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the only question； in estimating the worth of human actions； is how far he has taken up the law into
his conviction。 But if on this theory it is not actions which are to be judged； i。e。 measured generally；
by that law； it is impossible to see what the law is for and what end it is to serve。 Such a law is
degraded to a mere external letter； in fact to an empty word； if it is only my conviction which
makes it a law and invests it with obligatory force。
Such a law may claim its authority from God or the state。 It may even have behind it the authority
of tens of centuries during which it was the bond which gave men； with all their deeds and destiny；
coherence and subsistence。 And these are authorities which enshrine the convictions of countless
individuals。 Now if I set against these the authority of my single conviction … for as my subjective
conviction its sole validity is authority … that at first seems a piece of monstrous self…conceit； but in
virtue of the principle that subjective conviction is to be the measuring…rod； it is pronounced not to
be self…conceit at all。
Even if reason and conscience … which shallow science and bad sophistry can never altogether
expel … admit with a noble illogicality that error is possible； still by describing crime； and evil
generally； as only an error； we minimise the fault。 To err is human … who has not been mistaken on
one point or another； whether he had fresh or pickled cabbage for dinner yesterday； and about
innumerable other things of more or less importance？ But the difference between importance and
triviality vanishes if everything turns on the subjectivity of conviction and on persistence in it。 The
said noble illogicality which admits the possibility of error is inevitable then in the nature of the
case； but when it comes round to say that a wrong conviction is only an error； it only falls into a
further illogicality； the illogicality of dishonesty。 At one moment conviction is made the basis of
ethics and of man's supreme value； and is thus pronounced the supreme and the sacrosanct； at
another； all we have to do with is error； and my conviction is something trivial and casual； in fact
something strictly external； which may turn out this way or that。 Really； my being convinced is
something supremely trivial if I cannot know the truth； for then it is a matter of indifference how I
think； and all that is left to my thinking is that empty good； the abstraction to which the
Understanding reduces the good。
One other point。 It follows further； on this principle of justification by conviction； that logic requires
me； in dealing with the way others act against my action； to admit that they are quite in the right …
so far at any rate as they maintain with faith and conviction that my action is criminal。 On such
logic； not merely do I gain nothing； I am even deposed from the post of liberty and honour into a
situation of slavery and dishonour。 Justice； which in the abstract is mine as well as theirs； I feel only
as a foreign subjective conviction； and when it is executed on me； I fancy myself to be treated only
by an external force。
（f） Finally； the supreme form in which this subjectivism is completely comprised and expressed is
the phenomenon which has been called by a name borrowed from Plato … 'Irony'。 The name alone；
however； is taken from Plato； he used it to describe a way of speaking which Socrates employed
in conversation when defending the Idea of truth and justice against the conceit of the Sophists and
the uneducated。 What he treated ironically； however； was only their type of mind； not the Idea
itself。 Irony is only a manner of talking against people。 Except as directed against persons； the
essential movement of thought is dialectic； and Plato was so far from regarding the dialectical in
itself； still less irony； as the last word in thought and a substitute for the Idea； that he terminated the
flux and reflux of thinking； let alone of a subjective opinion； and submerged it in the substantiality of
the Idea。
Footnote： My colleague； the late Professor Solger； adopted the word 'irony' which Friedrich von Schlegel
brought into use at a comparatively early period of his literary career and enhanced to equivalence with the
said principle of subjectivity knowing itself as supreme。 But Solger's finer mind was above such an
exaggeration； he had philosophic insight and so seized upon； emphasised； and retained only that part of
Schlegel's view which was dialectic in the strict sense； i。e。 dialectic as the pulsating drive of speculative
inquiry。 His last publication； a solid piece of work； a thorough Kritik über die Vorlesungen des Herrn August
Wilhelm von Schlegel über dramatische Kunst und Literatur； I find somewhat obscure； however； and I cannot
agree with the argument which he develops。 'True irony'； he says； 'arises from the view that so long as man
lives in this present world； it is only in this world that he can fulfil his 〃appointed task〃 no matter how elevated
a sense we give to this expression。 Any hope we may have of transcending finite ends is foolish and empty
conceit。 'Even the highest is existent for our conduct only in a shape that is limited and finite。' Rightly
understood； this is Platonic doctrine； and a true remark in rejection of what he has referred to earlier； the empty
striving towards the （abstract） infinite。 But to say that the highest is existent in a limited and finite shape； like
the ethical order （and that order is in essence actual life and action）； is very different from saving that the
highest thing is a finite end。 The outward shape； the form of finitude； in no way deprives the content of ethical
life of its substantiality and the infinity inherent within it。 Solger continues： 'And just for this reason the
highest is in us as negligible as the lowest and perishes of necessity with us and our nugatory thoughts and
feelings。 The highest is truly existent in God alone； and as it perishes in us it is transfigured into something
divine； a divinity in which we would have had no share but for its immediate presence revealed in the very
disappearance of our actuality； now the mood to which this process directly comes home in human affairs is
tragic irony。' The arbitrary name 'irony' would be of no importance； but there is an obscurity here when it is said
that it is 'the highest' which perishes with our nothingness and that it is in the disappearance of our actuality
that the divine is first revealed； e。g。 again （ibid。； p。 91）：'We see heroes beginning to wonder whether they have
erred in the noblest and finest elements of their feelings and sentiments； not only in regard to their successful
issue； but also to their source and their worth； indeed； what elevates us is the destruction of the best itself。'
（The just destruction of utter scoundrels and criminals who flaunt their villainy — the hero of a modern tragedy
Die Schuld； is one — has an interest for criminal law； but none at all for art proper which is what is in question
here。） The tragic destruction of figures whose ethical life is on the highest plane can interest and elevate us
and reconcile us to its occurrence only in so fa