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That is true。
And when the recollection is derived from like things； then there is
sure to be another question； which is； whether the likeness of that
which is recollected is in any way defective or not。
Very true； he said。
And shall we proceed a step further； and affirm that there is such a
thing as equality； not of wood with wood； or of stone with stone；
but that； over and above this； there is equality in the abstract？
Shall we affirm this？
Affirm； yes； and swear to it； replied Simmias； with all the
confidence in life。
And do we know the nature of this abstract essence？
To be sure； he said。
And whence did we obtain this knowledge？ Did we not see equalities
of material things； such as pieces of wood and stones； and gather from
them the idea of an equality which is different from them？…you will
admit that？ Or look at the matter again in this way： Do not the same
pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal； and at another
time unequal？
That is certain。
But are real equals ever unequal？ or is the idea of equality ever
inequality？
That surely was never yet known； Socrates。
Then these （so…called） equals are not the same with the idea of
equality？
I should say； clearly not； Socrates。
And yet from these equals； although differing from the idea of
equality； you conceived and attained that idea？
Very true； he said。
Which might be like； or might be unlike them？
Yes。
But that makes no difference； whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another； whether like or unlike； there must surely have been
an act of recollection？
Very true。
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone； or other
material equals？ and what is the impression produced by them？ Are they
equals in the same sense as absolute equality？ or do they fall short
of this in a measure？
Yes； he said； in a very great measure； too。
And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object；
and perceive that the object aims at being some other thing； but falls
short of； and cannot attain to it…he who makes this observation must
have had previous knowledge of that to which； as he says； the other；
although similar； was inferior？
Certainly。
And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality？
Precisely。
Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time
when we first saw the material equals； and reflected that all these
apparent equals aim at this absolute equality； but fall short of it？
That is true。
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been
known； and can only be known； through the medium of sight or touch； or
of some other sense。 And this I would affirm of all such conceptions。
Yes； Socrates； as far as the argument is concerned； one of them is
the same as the other。
And from the senses； then； is derived the knowledge that all
sensible things aim at an idea of equality of which they fall short…is
not that true？
Yes。
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way； we
must have had a knowledge of absolute equality； or we could not have
referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses…for to
that they all aspire； and of that they fall short？
That； Socrates； is certainly to be inferred from the previous
statements。
And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon
as we were born？
Certainly。
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at
some time previous to this？
Yes。
That is to say； before we were born； I suppose？
True。
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born； and were born
having it； then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of
birth not only equal or the greater or the less； but all other
ideas； for we are not speaking only of equality absolute； but of
beauty； goodness； justice； holiness； and all which we stamp with the
name of essence in the dialectical process； when we ask and answer
questions。 Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the
knowledge before birth？
That is true。
But if； after having acquired； we have not forgotten that which we
acquired； then we must always have been born with knowledge； and shall
always continue to know as long as life lasts…for knowing is the
acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting。 Is not
forgetting； Simmias； just the losing of knowledge？
Quite true； Socrates。
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us
at birth； and afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that
which we previously knew； will not that which we call learning be a
process of recovering our knowledge； and may not this be rightly
termed recollection by us？
Very true。
For this is clear； that when we perceived something； either by the
help of sight or hearing； or some other sense； there was no difficulty
in receiving from this a conception of some other thing like or unlike
which had been forgotten and which was associated with this； and
therefore； as I was saying； one of two alternatives follows： either we
had this knowledge at birth； and continued to know through life； or；
after birth； those who are said to learn only remember； and learning
is recollection only。
Yes； that is quite true； Socrates。
And which alternative； Simmias； do you prefer？ Had we the
knowledge at our birth； or did we remember afterwards the things which
we knew previously to our birth？
I cannot decide at the moment。
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or
ought not to be able to give a reason for what he knows。
Certainly； he ought。
But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these
very matters of which we are speaking？
I wish that they could； Socrates； but I greatly fear that
to…morrow at this time there will be no one able to give a reason
worth having。
Then you are not of opinion； Simmias； that all men know these
things？
Certainly not。
Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned
before。
Certainly。
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge？…not since we were
born as men？
Certainly not。
And therefore previously？
Yes。
Then； Simmias； our souls must have existed before they were in the
form of man…without bodies； and must have had intelligence。
Unless indeed you suppose； Socrates； that these notions were given
us at the moment of birth； for this is the only time that remains。
Yes； my friend； but when did we lose them？ for they are not in us
when we are born…that is admitted。 Did we lose them at the moment of
receiving them； or at some