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cannot justify an action which is wrong。
Remark： It is one of the most prominent of the corrupt maxims of our time to enter a plea for
the so…called 'moral' intention behind wrong actions and to imagine bad men with well…meaning
hearts； i。e。 hearts willing their own welfare and perhaps that of others also。 This doctrine is rooted
in the 'benevolence' （guten Herzens） of the pre…Kantian philosophers and constitutes； e。g。； the
quintessence of well…known touching dramatic productions； but today it has been resuscitated in a
more extravagant form； and inner enthusiasm and the heart； i。e。 the form of particularity as such；
have been made the criterion of right； rationality； and excellence。 The result is that crime and the
thoughts that lead to it； be they fancies however trite and empty； or opinions however wild； are to
be regarded as right； rational； and excellent； simply because they issue from men's hearts and
enthusiasms。 （See the Remark to § 140； where more details are given。） ； Incidentally； however；
attention must be paid to the point of view from which right and welfare are being treated here。
We are considering right as abstract right and welfare as the particular welfare of the single agent。
The so…called 'general good'； the welfare of the state； i。e。 the right of mind actual and concrete； is
quite a different sphere； a sphere in which abstract right is a subordinate moment like particular
welfare and the happiness of the individual。 As was remarked above； it is one of the commonest
blunders of abstract thinking to make private rights and private welfare count as absolute in
opposition to the universality of the state。
Addition： The famous answer： Je n'en vois pas la nécessité； given ＇by Richelieu＇ to the
lampooner who excused himself with the words： Il faut donc que je vive； is apposite at this point。
Life ceases to be necessary in face of the higher realm of freedom。 When St。 Crispin stole leather
to make shoes for the poor； his action was moral but wrong and so inadmissible。
§ 127。
The particularity of the interests of the natural will； taken in their entirety as a
single whole； is personal existence or life。 In extreme danger and in conflict with
the rightful property of someone else； this life may claim （as a right； not a mercy）
a right of distress； because in such a situation there is on the one hand an infinite
injury to a man's existence and the consequent loss of rights altogether； and on
the other hand only an injury to a single restricted embodiment of freedom； and
this implies a recognition both of right as such and also of the injured man's
capacity for rights； because the injury affects only this property of his。
Remark： The right of distress is the basis of beneficium competentiae whereby a debtor is
allowed to retain of his tools； farming implements； clothes； or； in short； of his resources； i。e。 of his
creditor's property； so much as is regarded as indispensable if he is to continue to support life … to
support it； of course； on his own social level。
Addition： Life as the sum of ends has a right against abstract right。 If for example it is only by
stealing bread that the wolf can be kept from the door； the action is of course an encroachment on
someone's property； but it would be wrong to treat this action as an ordinary theft。 To refuse to
allow a man in jeopardy of his life to take such steps for self…preservation would be to stigmatise
him as without rights； and since he would be deprived of his life； his freedom would be annulled
altogether。 Many diverse details have a bearing on the preservation of life； and when we have our
eyes on the future we have to engage ourselves in these details。 But the only thing that is necessary
is to live now； the future is not absolute but ever exposed to accident。 Hence it is only the
necessity of the immediate present which can justify a wrong action； because not to do the action
would in turn be to commit an offence； indeed the most wrong of all offences； namely the complete
destruction of the embodiment of freedom。 Beneficium competentiae is relevant here； because
kinship and other close relationships imply the right to demand that no one shall be sacrificed
altogether on the altar of right。
§ 128。
This distress reveals the finitude and therefore the contingency of both right and
welfare of right as the abstract embodiment of freedom without embodying the
particular person； and of welfare as the sphere of the particular will without the
universality of right。 In this way they are established as one…sided and ideal； the
character which in conception they already possessed。 Right has already （see §
106） determined its embodiment as the particular will； and subjectivity； in its
particularity as a comprehensive whole； is itself the embodiment of freedom （see
§ 127）； while as the infinite relation of the will to itself； it is implicitly the
universal element in freedom。 The two moments present in right and subjectivity；
thus integrated and attaining their truth； their identity； though in the first instance
still remaining relative to one another； are （a） the good （as the concrete；
absolutely determinate； universal）； and （b） conscience （as infinite subjectivity
inwardly conscious and inwardly determining its content）。
iii Good & Conscience
§ 129。
The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular
will。 In this unity； abstract right； welfare； the subjectivity of knowing and the
contingency of external fact； have their independent self…subsistence superseded；
though at the same time they are still contained and retained within it in their
essence。 The good is thus freedom realised； the absolute end and aim of the
world。
Addition： Every stage is really the Idea； but the earlier stages contain it only in rather an
abstract form。 Thus for example； even the ego； as personality； is already the Idea； though in its
most abstract shape。 The good； therefore； is the Idea further determined； the unity of the concept
of the will with the particular will。 It is not something abstractly right； but something concrete
whose contents are made up of both right and welfare alike。
§ 130。
In this Idea； welfare has no independent validity as the embodiment of a single
particular will but only as universal welfare and essentially as universal in
principle； i。e。 as according with freedom。 Welfare without right is not a good。
Similarly； right without welfare is not the good； fiat justitia should not be
followed by pereat mundus。 Consequently； since the good must of necessity be
actualised through the particular will and is at the same time its substance； it has
absolute right in contrast with the abstract right of property and the particular
aims of welfare。 If either of these moments becomes distinguished from the good；
it has validity only in so far as it accords with the good and is subordinated to it。
§ 131。
For the subjective will； the good and the good alone