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other。 Their rights are actualised only in their particular wills and not in a
universal will with constitutional powers over them。 This universal proviso of
international law therefore does not go beyond an ought…to…be； and what really
happens is that international relations in accordance with treaty alternate with the
severance of these relations。
Remark： There is no Praetor to judge between states； at best there may be an arbitrator or a
mediator； and even he exercises his functions contingently only； i。e。 in dependence on the
particular wills of the disputants。 Kant had an idea for securing 'perpetual peace' by a League of
Nations to adjust every dispute。 It was to be a power recognised by each individual state； and
was to arbitrate in all cases of dissension in order to make it impossible for disputants to resort to
war in order to settle them。 This idea presupposes an accord between states； this would rest on
moral or religious or other grounds and considerations； but in any case would always depend
ultimately on a particular sovereign will and for that reason would remain infected with
contingency。
§ 334。
It follows that if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonised；
the matter can only be settled by war。 A state through its subjects has widespread
connections and many…sided interests； and these may be readily and considerably
injured； but it remains inherently indeterminable which of these injuries is to be
regarded as a specific breach of treaty or as an injury to the honour and
autonomy of the state。 The reason for this is that a state may regard its infinity
and honour as at stake in each of its concerns； however minute； and it is all the
more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is
impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity
abroad。
§ 335。
Apart from this； the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to
stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred。 On the
contrary； there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury as
the idea of a danger threatening from another state； together with calculations of
degrees of probability on this side and that； guessing at intentions； &c。； &c。
§ 336。
Since states are related to one another as autonomous entities and so as particular
wills on which the very validity of treaties depends； and since the particular will of
the whole is in content a will for its own welfare pure and simple； it follows that
welfare is the highest law governing the relation of one state to another。 This is all
the more the case since the Idea of the state is precisely the supersession of the
clash between right （i。e。 empty abstract freedom） and welfare （i。e。 the particular
content which fills that void）； and it is when states become concrete wholes that
they first attain recognition （see § 331）。
§ 337。
The substantial welfare of the state is its welfare as a particular state in its specific
interest and situation and its no less special foreign affairs； including its particular
treaty relations。。 Its government therefore is a matter of particular wisdom； not of
universal Providence （compare Remark to § 324）。 Similarly； its aim in relation to
other states and its principle for justifying wars and treaties is not a universal
thought （the thought of philanthropy） but only its actually injured or threatened
welfare as something specific。 and peculiar to itself。
Remark： At one time the opposition between morals and politics； and the demand that the latter
should conform to the former； were much canvassed。 On this point only a general remark is
required here。 The welfare of a state has claims to recognition totally different from those of the
welfare of the individual。 The ethical substance； the state； has its determinate being； i。e。 its right；
directly embodied in something existent； something not abstract but concrete； and the principle of
its conduct and behaviour can only be this concrete existent and not one of the many universal
thoughts supposed to be moral commands。 When politics is alleged to clash with morals and so to
be always wrong； the doctrine propounded rests on superficial ideas about morality； the nature of
the state； and the state's relation to the moral point of view。
§ 338。
The fact that states reciprocally recognise each other as states remains； even in
war — the state of affairs when rights disappear and force and chance hold sway
— a bond wherein each counts to the rest as something absolute。 Hence in war；
war itself is characterised as something which ought to pass away。 It implies
therefore the proviso of； the jus gentium — that the possibility of peace be
retained （and so； for example； that envoys must be respected）； and； in general；
that war be not waged against domestic institutions； against the peace of family
and private life； or against persons in their private capacity。
Addition： Modern wars are therefore humanely waged； and person is not set over against
person in hatred。 At most； personal enmities appear in the vanguard； but in the main body of the
army hostility is something vague and gives place to each side's respect for the duty of the other。
§ 339。
Apart from this； relations between states （e。g。 in war…time； reciprocal agreements
about taking prisoners； in peace…time； concessions of rights to subjects of other
states for the purpose of private trade and intercourse； &c。） depend principally
upon the customs of nations； custom being the inner universality of behaviour
maintained in all circumstances。
Addition： The European peoples form a family in accordance with the universal principle
underlying their legal codes； their customs； and their civilisation。 This principle has modified their
international conduct accordingly in a state of affairs ＇i。e。 war＇ otherwise dominated by the mutual
infliction of evils。 The relations of state to state are uncertain； and there is no Praetor available to
adjust them。 The only higher judge is the universal absolute mind； the world mind。
§ 340。
It is as particular entities that states enter into relations with one another。 Hence
their relations are on the largest scale a maelstrom of external contingency and the
inner particularity of passions； private interests and selfish ends； abilities and
virtues； vices； force； and wrong。 All these whirl together； and in their vortex the
ethical whole itself； the autonomy of the state； is exposed to contingency。 The
principles of the national minds are wholly restricted on account of their
particularity； for it is in this particularity that； as existent individuals； they have
their objective actuality and their self…consciousness。 Their deeds and destinies in
their reciprocal relations to one another are the dialectic of the finitude of these
minds； and out of it arises the uni