or pity （｛GREEK n n f e ｝；from which