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If we consider a man alone； apart from his relation to everything
around him； each action of his seems to us free。 But if we see his
relation to anything around him； if we see his connection with
anything whatever… with a man who speaks to him； a book he reads；
the work on which he is engaged； even with the air he breathes or
the light that falls on the things about him… we see that each of
these circumstances has an influence on him and controls at least some
side of his activity。 And the more we perceive of these influences the
more our conception of his freedom diminishes and the more our
conception of the necessity that weighs on him increases。
The second consideration is the more or less evident time relation
of the man to the world and the clearness of our perception of the
place the man's action occupies in time。 That is the ground which
makes the fall of the first man； resulting in the production of the
human race； appear evidently less free than a man's entry into
marriage today。 It is the reason why the life and activity of people
who lived centuries ago and are connected with me in time cannot
seem to me as free as the life of a contemporary； the consequences
of which are still unknown to me。
The degree of our conception of freedom or inevitability depends
in this respect on the greater or lesser lapse of time between the
performance of the action and our judgment of it。
If I examine an act I performed a moment ago in approximately the
same circumstances as those I am in now； my action appears to me
undoubtedly free。 But if I examine an act performed a month ago；
then being in different circumstances； I cannot help recognizing
that if that act had not been committed much that resulted from it…
good； agreeable； and even essential… would not have taken place。 If
I reflect on an action still more remote； ten years ago or more；
then the consequences of my action are still plainer to me and I
find it hard to imagine what would have happened had that action not
been performed。 The farther I go back in memory； or what is the same
thing the farther I go forward in my judgment； the more doubtful
becomes my belief in the freedom of my action。
In history we find a very similar progress of conviction
concerning the part played by free will in the general affairs of
humanity。 A contemporary event seems to us to be indubitably the doing
of all the known participants； but with a more remote event we already
see its inevitable results which prevent our considering anything else
possible。 And the farther we go back in examining events the less
arbitrary do they appear。
The Austro…Prussian war appears to us undoubtedly the result of
the crafty conduct of Bismarck； and so on。 The Napoleonic wars still
seem to us； though already questionably； to be the outcome of their
heroes' will。 But in the Crusades we already see an event occupying
its definite place in history and without which we cannot imagine
the modern history of Europe； though to the chroniclers of the
Crusades that event appeared as merely due to the will of certain
people。 In regard to the migration of the peoples it does not enter
anyone's head today to suppose that the renovation of the European
world depended on Attila's caprice。 The farther back in history the
object of our observation lies； the more doubtful does the free will
of those concerned in the event become and the more manifest the law
of inevitability。
The third consideration is the degree to which we apprehend that
endless chain of causation inevitably demanded by reason； in which
each phenomenon comprehended； and therefore man's every action； must
have its definite place as a result of what has gone before and as a
cause of what will follow。
The better we are acquainted with the physiological；
psychological； and historical laws deduced by observation and by which
man is controlled； and the more correctly we perceive the
physiological； psychological； and historical causes of the action； and
the simpler the action we are observing and the less complex the
character and mind of the man in question； the more subject to
inevitability and the less free do our actions and those of others
appear。
When we do not at all understand the cause of an action； whether a
crime； a good action； or even one that is simply nonmoral； we
ascribe a greater amount of freedom to it。 In the case of a crime we
most urgently demand the punishment for such an act； in the case of
a virtuous act we rate its merit most highly。 In an indifferent case
we recognize in it more individuality； originality； and
independence。 But if even one of the innumerable causes of the act
is known to us we recognize a certain element of necessity and are
less insistent on punishment for the crime； or the acknowledgment of
the merit of the virtuous act； or the freedom of the apparently
original action。 That a criminal was reared among male factors
mitigates his fault in our eyes。 The self…sacrifice of a father or
mother； or self…sacrifice with the possibility of a reward； is more
comprehensible than gratuitous self…sacrifice； and therefore seems
less deserving of sympathy and less the result of free will。 The
founder of a sect or party； or an inventor； impresses us less when
we know how or by what the way was prepared for his activity。 If we
have a large range of examples； if our observation is constantly
directed to seeking the correlation of cause and effect in people's
actions； their actions appear to us more under compulsion and less
free the more correctly we connect the effects with the causes。 If
we examined simple actions and had a vast number of such actions under
observation； our conception of their inevitability would be still
greater。 The dishonest conduct of the son of a dishonest father； the
misconduct of a woman who had fallen into bad company； a drunkard's
relapse into drunkenness； and so on are actions that seem to us less
free the better we understand their cause。 If the man whose actions we
are considering is on a very low stage of mental development； like a
child； a madman； or a simpleton… then； knowing the causes of the act
and the simplicity of the character and intelligence in question； we
see so large an element of necessity and so little free will that as
soon as we know the cause prompting the action we can foretell the
result。
On these three considerations alone is based the conception of
irresponsibility for crimes and the extenuating circumstances admitted
by all legislative codes。 The responsibility appears greater or less
according to our greater or lesser knowledge of the circumstances in
which the man was placed whose action is being judged； and according
to the greater or lesser interval of time between the commission of
the action and its investigation； and according to the greater or
lesser understanding of the causes that led to the action。
EP2｜CH10
CHAPTER X
Thus our conception of free will and inevitability gradually
diminishes or increases according to the greater or lesser
con