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〃If the animals in front are continually changing and the
direction of the whole herd is constantly altered； this is because
in order to follow a given direction the animals transfer their will
to the animals that have attracted our attention； and to study the
movements of the herd we must watch the movements of all the prominent
animals moving on all sides of the herd。〃 So say the third class of
historians who regard all historical persons； from monarchs to
journalists； as the expression of their age。
The theory of the transference of the will of the people to historic
persons is merely a paraphrase… a restatement of the question in other
words。
What causes historical events？ Power。 What is power？ Power is the
collective will of the people transferred to one person。 Under what
condition is the will of the people delegated to one person？ On
condition that that person expresses the will of the whole people。
That is； power is power： in other words； power is a word the meaning
of which we do not understand。
If the realm of human knowledge were confined to abstract reasoning；
then having subjected to criticism the explanation of 〃power〃 that
juridical science gives us； humanity would conclude that power is
merely a word and has no real existence。 But to understand phenomena
man has； besides abstract reasoning； experience by which he verifies
his reflections。 And experience tells us that power is not merely a
word but an actually existing phenomenon。
Not to speak of the fact that no description of the collective
activity of men can do without the conception of power； the
existence of power is proved both by history and by observing
contemporary events。
Whenever an event occurs a man appears or men appear； by whose
will the event seems to have taken place。 Napoleon III issues a decree
and the French go to Mexico。 The King of Prussia and Bismarck issue
decrees and an army enters Bohemia。 Napoleon I issues a decree and
an army enters Russia。 Alexander I gives a command and the French
submit to the Bourbons。 Experience shows us that whatever event occurs
it is always related to the will of one or of several men who have
decreed it。
The historians； in accord with the old habit of acknowledging divine
intervention in human affairs； want to see the cause of events in
the expression of the will of someone endowed with power； but that
supposition is not confirmed either by reason or by experience。
On the one side reflection shows that the expression of a man's
will… his words… are only part of the general activity expressed in an
event； as for instance in a war or a revolution； and so without
assuming an incomprehensible； supernatural force… a miracle… one
cannot admit that words can be the immediate cause of the movements of
millions of men。 On the other hand； even if we admitted that words
could be the cause of events； history shows that the expression of the
will of historical personages does not in most cases produce any
effect； that is to say； their commands are often not executed； and
sometimes the very opposite of what they order occurs。
Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanity
we cannot regard 〃power〃 as the cause of events。
Power； from the standpoint of experience； is merely the relation
that exists between the expression of someone's will and the execution
of that will by others。
To explain the conditions of that relationship we must first
establish a conception of the expression of will； referring it to
man and not to the Deity。
If the Deity issues a command； expresses His will； as ancient
history tells us； the expression of that will is independent of time
and is not caused by anything； for the Divinity is not controlled by
an event。 But speaking of commands that are the expression of the will
of men acting in time and in relation to one another； to explain the
connection of commands with events we must restore： （1） the
condition of all that takes place： the continuity of movement in
time both of the events and of the person who commands； and （2） the
inevitability of the connection between the person commanding and
those who execute his command。
EP2｜CH6
CHAPTER VI
Only the expression of the will of the Deity； not dependent on time；
can relate to a whole series of events occurring over a period of
years or centuries； and only the Deity； independent of everything； can
by His sole will determine the direction of humanity's movement； but
man acts in time and himself takes part in what occurs。
Reinstating the first condition omitted； that of time； we see that
no command can be executed without some preceding order having been
given rendering the execution of the last command possible。
No command ever appears spontaneously； or itself covers a whole
series of occurrences； but each command follows from another； and
never refers to a whole series of events but always to one moment only
of an event。
When； for instance； we say that Napoleon ordered armies to go to
war； we combine in one simultaneous expression a whole series of
consecutive commands dependent one on another。 Napoleon could not have
commanded an invasion of Russia and never did so。 Today he ordered
such and such papers to be written to Vienna； to Berlin； and to
Petersburg； tomorrow such and such decrees and orders to the army； the
fleet； the commissariat； and so on and so on… millions of commands；
which formed a whole series corresponding to a series of events
which brought the French armies into Russia。
If throughout his reign Napoleon gave commands concerning an
invasion of England and expended on no other undertaking so much
time and effort； and yet during his whole reign never once attempted
to execute that design but undertook an expedition into Russia； with
which country he considered it desirable to be in alliance （a
conviction he repeatedly expressed）… this came about because his
commands did not correspond to the course of events in the first case；
but did so correspond in the latter。
For an order to be certainly executed； it is necessary that a man
should order what can be executed。 But to know what can and what
cannot be executed is impossible； not only in the case of Napoleon's
invasion of Russia in which millions participated； but even in the
simplest event； for in either case millions of obstacles may arise
to prevent its execution。 Every order executed is always one of an
immense number unexecuted。 All the impossible orders inconsistent with
the course of events remain unexecuted。 Only the possible ones get
linked up with a consecutive series of commands corresponding to a
series of events； and are executed。
Our false conception that an event is caused by a command which
precedes it is due to the fact that when the event has taken place and
out of thousands of others those few commands which were consistent
with that event have been executed； we forget about the others that
were not executed because they could not be。 Apart from that； the
chief source of our error in this