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ion with Kilpatrick's cavalry； he can better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of Port Royal。 Besides； I would much prefer not to detach from my regular corps any of its veteran divisions； and would even prefer that other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Foster from some other quarter。 My four corps； full of experience and full of ardor； coming to you en masse； equal to sixty thousand fighting men； will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard。 Indeed； with my present command； I had expected； after reducing Savannah； instantly to march to Columbia； South Carolina； thence to Raleigh； and thence to report to you。 But this would consume； it may be； six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah； whereas； by sea； I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the middle of January。
I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in Tennessee。 I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas assured me that he was all ready； and my last dispatch from him of the 12th of November was full of confidence； in which he promised me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence； urging me to go ahead； and give myself no concern about Hood's army in Tennessee。
Why he did not turn on him at Franklin； after checking and discomfiting him； surpasses my understanding。 Indeed； I do not approve of his evacuating Decatur； but think he should have assumed the offensive against Hood from Pulaski； in the direction of Waynesburg。 I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action； but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidence in him。 I still hope he will out…manoeuvre and destroy Hood。
As to matters in the Southeast； I think Hardee； in Savannah； has good artillerists； some five or six thousand good infantry； and； it may be； a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia。 In all our marching through Georgia； he has not forced us to use any thing but a skirmish…line； though at several points he had erected fortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats。 In Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps and overflowed rice…fields； extending from a point on the Savannah River about three miles above the city； around by a branch of the Little Ogeechee； which stream is impassable from its salt…marshes and boggy swamps； crossed only by narrow causeways or common corduroy…roads。
There must be twenty…five thousand citizens； men； women； and children； in Savannah； that must also be fed； and how he is to feed them beyoud a few days I cannot imagine。 I know that his requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled； and we are in possession of the rice…fields and mills； which could alone be of service to him in this neighborhood。 He can draw nothing from South Carolina； save from a small corner down in the southeast； and that by a disused wagon…road。 I could easily get possession of this； but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a detachment； which would be in danger by its isolation from the main army。 Our whole army is in fine condition as to health； and the weather is splendid。 For that reason alone I feel a personal dislike to turning northward。 I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah； but； whether successful or not； shall not delay my execution of your order of the 6th； which will depend alone upon the time it will require to obtain transportation by sea。
I am； with respect； etc。； your obedient servant； W。 T。 SHERMAN； Major…General United States Army。
Having concluded all needful preparations； I rode from my headquarters； on the plank…road； over to General Slocum's headquarters； on the Macon road； and thence dispatched （by flag of truce） into Savannah； by the hands of Colonel Ewing； inspectorgeneral； a demand for the surrender of the place。 The following letters give the result。 General Hardee refused to surrender； and I then resolved to make the attempt to break his line of defense at several places； trusting that some one would succeed。
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OE THE MISSISSIPPI； IN THE FIELD； NEAR SAVANNAH； December 17； 1864。
General WILLIAM J。 HARDEE； commanding Confederate Forces in Savannah。
GENERAL： You have doubtless observed； from your station at Rosedew that sea…going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the Ogeechee to the rear of my army； giving me abundant supplies of all kinds； and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for the reduction of Savannah。 I have already received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city； also； I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied； and I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah； and its dependent forts； and shall wait a reasonable time for your answer； before opening with heavy ordnance。 Should you entertain the proposition； I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison； but should I be forced to resort to assault； or the slower and surer process of starvation； I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures； and shall make little effort to restrain my armyburning to avenge the national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war。 I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaoa； to be used by you for what it is worth。 I have the honor to be your obedient servant；
W。 T。 SHERMAN； Major…General。
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA； GEORGIA AND FLORIDA SAVANNAH； GEORGIA； December 17； 1864
Major…General W。 T。 SHERMAN； commanding Federal Forces near Savannah； Georgia。
GENERAL： I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from you of this date； in which you demand 〃the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts；〃 on the ground that you 〃have received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the city；〃 and for the further reason that you 〃have； for some days； held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied。〃 You add that； should you be 〃forced to resort to assault； or to the slower and surer process of starvation； you will then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures； and will make little effort to restrain your army；〃 etc。； etc。 The position of your forces （a half…mile beyond the outer line for the land… defense of Savannah） is； at the nearest point； at least four miles from the heart of the city。 That and the interior line are both intact。
Your statement that you have； for some days； held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied； is incorrect。 I am in free and constant communication with my department。
Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts is refused。
With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of your letter （of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied with）； I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the military operations intrusted