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something which is their own。 ＇b＇ A more determinate content； however； the still
abstract and formal freedom of subjectivity possesses only in its。 natural。
subjective embodiment； i。e。 in needs； inclinations； passions； opinions； fancies； &c。
The satisfaction of these is welfare or happiness； both in general and in its
particular species … the ends of the whole sphere of finitude。
Remark： Here … the standpoint of relation （see § 108）； when the subject is characterised by his
self…difference and so counts as a particular … is the place where the content of the natural will （see
§ 11）。 comes on the scene。 But the will here is not as it is in its immediacy； on the contrary； this
content now belongs to a will reflected into itself and so is elevated to become a universal end； the
end of welfare or happiness； this happens at the level of the thinking which does not yet apprehend
the will in its freedom but reflects on its content as on one natural and given … the level； for
example； of the time of Croesus and Solon。
Addition： Since the specifications of happiness are given； they are not true specifications of
freedom； because freedom is not genuinely free in its own eyes except in the good； i。e。 except
when it is its own end。 Consequently we may raise the question whether a man has the right to set
before himself ends not freely chosen but resting solely on the fact that the subject is a living being。
The fact that man is a living being； however； is not fortuitous； but in conformity with reason； and to
that extent he has a right to make his needs his end。 There is nothing degrading in being alive； and
there is no mode of intelligent being higher than life in which existence would be possible。 It is only
the raising of the given to something self…created which yields the higher orbit of the good； although
this distinction implies no incompatibility between the two levels。
§ 124。
Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual himself （including the
recognition which he receives by way of honour and fame） is also part and parcel
of the achievement of ends of absolute worth； it follows that the demand that
such an end alone shall appear as willed and attained； like the view that； in willing；
objective and subjective ends are mutually exclusive； is an empty dogmatism of
the abstract Understanding。 And this dogmatism is more than empty； it is
pernicious if it passes into the assertion that because subjective satisfaction is
present； as it always is when any task is brought to completion； it is what the
agent intended in essence to secure and that the objective end was in his eyes
only a means to that。 — What the subject is； is the series of his actions。 If ；these
are a series of worthless productions； then the subjectivity of his willing is just as
worthless。 But if the series of his deeds is of a substantive nature； then the same
is true also of the individual's inner will。
Remark： The right of the subject's particularity； his right to be satisfied； or in other words the
right of subjective freedom； is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern
times。 This right in its infinity is given expression in Christianity and it has become the universal
effective principle of a new form of civilisation。 Amongst the primary shapes which this right
assumes are love； romanticism； the quest for the eternal salvation of the individual； &c。； next come
moral convictions and conscience； and； finally； the other forms； some of which come into
prominence in what follows as the principle of civil society and as moments in the constitution of
the state； while others appear in the course of history； particularly the history of art； science； and
philosophy。
Now this principle of particularity is； to be sure； one moment of the antithesis； and in the first place
at least it is just as much identical with the universal as distinct from it。 Abstract reflection；
however； fixes this moment in its distinction from and opposition to the universal and so produces
a view of morality as nothing but a bitter； unending； struggle against self…satisfaction； as the
command： 'Do with abhorrence what duty enjoins。'
It is just this type of ratiocination which adduces that familiar psychological view of history which
understands how to belittle and disparage all great deeds and great men by transforming into the
main intention and operative motive of actions the inclinations and passions which likewise found
their satisfaction from the achievement of something substantive； the fame and honour； &c。；
consequential on such actions； in a word their particular aspect； the aspect which it has decreed in
advance to be something in itself pernicious。 Such ratiocination assures us that； while great actions
and the efficiency which has subsisted through a series of them have produced greatness in the
world and have had as their consequences for the individual agent power； honour； and fame； still
what belongs to the individual is not the greatness itself but what has accrued to him from it； this
purely particular and external result； because this result is a consequence； it is therefore supposed
to have been the agent's end and even his sole end。 Reflection of this sort stops short at the
subjective side of great men； since it itself stands on purely subjective ground； and consequently it
overlooks what is substantive in this emptiness of its own making。 This is the view of those valet
psychologists 'for whom there are no heroes； not because there are no heroes； but because these
psychologists are only valets'。
Addition： In magnis 。。。 voluisse sat est ＇In great things to have willed is enough＇ is right in the
sense that we ought to will something great。 But we must also be able to achieve it； otherwise the
willing is nugatory。 The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green。
§ 125。
The subjective element of the will； with its particular content … welfare； is
reflected into itself and infinite and so stands related to the universal element； to
the principle of the will。 This moment of universality； posited first of all within
this particular content itself； is the welfare of others also； or； specified completely；
though quite emptily； the welfare of all。 The welfare of many other unspecified
particulars is thus also an essential end and right of subjectivity。 But since the
absolutely universal； in distinction from such a particular content； has not so far
been further determined than as 'the right'； it follows that these ends of
particularity； differing as they do from the universal； may be in conformity with it；
but they also may not。
§ 126。
My particularity； however； like that of others； is only a right at all in so far as I
am a free entity。 Therefore it may not make claims for itself in contradiction to
this its substantive basis； and an intention to secure my welfare or that of others
（and it is particularly in this latter case that such an intention is called moral'）
cannot justify an action which is wrong。
Remark： It is