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necessity of the self…contained and self…developed object； and as regards the form there is
discarded the nature of the conception。 In philosophic knowledge the necessity of a； conception is
the main thing； and the process； by which it； as a result； has come into being is the proof and
deduction。 After the content is seen to be necessary independently； the second point is to look
about for that which corresponds to it in existing ideas and modes of speech。 But the way in which
a conception exists in its truth； and the way it presents itself in random ideas not only are but must
be different both in form and structure。 If a notion is not in its content false； the conception can be
shown to be contained in it and to be already there in its essential traits。
A notion may thus be raised to the form of a conception。 But so little is any notion the measure
and criterion of an independently necessary and true conception； that it must accept truth from the
conception； be justified by it； and know itself through it。 If the method of knowing； which proceeds
by formal definition； inference and proof； has more or less disappeared； a worse one has come to
take its place。 This new method maintains that ideas； as； e。g。； the idea of right in all its aspects； are
to be directly apprehended as mere facts of consciousness； and that natural feeling or that
heightened form of it which is known as the inspiration of one's own breast； is the source of right。
This method may be the most convenient of all； but it is also the most unphilosophic。 Other
features of this view； referring not merely to knowledge but directly to action； need not detain us
here。 While the first or formal method went so far as to require in definition the form of the
conception； and in proof the form of a necessity of knowledge； the method of the intuitive
consciousness and feeling takes for its principle the arbitrary contingent consciousness of the
subject。 In this treatise we take for granted the scientific procedure of philosophy； which has been
set forth in the philosophic logic。
§ 3。
Right is positive in general （a） in its form； since it has validity in a state； and this
established authority is the principle for the knowledge of right。 Hence we have
the positive science of right。 （b） On the side of content this right receives a
positive element ＇a＇ through the particular character of a nation； the stage of its
historical development； and the interconnection of all the relations which are
necessitated by nature： ＇b＇ through the necessity that a system of legalised right
must contain the application of the universal conception to objects and cases
whose qualities are given externally。 Such an application is not the speculative
thought or the development of the conception； but a subsumption made by the
understanding： ＇c＇ through the ultimate nature of a decision which has become a
reality。
Remark： Philosophy at least cannot recognise the authority of feeling； inclination and caprice；
when they are set in opposition to positive right and the laws。 It is an accident； external to the
nature of positive right； when force or tyranny becomes an element of it。 It will be shown later （§§
211 … 214）； at what point right must become positive。 The general phases which are there
deduced； are here only mentioned； in order to indicate the limit of philosophic right； and also to
forestall the idea or indeed the demand that by a systematic development of right should be
produced a law…book； such as would be needed by in actual state。 To convert the differences
between right of nature and positive right； or those between philosophic right and positive right；
into open antagonism would be a complete misunderstanding。
Natural right or philosophic right stands to positive right as institutions to pandects。 With regard to
the historical element in positive right； referred to in the paragraph； it may be said that the true
historical view and genuine philosophic standpoint have been presented by Montesquieu。 He
regards legislation and its specific traits not in an isolated and abstract way； but rather as a
dependent element of one totality； connecting it with all the other elements which form the
character of a nation and an epoch。 In this interrelation the various elements receive their meaning
and justification。 The purely historical treatment of the phases of right； as they develop in time； and
a comparison of their results with existing relations of right have their own value； but they are out
of place in a philosophic treatise； except in so far as the development out of historic grounds
coincides with the development out of the conception； and the historical exposition and justification
can be made to cover a justification which is valid in itself and independently。
This distinction is as manifest as it is weighty。 A phase of right may be shown to rest upon and
follow from the circumstances and existing institutions of right； and yet may be absolutely
unreasonable and void of right。 This is the case in Roman law with many aspects of private right；
which were the logical results of its interpretation of paternal power and of marriage。 Further； if the
aspects of right are really right and reasonable； it is one thing to point out what with regard to them
can truly take place through the conception； and quite another thing to portray the manner of their
appearance in history； along with the circumstances； cases； wants and events； which they have
called forth。 Such a demonstration and deduction from nearer or more remote historic causes；
which is the occupation of pragmatic history； is frequently called exposition； or preferably
conception； under the opinion that in such an indication of the historic elements is found all that is
essential to a conception of law and institutions of right。 In point of fact that which is truly essential；
the conception of the matter； has not been so much as mentioned。 So also we are accustomed to
hear of Roman or German conceptions of right； and of conceptions of right as they are laid down
in this or that statute…book； when indeed nothing about conceptions can be found in them； but only
general phases of right； propositions derived from the understanding； general maxims； and laws。
By neglect of the distinction； just alluded to； the true standpoint is obscured and the question of a
valid justification is shifted into a justification based upon circumstances； results are founded on
presuppositions； which in themselves are of little value； and in general the relative is put in place of
the absolute； and external appearance in place of the nature of the thing。 When the historical
vindication substitutes the external origin for the origin from the conception； it unconsciously does
the opposite of what it intends。 Suppose that an institution； originating under definite
circumstances； is shown to be necessary and to answer its purpose； and that it accomplishes all
that is required of it by the historical standpoint。 When such a proof is made to stand for a
justification of the thing itself； it follows that； when the circumstances are removed