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Remark： The objectivity of the aim achieved thus involves three meanings； or rather it has three
moments present within it at once； it is：
＇a＇ something existing externally and immediately （see § 106）；
＇b＇ adequate to the concept （see § 111）；
＇c＇ universal subjectivity。
The subjectivity which maintains itself in this objectivity consists：
＇a＇ in the fact that the objective aim is mine； so that in it I maintain myself as this individual
（see § 110）；
＇b＇ and ＇c＇； in moments which coincide with the moments ＇b＇ and ＇c＇ above。
At the standpoint of morality； subjectivity and objectivity are distinct from one another； or united
only by their mutual contradiction； it is this fact more particularly which constitutes the finitude of
this sphere or its character as mere appearance （see § 108）； and the development of this
standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their resolutions； resolutions； however；
which within this field can be no more than relative。
Addition： In dealing with formal right； I said ＇see § 38＇ that it contained prohibitions only； that
hence a right action； strictly so called； was purely negative in character in respect of the will of
others。 In morality； on the other hand； my will has a positive character in relation to the Will of
others； i。e。 the universal will is implicitly present within what the subjective will effects。 To effect
something is to produce something or to alter what already exists； and such changes have a
bearing on the will of others。 The concept of morality is the inner relation of the will to itself。 But
here it is not only one will； on the contrary its objectification implies at the same time the
cancellation of the single will； and therefore； in addition； just because the character of
one…sidedness vanishes； the positing of two wills and a positive bearing of each on the other。 So
far as rights are concerned； it makes no difference whether someone else's will may do something
in relation to mine； when I give my will an embodiment in property。 In morality； however； the
welfare of others too is in question； and this positive bearing cannot come on the scene before this
point。
§ 113。
The externalisation of the subjective or moral will is action。 Action implies the
determinate characteristics here indicated： ＇a＇ in its externality it must be known
to me as my action； ＇b＇ it must bear essentially on the concept as an 'ought' ＇see §
131＇； ＇c＇ it must have an essential bearing on the will of others。
Remark： It is not until we come to the externalisation of the moral will that we come to action。
The existence which the will gives to itself in the sphere of formal rights is existence in an
immediate thing and is itself immediate； to start with； it neither has in itself any express bearing on
the concept； which is at that point not yet contrasted with the subjective will and so is not
distinguished from it； nor has it a positive bearing on the will of others； in the sphere of right；
command in its fundamental character is only prohibition （see § 38）。 In contract and wrong； there
is the beginning of a bearing on the will of others； but the correspondence established in contract
between one will and another is grounded in arbitrariness； and the essential bearing which the will
has there on the will of the other is； as a matter of rights； something negative； i。e。 one party retains
his property （the value of it） and allows the other to retain his。 On the other hand； crime in its
aspect as issuing from the subjective will； and the question of the mode of its existence in that will；
come before us now for consideration for the first time。
The content of an action at law （actio）； as something determined by legal enactment； is not
imputable to me。 Consequently； such an action contains only some of the moments of a moral
action proper； and contains them only Incidentally。 The aspect of an action in virtue of which it is
properly moral is therefore distinct from its aspect as legal。
§ 114。
The right of the moral will involves three aspects：
（a） The abstract or formal right of action； the right that the content of the
action as carried out in immediate existence； shall be in principle mine； that
thus the action shall be the Purpose of the subjective will。
（b） The particular aspect of the action is its inner content ＇a＇ as I am aware
of it in its general character； my awareness of this general character
constitutes the worth of the action and the reason I think good to do it … in
short my Intention。 ＇b＇ Its content is my special aim； the aim of my
particular； merely individual； existence； i。e。 Welfare。
（c） This content （as something which is inward and which yet at the same
time is raised to its universality as to absolute objectivity） is the absolute end
of the will； the Good — with the opposition in the sphere of reflection； of
subjective universality； which is now wickedness and now conscience。
Addition： If an action is to be moral； it must in the first place correspond with my purpose；
since the moral will has the right to refuse to recognise in the resulting state of affairs what was not
present inwardly as purpose。 Purpose concerns only the formal principle that the external will shall
be within me as something inward。 On the other hand； in the second moment of the moral sphere；
questions may be asked about the intention behind the action； i。e。 about the relative worth of the
action in relation to me。 The third and last moment is not the relative worth of the action but its
universal worth； the good。
In a moral action； then； there may be a breach first between what is purposed and what is really
effected and achieved； secondly； between what is there externally as a universal will and the
particular inner determination which I give to it。 The third and last point is that the intention should
be in addition the universal content of the action。 The good is the intention raised to be the concept
of the will。
i Purpose & Responsibility
§ 115。
The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of acting consists directly in
this； that its action presupposes an external object with a complex environment。
The deed sets up an alteration in this state of affairs confronting the will； and my
will has responsibility in general for its deed in so far as the abstract predicate
'mine' belongs to the state of affairs so altered。
Remark： An event； a situation which has been produced； is a concrete external actuality which
because of its concreteness has in it an indeterminable multiplicity of factors。 Any and every single
element which appears as the condition； ground； or cause of one such factor； and so has
contributed its share to the event in question； may be looked upon as responsible for the event； or
at least as sharing the responsibility for it。 Hence； in the case of a complex event （e。g。 the French
Revolution） it is open to the abstract Understanding to choose whi