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memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第94章

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 you。  The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is; to give General Sherman material aid; if needed; in his march north; the second; to open a base of supplies for him on the line of his march。  As soon; therefore; as you can determine which of the two points; Wilmington or Newbern; you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior; you will commence the accumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals。  You will get of these as many as you can house and protect; to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy。

I believe General Innis N。 Palmer has received some instructions directly from General Sherman; on the subject of securing supplies for his army。  You can learn what steps he has taken; and be governed in your requisitions accordingly。  A supply of ordnance… stores will also be necessary。

Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments; in the field; with me at City Point。  Communicate with me by every opportunity; and; should you deem it necessary at any time; send a special boat to Fortress Monroe; from which point you can communicate by telegraph。

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required by your own command。

The movements of the enemy may justify you; or even make it your imperative duty; to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior; to aid Sherman。  In such case you will act on your own judgment; without waiting for instructions。  You will report; however; what you propose doing。  The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you。  I would urge; however; if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it; prompt action。  Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February。  This limits your time very materially。

If rolling…stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington; it can be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad…men has already been sent to Beaufort; and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two。  On this point I have informed you by telegraph。

Very respectfully; your obedient servant;

U。 S。 GRANT; Lieutenant…General。


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES CITY POINT; VIRGINIA; March 16; 1865。

Major…General W。 T。 SHERMAN; commanding military Division of the Mississippi。

GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst; is just received。  I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety; but I have felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing。  I knew; or thought I did; that; with the magnificent army with you; you would come out safely somewhere。

To secure certain success; I deemed the capture of Wilmington of the greatest importance。  Butler came near losing that prize to us。 But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders; and I do not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for the country as the capture of Fort Fisher。  Butler may not see it in that light。

Ever since you started on the last campaign; and before; I have been attempting to get something done in the West; both to cooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness thereto accomplish results favorable to us。  Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse; I depleted his army to reinforce Canby; so that he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior。  With all I have said; he has not moved at last advices。  Canby was sending a cavalry force; of about seven thousand; from Vicksburg toward Selma。  I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the same point; and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February as possible。  He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date。 He has not yet started; or had not at last advices。  I ordered him to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina; to be there about the time you would reach Columbia。  He would either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you; or would have succeeded in destroying railroads; supplies; and other material; which you could not reach。  At that time the Richmond papers were full of the accounts of your movements; and gave daily accounts of movements in West North Carolina。  I supposed all the time it was Stoneman。  You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that Stoneman was still in Louisville; Kentucky; and that the troops in North Carolina were Kirk's forces!  In order that Stoneman might get off without delay; I told Thomas that three thousand men would be sufficient for him to take。  In the mean time I had directed Sheridan to get his cavalry ready; and; as soon as the snow in the mountains melted sufficiently; to start for Staunton; and go on and destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal。  Time advanced; until he set the 28th of February for starting。  I informed Thomas; and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg; to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as possible。  Not hearing from Thomas; I telegraphed to him about the 12th; to know if Stoneman was yet off。  He replied not; but that he (Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville; to get him off as soon as possible。

Sheridan has made his raid; and with splendid success; so far as heard。  I am looking for him at 〃White House〃 to…day。  Since about the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited from publishing accounts of army movements。  We are left to our own resources; therefore; for information。  You will see from the papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not; the officer who bears this will tell you all。

Lee has depleted his army but very little recently; and I learn of none going south。  Some regiments may have been detached; but I think no division or brigade。  The determination seems to be to hold Richmond as long as possible。  I have a force sufficient to leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them); and move out with plenty to whip his whole army。  But the roads are entirely impassable。  Until they improve; I shall content myself with watching Lee; and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts to evacuate the place。  I may bring Sheridan overthink I will and break up the Danville and Southaide Railroads。  These are the last avenues left to the enemy。

Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood。  I have stopped all who; under previous orders; would go to him; except those from Illinois。

Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg; and afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky; I have ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap; and to fortify there; and to hold out to the Virginia line; if he can。  He has accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville; and has been ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of the Virginia Hue。  I told him to get ready for a campaign toward Lynchburg; if it became necessary。  He never can make one there or elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else to take his troops and come east or go toward Rome; whichever may be necessary。  I 
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