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but the self…conscious adult； and when we speak of good； we mean the knowledge of it。 It is
doubtless true that the natural is inherently innocent； neither good nor bad； but when it is drawn
into the orbit of the will which is free and knows that it is free； it acquires the character of not being
free and is therefore evil。 When man wills the natural； it is no longer merely natural； but the
negative opposed to the good； i。e。 to the concept of the will。
On the other hand； if it is now objected that since evil is rooted in the concept and inevitable； man
would be guiltless if he committed it； our reply must be that a man's decision is his own act； and his
own act is freely chosen and his own responsibility。 In the religious legend it is said that man is as
God when he knows good and evil； and it is true that this likeness to God is present in such
knowledge in that the inevitability here is no natural inevitability since on the contrary the decision
is really the transcendence of this duality of good and evil。 When both good and evil are placed
before me； I have a choice between the two； I can decide between them and endow my
subjective character with either。 Thus the nature of evil is that man may will it but need not。
§ 140。
In every end of a self…conscious subject； there is a positive aspect （see § 135）
necessarily present because the end is what is purposed in an actual concrete
action。 This aspect he knows how to elicit and emphasise； and he may then
proceed to regard it as a duty or a fine intention。 By so interpreting it； he is
enabled to pass off his action as good in the eyes both of himself and others；
despite the fact that； owing to his reflective character and his knowledge of the
universal aspect of the will； he is aware of the contrast between this aspect and
the essentially negative content of his action。 To impose in this way on others is
hypocrisy； while to impose on oneself is a stage beyond hypocrisy； a stage at
which subjectivity claims to be absolute。
Remark： This final； most abstruse； form of evil； whereby evil is perverted into good and good
into evil； and consciousness； in being aware of its power to effect this perversion； is also made
aware of itself as absolute； is the high…water mark of subjectivity at the level of morality； it is the
form into which evil has blossomed in our present epoch； a result due to philosophy； i。e。 to a
shallowness of thought which has twisted a profound concept into this shape and usurped the
name of philosophy； just as it has arrogated to evil the name of good。
In this Remark； I will indicate briefly the chief forms of this subjectivity which have become
current。
（a） In hypocrisy the following moments are contained：
＇a＇ knowledge of the true universal； whether knowledge in the form merely of a feeling for
right and duty； or of a deeper cognition and apprehension of them；
＇b＇ volition of the particular which conflicts with this universal；
＇c＇ conscious comparison of both moments ＇a＇ and ＇b＇； so that the conscious subject is
aware in willing that his particular volition is evil in character。
These points are descriptive of acting with a bad conscience； hypocrisy proper involves something
more。
At one time great importance was attached to the question whether an action was evil only in so
far as it was done with a bad conscience； i。e。 with explicit knowledge of the three moments just
specified。 The inference from an affirmative answer is admirably drawn by Pascal： Ils seront tous
damnés ces demi…pécheurs； qui ont quelque amour pour la vertu。 Mais pour ces
franc…pécheurs； pécheurs endurcis； pécheurs sans mélange； pleins et achevés； 1'enfer ne
les tient pas； ils ont trompé le diable à force de s'y abandonner。
Footnote： Lettres provinciales； iv。 In the same context； Pascal also quotes Christ's intercession on the
Cross for his enemies： 'Father； forgive them； for they know not what they do' … a superfluous prayer if the fact
that they did not know what they did made their action innocent and so took away the need of forgiveness。
Pascal quotes there too Aristotle's distinction between the man who acts ouk eidos and the one who acts
agnoon； in the former type of ignorance； his action is not freely willed （here the ignorance depends on external
circumstances； see above； § 117） and his action is not imputable to him。 But of the latter Aristotle says： 'Every
wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to refrain from doing； and it is this kind of
failure which makes men unjust and in general bad。。。。 An ignorant choice' between good and evil 'is the cause
not of the action's being involuntary' （of being non…imputable） 'but only of its being wicked'。 Aristotle
evidently had a deeper insight into the connection between knowing and willing than has become common in a
superficial philosophy which teaches that the opposite of knowledge； the heart and enthusiasm； are the true
principles of ethical action。
The subjective right of self…consciousness to know whether an action is truly good or evil in
character must not be thought of as so colliding with the absolute right of the objectivity of this
character that the two rights are represented as separable； indifferent to one another； and related
only accidentally。 It was such a conception of their relation that lay in particular at the root of the
old questions about efficacious grace。 On its formal side； evil is most peculiarly the individual's
own； since （a） it is precisely his subjectivity establishing itself purely and simply for itself； and for
that reason it is purely and simply the individual's own responsibility （see § 139 and the Remark
thereto）； （b） on his objective side man accords with his concept inasmuch as he is mind； in a word
a rational entity； and has in his own nature as such the character of self…knowing universality。
Therefore it means failing to treat him with the respect due to his concept if his good side is
divorced from him； so that the character of his evil action as evil is divorced from him too and is
not imputed to him as evil。 How determinate is the consciousness of these moments in distinction
from one another； or to what extent it has developed or failed to develop in clarity so as to
become a recognition of them； and to what degree an evil action has been done with a conscience
more or less downright evil … all these questions are the more trivial aspect of the matter； the
aspect mainly concerned with the empirical。
（b） Evil and doing evil with a bad conscience； however； is not quite hypocrisy。 Into hypocrisy
there enters in addition the formal character of falsity； first the falsity of holding up evil as good in
the eyes of others； of setting oneself up to all appearance as good； conscientious； pious； and so on
… conduct which in these circumstances is only a trick to deceive others。 Secondly； however； the
had man may find in his good conduct on other occasions； or in his piety； or； in a word； in good
reasons； a justification in his own eyes for the evil he does； because he can use these reasons to
pervert its